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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTAION
CREDIBILITY AND OPPORTUNITY: THE LIMITS ON U.S. COERCIVE
STRATEGIES AFTER THE COLD WAR
by
Danijela Felendes
Florida International University, 2021
Miami, Florida
Professor Thomas A. Breslin, Major Professor
In coercive diplomacy, states employ the threat of force to get an opponent to
change its behavior. A common belief is that strong military powers, such as the United
States, make persuasive threats due to their capability to inflict punishment in the case of
noncompliance. However, the record shows that the failure of asymmetric coercion has
been a persistent feature of international crises. This finding inspires the core question of
this dissertation: Why do weak states resist coercive threats from a militarily superior
state, and under what conditions do weak states concede?
This dissertation addresses the question by proposing the Coercive Diplomacy
(CD) Triangle, a model of coercive diplomacy in asymmetric military crisis. At the core
of this model are three conditions: Credible threats, credible assurances, and the
international strategic environment favoring the coercer. This model predicts that in
asymmetric interstate crisis, the target will acquiesce to the coercer’s demands when all
three conditions are present. To test the explanatory power of this model, this dissertation
examines U.S. coercive strategies during the Bosnian War (1992-95) and during the
Kosovo Crisis (1998-99). The dissertation employs a process tracing, structured, focused

vii

comparison, and a modified form of the Boolean truth table to analyze how these three
conditions influence the outcome of coercive diplomacy in three episodes of U.S.
coercion in the Bosnian War and five episodes of U.S. coercion during the Kosovo War.
The evidence shows, as predicted by the CD Triangle, that credible threats,
credible assurances, and the international environment favoring the coercer are present
when coercive diplomacy succeeded. The evidence also shows that coercion in
asymmetric interstate crises often fails even if the threats are credible (“believable”) and
even if the international environment favors the coercer because the coercer
underestimates the target’s “need” for assurances that the coercer’s demands are limited
and true to those stated by the coercer. Consequently, to improve the effectiveness of
coercive diplomacy in asymmetric interstate crises, a coercer should combine threats with
assurances that the target will not be harmed if the target complies with the demands.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

“The general idea of coercive diplomacy is to back one’s demands on an adversary with a
threat of punishment for noncompliance” that the adversary will consider credible and
potent enough to persuade the adversary to comply with demands.1 In the words of
Thomas Schelling, “[T]he power to hurt (…) is the threat of damage, or of more damage
to come, that can make someone yield or comply.”2
It would be logical to assume that strong military powers, such as the United
States, would make persuasive threats due to their capability to inflict punishment (their
“power to hurt”) in the case of noncompliance. However, the historical record does not
support this conventional wisdom; the record shows that the failure of asymmetric
coercion has been a persistent feature of international crises.3
The failure of coercive diplomacy and military coercion resonates strongly in U.S.
foreign policy.4 Robert Art concluded from a combined set of twenty-two case studies

1

See Alexander George, “Coercive Diplomacy,” in The Use of Force: Military Power
and International Politics, 8th ed. Robert Art and Kelly M. Greenhill (Lanham: Rowman
& Littlefield Publishers, 2015), 72.
2

Ibid., 6.

3

For example, the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC) and Athens’ attempt to
unsuccessfully intimidate the tiny island of Melos to surrender its neutrality; Russian
coercion of Turkey which led to the Crimean War; American “Gunboat Diplomacy.” See
Todd S. Sechser, “Goliath’s Curse: Coercive Threats and Asymmetric Power,”
International Organization 64, no.4 (Fall 2010), 628. Also, Paul Gordon Lauren, A.
Craig, and Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Challenges of Our
Time, 4th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 203.
4

In asymmetric interstate conflict, the distribution of power favors the coercer, where the
coercer (usually a great power) can threaten the survival of the target (usually a weak

1

that U.S. coercive campaigns, since the late 1930s, have succeeded roughly 30 percent of
the time.5 Dianne Chamberlain concluded that during the Cold War (1947-1989) the
United States issued compellent threats in eleven of forty-nine crises and the success rate
was roughly 55 percent. Regarding the post-Cold War period (1989-2007), Chamberlain
concluded that the United States issued compellent threats in eight of fourteen crises and
the success rate was 25 percent.6 Phil Haun concluded that the United States failed to
coerce the opponents in five out of twelve coercion cases that took place in the post-Cold
War era (1989-2011).7 Robert Jervis confirmed that in the post-Cold War era the United
States issued compellent threats which failed to convince a succession of weak
adversaries, including Serbia in 1999, to change their behavior leading the United States
to take on military action.8

state), but the target cannot threaten the survival of the coercer. See, for example, Phil
Haun, Coercion, Survival, and War: Why Weak States Resist the United States (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2015), 20.
5

See Robert Art, “Coercive Diplomacy: What Do We Know?” in The United States and
Coercive Diplomacy, edited by Robert J. Art and Patrick M Cronin (Washington, D.C.:
United States Institute of Peace, 2003), 387.
6

See Dianne P. Chamberlain, Cheap Threats: Why the United States Struggles to
Coercer Weaker States (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2016), 59-70.
Chamberlain used the data and case histories from the International Crisis Behavior
(ICB) Project as a starting point for her data set on U.S. compellent military threats in
crises from 1945 to 2007.
7

See Haun, Coercion, Survival, and War, 5-6. Haun used International Development and
Conflict Management’s International Crisis Behavior (lISB) database and Kenneth
Schultz and Jeffrey Lewis’s Coercive Diplomacy Database to evaluate U.S. success rate
in coercing military weaker opponents. Haun also argues that in roughly 18 percent of
case coercion is coded as failure.
8

See Robert Jervis, “Getting to Yes with Iran: The Challenges of Coercive Diplomacy,”
Foreign Affairs 92, no.1 (January/February 2013), 105-115.

2

1.1 The Puzzle, the Research Questions, and the Main Argument
Taking into consideration that after the Cold War, U.S. military, economic, and political
preponderance was without any serious competitor, it is puzzling that the United States
has had difficulties in coercing militarily weak opponents, who often rejected coercive
threats and refused to comply with the U.S. demands.9 Therefore, the key goal of this
dissertation is to answer the following questions: Why do weak states resist coercive
threats from a militarily superior state, and under what conditions do weak states
concede?
The core of the argument presented in this dissertation is two-fold: First, building
on the work of Thomas Schelling and Alexander George, this dissertation argues that
three conditions minimally sufficient and necessary for the success of coercive diplomacy
applied in the asymmetric interstate crises are: Credible threats, credible assurances, and
the international strategic environment favoring the coercer.10 The three conditions
comprise the Coercive Diplomacy (CD) Triangle, a model for coercive diplomacy in
asymmetric interstate crises. Second, this dissertation argues that coercion in asymmetric
interstate crises often fails even if the threats are credible (“believable”) and even if the
international environment favors the coercer because the coercer underestimates the

9

The focus is on the past instances where the United States used its military force in the
conduct of statecraft as a means to communicate U.S preferences to the adversary, not as
a use of brute force to impose its will on the adversary.
10

The distribution of power in asymmetric crises favors the coercer, where the coercer, a
great power, can threaten the survival of the target, a weak state, but the target, a weak
state cannot threaten survival of the coercer, a great power. See Haun, Coercion,
Survival, and War, 12.

3

target’s “need” for assurances that the coercer’s demands are limited and true to those
stated by the coercer.11
Why does this matter? First, failed coercive diplomacy (use of military threats),
usually leads to military coercion (use of limited military force) and war (use of brute
force). Therefore, one can argue that explaining why coercive diplomacy fails is
important for scholars seeking to understand the causes of war and the conditions for
peace.
Second, the current literature on coercion in international relations undertheorizes
the importance of differentiating between the strategy of using military threats only (in
this dissertation defined as coercive diplomacy) and the strategy of using limited force (in
this dissertation defined as military coercion) to obtain compliance from the target. By
differentiating between the two strategies, this dissertation explains under what
conditions the target decides to resist the coercer’s demands, despite that the coercer
demonstrating the will and capability to escalate coercion, that is, despite the threats
being perceived as credible by the target.
Lastly, this dissertation aims to make contributions to understanding U.S. foreign
policy. Using the CD Triangle to analyze the cases where the Unites States was directly
involved in coercing the weak targets should enhance understanding not only why the
targets resist acquiescing to the demands, but also why the coercer escalates the crisis by
elevating coercion from the use of military threats to the use of limited force. Identifying

11

Phill Haun defines an asymmetric interstate conflict as one where a conflict arises
between a powerful challenger and a weaker target over an issue controlled by the target.
See Haun, Coercion, Survival and War, 21.

4

a condition missing from the coercive strategy should be helpful to policymakers when
making the decision to escalate coercion. For example, the coercer’s response to the
target’s “need” for assurances (tied to target’s expectations and “anxiety” of further
demands) can be solved with diplomatic engagement and not with military escalation.
Therefore, the CD Triangle, could be helpful to policymakers when employing coercive
strategies and tools.12
The remainder of the Introduction is divided into three sections: Section 1.2
provides a definition of coercive diplomacy and summarizes the existing explanations for
the success and failure of coercive diplomacy. Section 1.3 gives the summary of the CD
Triangle, a model of coercive diplomacy in asymmetric military crisis. Section 1.4
discusses the research design. Section 1.5 gives an overview of the rest of the
dissertation.

1.2 Coercive Diplomacy: A Conceptual Definition and the Conditions for Success
As stated before, coercive diplomacy has been often employed in international crises.
However, there is a general consensus among scholars of international security studies,
and coercive theorists in particular, that coercive diplomacy is hard; a coercer has a

12

The starting point is that the policymakers who use this threat-based strategy use it
with the purpose of avoiding war, not as a pretext for war. In addition, this notion of
‘winning without fighting’ (generalized as to ‘stop and/or reverse’ acts of military
aggression with no use of force) is especially attractive from a crisis management
perspective. In addition to coercion, accommodation is another important element of
crisis management, but with different constraints and goals.

5

difficult task to simultaneously balance frightening and reassuring a target.13 The coercer
also has to influence the behavior of another actor in the international system (mostly
another state/s or a nonstate actor/s usually affiliated with a state).14 Since one of the
main characteristics of the Westphalian international system is that each state has
sovereignty over its territory and its domestic affairs, some would point out that
sovereignty gives an additional burden to the success of coercive diplomacy, especially
when employed in intrastate crises.15 Therefore, some scholars argue that coercive
diplomacy is so hard that there is “no recipe for success,” or it is so hard that it should not
be attempted.16 On the other hand, one can argue that the reason why coercive diplomacy

13

See, for example, “Pushing the Limits of Military Coercion Theory” International
Studies Perspectives 12 (2011), 153–170; Robert Art, “Coercive Diplomacy: What Do
We Know?,” 361-371.
14

Where war (use of brute force) removes a choice that the target state has, the goal of
coercion should be to shape the target’s choice according to the coercer’s preferences.
15

As Kenneth Waltz points out, “To say that a state is sovereign means that it decides for
itself how it will cope with its internal and external problems (…).” See Kenneth Waltz,
Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979), 96. Arguably, the
post-Cold War era can also be called the post-Westphalian international system where
‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) gives the United Nations (UN) members rights and
responsibility to intervene if the member state does not meet its obligation to protect its
population.
16

For example, Alexander George and William E. Simons, eds. The Limits of Coercive
Diplomacy, 2nd ed (Boulder: Westview, 1994); Peter Vigo Jakobsen, Western Use of
Coercive Diplomacy After the Cold War: A Challenge for Theory and Practice (London:
MacMillan Press Ltd, 1998); Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, The Dynamics of
Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2002); Rob de Wijk, “The Limits of Military Power,” The
Washington Quarterly 25, no.1 (2002); Robert Art, “Coercive Diplomacy: What Do We
Know?” in The United States and Coercive Diplomacy, edited by Robert J. Art and
Patrick M Cronin (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2003); Todd S.
Sechser, “Militarized Compellent Threats, 1918-2001.” Conflict Management and Peace
Science 28, no. 4 (2011).

6

is hard, and why there has not been formulated a systemic general theory for successful
coercive diplomacy or successful compellence, is due to the lack of consensus among
scholars when it comes to conceptual and operational definition of the main concepts.

1.2.1 Coercion, Deterrence, and Compellence
There is an agreement among scholars that the term deterrence is characterized by the use
of military threats to dissuade the target from changing the status quo.17 However,
scholars disagree on how to define the term when military threats and/or limited force is
used to persuade the target to change the status quo and stop doing or undo something
that is considered by the coercer as unacceptable and harmful. There are four approaches
to this dilemma: First, some scholars who follow in Thomas Schelling’s footsteps use the
term compellence, which includes both blackmail (to initiate target action; an offensive
strategy in its nature) and reactive coercive diplomacy (to stop/undo action which was
undertaken by the target). Second, some scholars, who follow in Alexander George’s
footsteps, narrow the term to reactive coercive diplomacy (responding to the unacceptable
actions of the target; defensive strategy in its nature). Third, some scholars use the term
military coercion, which encompasses both coercive diplomacy and compellence.18

17

See, for example, Schelling, Arms and Influence, 70-73; Samuel W. Lewis, forward to
Forceful Persuasion, by Alexander L George (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute
of Peace, 1991), x.
18

See, for example, Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War
(New York: Cornell University, 1996); Byman and Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion
(2002); Jakobsen, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy (1998); Peter Vigo Jakobsen,
“Pushing the Limits of Military Coercion Theory,” International Studies Perspectives 12
(2011).

7

Lastly, some scholars use the term strategic coercion, which encompasses both
deterrence and compellence/coercive diplomacy, that is use of threats in general.19 The
term coercion is sometimes used interchangeably with compellence.20 However, as
argued by Schelling, coercion and compellence should not be treated as the same term,
since the term coercion encompasses both compellence and deterrence.21
In addition to disagreeing how to define compellence and coercion, one has to
mention that scholars also disagree on how limited or exemplary use of force should be
defined.

1.2.2 Military Threat and Limited Use of Military Force
Alexander George defines coercive diplomacy as the use of threats and limited/exemplary
force to make an adversary halt a course of action it has embarked on or reverse an action
that was done already.22 According to George, coercive diplomacy is termed a success
(threats are considered credible and successful) if the target concedes to the demands of
the coercer without the use of force as the main tool.23 On the other hand, coercive
diplomacy is termed a failure if the coercion leads to a full-fledged war or if the coercer

19

Most notably Lawrence Freedman ed., Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
20

See, for example, Pape, Bombing to Win.

21

See Schelling, Arms and Influence, 71.

22

See Alexander L. George, Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative
to War (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991).
23

The limited/exemplary use of force is permitted.

8

backs down without the demands being fulfilled. However, George never fully defined
the term ‘limited/exemplary’ use of force. According to George ‘limited/exemplary’ use
of force meant “the use of just enough force” to give credibility to the threat.24 Some
scholars, such as Robert Art accepted the term and the use of limited force as a part of
coercive diplomacy.25 Other scholars, such as Jakobsen have made air and sea power part
of a coercive strategy, since it leaves the choice to the target to comply with the coercer’s
demands.26

1.2.3 The Conditions for Success
In addition to a disagreement among the scholars about how to define coercive diplomacy
there is a disagreement regarding what conditions have to be present for coercive
diplomacy to succeed. According to Schelling there are five necessary conditions for
successful compellence: Threats must be potent; threats must be credible; clearly defined
deadline for compliance; definite demands; and the conflict should not be perceived as a
zero-sum game.27 Alexander George expanded Schelling’s abstract framework by

24

See Alexander L. George, Forceful Persuasion, 5. Also, Peter Viggo Jakobsen,
referencing George’s definition of limited force, wrote “The problem is that it is next to
impossible to operationalize ‘just enough [force]’… It can only be known after the fact.”
See, Jakobsen, “Pushing the Limits of Military Coercion,” 162.
25

See Robert Art, “Introduction,” in The United States and Coercive Diplomacy, edited
by Robert J. Art and Patrick M Cronin (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of
Peace, 2003), 6.
26

See Jakobsen, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War, 16. Also, see
for example, Haun, Coercion, Survival, and War, 18.
27

Schelling, Arms and Influence, 3-4, 69-76, 89, as quoted in Jakobsen, “Pushing the
Limits of Military Coercion,” 156.

9

identifying five contextual factors (global strategic environment; type of provocation;
image of war; unilateral or coalitional coercive diplomacy; and isolation of the
adversary) and nine conditions (clarity of the objective; strong motivation; asymmetry of
motivation; sense of urgency; strong leadership; unacceptability of threatened escalation;
clarity and the precise terms of settlement of the crisis; adequate domestic support; and
adequate international support) necessary for successful coercive diplomacy.28
Scholars following in the footsteps of George and Schelling have been exploring
the conditions necessary for success offering possible explanations why coercive
diplomacy fails or why it succeeds. However, there is no agreement among international
relations scholars on the theoretical mechanism, as well as a strategy, that makes coercive
diplomacy effective.

1.3 Coercive Diplomacy, Military Coercion, and the Coercive Diplomacy (CD)
Triangle
This dissertation distinguishes between coercive diplomacy (use of threats only) and
military coercion (use of limited force). To define limited force, this dissertation employs
Jakobsen’s approach, which makes air and sea power part of a coercive strategy.
However, the coercer has to leave the choice to the target to comply with its demands.29

28

See George and Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 270, 271-274, 279.

29

See Jakobsen, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War, 16.

10

This dissertation defines the term coercive diplomacy to be when the coercer
threatens to use military force to obtain the compliance from the target.30 The threat of
force can only involve a verbal warning, swaggering, or mobilization, but not actual use
of force.31 Coercive diplomacy succeeds when the target acquiesces to coercer’s demands
without use of force. Coercive diplomacy fails if, after the coercer communicated threats
and demands, the target: (1) Resists acquiescing to the demands; (2) the coercer escalates
the crisis and uses limited or brute force; or (3) the coercer accommodates the target and
abandons the coercive strategy.
This dissertation defines the term military coercion to be when the coercer
employs limited force to persuade the target to change its behavior. Military coercion
succeeds when the target acquiesces to coercer’s demands after coercer used limited force
(short of full-scale war) to coerce the target. Military coercion fails if the target: (1) Does
not acquiesce to coercer’s demands after the coercer used limited force; (2) the coercer
escalates the crisis and uses brute force; or (3) the coercer accommodates the target and
abandons the coercive strategy.
The CD Triangle, a model of coercive diplomacy in an asymmetric military crisis,
predicts that if the following three conditions are present, it is most likely that the
target/weak state will acquiesce to the demands of the coercer/great power: Credible
threats, credible assurances, and the international strategic environment favoring
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As Schelling points out, “successful threats are those that do not have to be carried
out.” See Schelling, Arms and Influence, 10.
31

As Art argues, swaggering (that is, showing off military power through military
exercise) potentially has coercive power. See Robert J. Art, “To What Ends Military
Power,” International Security 4 (Spring 1980), 10.
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coercer. Where credible threats are crucial to convince the target that the coercer has the
capability and will to inflict pain, credible assurances are necessary to convince the target
that the demands and objectives are limited to those stated by the coercer. Moreover, a
key component of credible assurances is trust. This dissertation argues that the trust
perceived by the target that the coercer will not expand its demands shapes the target’s
behavior in a predictable way; that is, it will influence the target’s cost-benefit equation
in a predictable way: The target will acquiesce to coercer’s demands if the target trusts
the coercer that the coercer will not change the cost-benefits equation, where expanded
demands mean increased cost for the target. If the target does not trust that the coercer’s
assurances are true, the target will resist acquiescing to the coercer’s demands and the
target will look for regional or global spoiler/s to balance the coercer’s threat. The
spoilers are those states that may perceive the failure of coercion (that is, escalation of
crisis to war) to be as beneficial to their regional or international standing.
To test the explanatory power of the CD Triangle, this dissertation analyzes U.S.
coercive strategies in two case studies: the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Crisis.

1.4 Research Design
This section is divided into four parts: The first part gives an overview of the criteria for
the selection of cases. The second part outlines the methods employed to identify and
analyze the influence of credible threats, credible assurances, and the international
strategic environment on the success of coercive diplomacy and military coercion. The
third part presents an overview of the sources on which the case studies are based.
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1.4.1 Case Selection
The cases selected for the empirical analysis are the Bosnian War (1992-1995) and the
Kosovo Crisis (1998-1999). The two selected cases are instances of the same class of
events, that is, they share an effort by the United States (unilaterally or as a part of a
coalition, but always in the leading role) to employ the coercive strategies after the end of
the Cold War against weaker states. In addition, the two cases are important because the
Bosnian War is generally coded as a success, while the Kosovo Crisis case is generally
coded as a failure.32 It is significant that despite the asymmetry of military capability
favoring the United States and the explicit military threats, Serbia, led by Slobodan
Milosevic, did not acquiesce to the United States’ demand to sign and implement the
Rambouillet agreement.33 As a result, the United States escalated coercion from use of
military threats to use of limited force; that is, the U.S.-led NATO Operation Allied Force
(OAF) began on March 24, 1999.
Two important limitations are: First, the cases are not varied geographically, and
all involved states, although the non-state actors also played an important role. Second,
this dissertation has a two-case research design (small-n). While some scholars doubt the

32

See, for example, Jakobsen, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War;
Kenneth A. Schultz, Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001); Bayman and Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion; Steven L.
Burg, “Coercive Diplomacy in the Balkans: The Use of Force in Bosnia and Kosovo” in
The United States and Coercive Diplomacy, ed. Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin
(Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2003), 57–118.
33

See UN Peacemaker, “Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo
(Rambouillet Accords).”
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utility of small-n observation case studies, other have found them valuable depending on
the nature of the selected case.34 In addition, the two cases are broken down into three
coercing episodes during the Bosnian War and five coercing episodes during the Kosovo
Crisis. This has allowed more tests of the hypothesized framework with a greater variety
of data.

1.4.2 Research Methods
The dissertation employs a process tracing, structured, focused comparison, and a
modified form of the Boolean truth table to evaluate the explanatory power of Coercive
Diplomacy (CD) Triangle; more precisely, to analyze how credible threats, credible
assurances, and international strategic environment influence the outcome of coercive
diplomacy and military coercion if attempted in asymmetric interstate conflict.
This dissertation employs the process tracing method to analyze the evidence on
processes, sequences, and conjunctures of events in the episodes of coercion in each case
study.35 The advantage of process tracing over statistical analysis is that process tracing
helps gather a wide range of evidence, especially transcript evidence, that is, what the

34

George and Bennet argue that “several kinds of no-variance research designs can be
useful in theory development and testing using multiple observations from a single case.
These include the deviant, crucial, most-likely, and least-likely research designs, as well
as single-case study tests of claims of necessity and sufficiency.” See Alexander L.
George and Andrew Bennett, Case study and Theory Development in the Social Science
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), 32-33.
35

See Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Process Tracing: From Philosophical
Roots to Best Practices” in Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytical Tool, edited
by Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2014). See 33. See also Collier David Collier, “Understanding Process Tracing,” Political
Science and Politics, Vol. 44, No. 4 (October 2011), 823-830.
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actors (decision-makers) in the particular episodes of coercion, and those around them,
actually said and/or wrote.36 Transcript evidence is valuable in assessing why the targets
refused to acquiesce and why the coercers escalated their coercive strategy (from
coercive diplomacy to military coercion). Furthermore, process tracing is a valuable tool
in uncovering causal mechanisms that might casusally explain the case, with the purpose
of either developing or testing hypotheses about causal mechanisms.
For the cross-case/cross-episode comparison, this dissertation employs the
method of structured, focused comparison combined with the modified Boolean truth
table.37 By employing the structured, focused comparison this dissertation focuses on the
particular indicators to determine the presence or absence of three conditions postulated
by the CD Triangle model as minimally sufficient for the success of coercive diplomacy:
Credible threats, credible assurances, and the international environment favoring the
coercer. To assess presence or absence of credible threats (ex-ante) the dissertation
focuses on the following indicators: (1) Did the coercer fail to respond to the challenges
made by past targets in similar situations? (2) Did the coercer explicitly communicate its
interest/s in a particular episode of coercion? (3) Did the coercer demonstrate its

36

Peter Lorentzen, M. Talor Fravel, and Jack Pine, “Qualitative Investigation of
Theoretical Models: The Value of Process Tracing,” Journal of Theoretical Politics 25
(September 2016), 13-14.
37

I follow the George and Bennett’s definition of structured, focused comparison, “the
method is “structured” in that the researcher writes general questions that reflect the
researcher objective [and they are asked] of each case under study to guide and
standardized data collection.” The method is “focused” in that “it deals only with certain
aspects of the (…) case examined.” See Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett. Case
Study and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), 67.
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readiness to employ military force (by, for example, mobilizing troops or conducting a
military exercise)?
To assess the presence of credible assurances this dissertation focuses on the
following indicators: (1) Did the target explicitly manifest its distrust of the coercer? (2)
Did the target perceive the coercer as trustworthy? (3) Did the coercer clearly
communicate its assurances?
To assess if the international strategic environment favors the coercer this
dissertation focuses on the following indicators: (1) Did any of the great powers extend
public and/or military support to the target? (2) Did the coercer engage diplomatically
with the potential spoiler? (3) Was the target a member of a military alliance or did the
target sign a military treaty with any of the great powers?
The modified Boolean truth table is used to explore and present similarities and
differences across comparative cases/episodes and make generalizations.38 The steps
taken to construct the Boolean truth tables are: First, the hypotheses are described in
terms of a set of conditions (independent variables) and outcomes (dependent
variables).39 Second, the qualitative data are transformed into truth tables; where each

38

Stuart Mill’s system of logic is usually used in conventional cooperative methods; in
particular Mill’s ‘direct method of agreement’ and ‘indirect method of differences’. In
Mill’s method of agreement the researcher attempts to determine which of the possible
causal variables is constant across all instances, where Mill’s method of differences
involve a search for patterns of invariance. However, one of the main problems with this
method is its inability to deal with multiple causations. See A. Georges L. Romme,
“Boolean comparative analysis of qualitative data: A methodological note” Quality &
Quantitative 29 (1995), 322.
39

See, for example, Romme, “Boolean comparative analysis of qualitative data,” 322324; Charles C. Ragin, The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative
Quantitative Strategy (Okland: University of California Press, 2014), 106-108

16

condition (independent variable) can have two logical states: 1 (presence/true) and 0
(absence/false). In this dissertation, the conditions (independent variables) are credible
threats (CT), credible assurances (CA), and the international strategic environment (ISE).
The outcomes (dependent variables) are coercive diplomacy (CD) and military coercion
(MC); each outcome (dependent variable) can have two logical states: 1 (presence/true)
and 0 (absence/false). Lastly, the results obtained in the truth table are compared with the
initial hypotheses in each empirical chapter as well as the concluding chapter of this
dissertation.

1.4.3 Sources
This dissertation relies on primary and secondary sources. For both the Bosnian
War and the Kosovo Crisis there is a rich body of primary sources available through the
Clinton Digital Library containing declassified documents regarding the top-level
decision making from the William J. Clinton presidency, 1993-2001. Especially valuable
were three groups of documents: First, declassified documents concerning Russian
President Boris Yeltsin, more precisely, the transcript of telephone conversations between
President Clinton and President Yeltsin. Second, declassified documents concerning the
National Security Council (NSC). Third, the declassified documents concerning Bosnia
and Yugoslavia. Furthermore, documented testimonies and reports from the trial of
Slobodan Milosevic and other top-level Serbian and Bosnian decision-makers accessed
through the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
database were valuable in analyzing the top-level decision making in FR Yugoslavia,
Republika Srpska, and Serbia.

17

This dissertation also draws on memoirs, speeches, and interviews with topofficials from the United States, Russia, Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo, Serbia and other
countries published during and after the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Crisis. Most
notably are the University of Virginia Miller Center’s Presidential History Project (an
archive of 134 interviews with senior members of the Clinton administration, political
advisors and the foreign leaders with whom President Clinton had a close working
relationship) and the Association for Diplomatic Studies & Training (ADST) Oral History
Collection (an archive which includes the interviews with American diplomats directly
involved in negotiations with President Slobodan Milosevic during the Bosnian War and
Kosovo Crisis). This dissertation also makes use of Serbian, Bosnian, U.S., and global
media coverage of the Bosnian War and the Kosovo Crisis.

1.5 Outline of the Dissertation
The rest of the dissertation proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the literature on
coercive diplomacy and compellence in international relations as well as the most
prominent theoretical attempts to explain and predict coercion’s success and failure. After
the literature review, Chapter 2 identifies the model explaining how credible threats,
credible assurances, and the international strategic environment influence success or
failure of coercive diplomacy in asymmetric interstate crises.
The proposed model is applied in two case studies. Chapter 3 examines four
phases of the United States involvement in the Bosnian War and tests the proposed model
on three episodes of coercion. In one episode the United States used coercive diplomacy
and failed to coerce the Bosnian Serbs to end the siege of Sarajevo. In two episodes of
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military coercion, the United States succeeded once. The CD Triangle correctly predicted
that the target would acquiesce to the demands when all three conditions postulated were
present. Chapter 4 examines four phases of U.S. involvement in the Kosovo Crisis and
tests the proposed framework on five episodes of coercion. In two episodes, the United
States used coercive diplomacy and succeeded once. In three episodes the United States
used military coercion and succeeded once. The CD Triangle correctly predicted that the
target would acquiesce to the demands when all three postulated conditions are present.
However, this chapter shows that the deficit of trust between a coercer and a target can be
balanced by a third “trustworthy” actor.
Chapter 5 summarizes the principal findings of the study and discusses the
implications for theory building and practice/policy making. This chapter also briefly
explores possible avenues for future research.
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CHAPTER II: COERCIVE DIPLOMACY: THEORETICAL SHORTCOMINGS AND
THE COERCIVE DIPLOMACY (CD) TRIANGLE

The structure of this chapter is as follows: The first part of this chapter conducts a
literature review and briefly discusses theoretical shortcomings important to this
dissertation. The second part discusses the Coercive Diplomacy (CD) Triangle as a
proposed explanation for the success and failure of coercive diplomacy in asymmetric
interstate crises. The third part provides a road map for the remaining chapters of this
dissertation.

2.1 Coercive Diplomacy Versus Compellence
Two scholars who set the path for the theory, as well as strategy, of coercive diplomacy
are Thomas Schelling and Alexander George. Schelling asserted that coercion includes
deterrence (efforts to discourage through fear to take action) and compellence (efforts to
actively change an existing situation; to force into action).40 Schelling’s compellence
includes blackmail and coercive diplomacy (see Figure 1). Where blackmail includes
threats that are aimed to initiate some action (that is, a proactive use of threats), the main
purpose of coercive diplomacy is to undo or to stop a certain action (that is, a reactive use
of threats). On the other hand, the main purpose of deterrence is to prevent an action by

40

See Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence, (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University
Press,1966), 69. Also, Freedman argues that deterrence is the defensive equivalent of
coercion, that is, persuading an enemy not to attack. Freedman also argues that
compellence is the offensive equivalent of coercion, which includes withdrawal or
acquiescence. See Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2013), 163.
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the target. Compellence also involves timing in a way that deterrence commonly does
not; that is, compellence must have a defined deadline for compliance.41

Figure 1. Coercion: Terminological Overview42

Alexander George defined coercive diplomacy as “coercive threats employed to
persuade an opponent to stop or reverse an action.” The focus in coercive diplomacy,
according to George, is on reactive threats and involves accommodation and diplomacy,
whereas compellence mostly relies on threats of force.43 George also differentiated

41

As Schelling points out, “If action carries no deadlines it is only a posture, or a
ceremony with no consequences.” Therefore, making a clear deadline is a necessary
component of successful compellence. See Schelling, Arms and Influence, 72.
42

See Jakobsen, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy After the Cold War, 12.

43

Alexander L. George, “Theory and Practice,” in The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy,
2nd ed., edited by Alexander L. George and William E. Simons (Boulder: Westview,
1994b), 7. Also, when stating that compellence mostly relies on the threats of force, one
has to mention that Schelling indicates that “the power to hurt is often communicated by
some performance of it.” Therefore, limited use of force is permissible. See Schelling,
Arms and Influence, 2.
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between the defensive and offensive use of threats. The defensive use of threats has the
main role of stopping or reversing an act already started by the target, for example, an
invasion of a nearby state or violence against its citizens. The offensive use of threats
aims at provoking a target to do something that, if not provoked, the target would not do;
for example, giving up power. George called the offensive use of threats blackmail and
regards it as illegitimate (see Figure 1).44
The differentiation between the offensive and defensive use of force has been
criticized, most notably, by Lawrence Freedman, Robert Art, and Peter Viggor Jakobsen.
Freedman argues that limiting coercive diplomacy to use of defensive threats is not
practical and is not useful analytically, since in some instances it may be hard to
distinguish between the offensive and defensive use of threats.45 Robert Art argues that
the coercers and the targets may see themselves as acting defensively; the coercers may
perceive their use of threats as defensive and, on the other hand, the target may perceive
the coercer’s use of threats as unjust and offensive.46 Jakobsen points out that whether
coercive diplomacy is justified cannot be determined by generally defining threats as
offensive or defensive, since threats to change the status quo cannot be generalized as

44

See George, “Coercive Diplomacy,” 7; Jakobsen, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy,
13.
45

See Lawrence Freedman, “Strategic Coercion,” in Strategic Coercion: Concepts and
Cases, edited by Lawrence Freedman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 18.
46

See Robert Art, “Introduction” in The United States and Coercive Diplomacy, edited
by Robert J. Art and Patrick M Cronin (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of
Peace, 2003), 6.
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offensive and, therefore, generalized as illicit.47 Since George’s distinction between the
defensive and offensive use of force is hard to operationalize, many scholars, including
Freedman, Art, and Jakobsen, have accepted Schelling’s assumption that coercive
diplomacy can include defensive and offensive use of threats. This dissertation also
follows Schelling’s assumption.

2.2 Threat of Force Versus Limited Use of Force
Alexander George defines coercive diplomacy as the use of threats and limited/exemplary
force to make an adversary halt a course of action it has embarked on or reverse an action
that has been done already.48 According to George, coercive diplomacy is termed a
success (threats are considered credible and successful) if the target concedes to the
demands of the coercer without the use of force as the main tool.49 On the other hand,
coercive diplomacy is termed a failure if the coercion leads to a full-fledged war or if the
coercer backs down without the demands being fulfilled. However, George never fully
defined the term, “limited” use of force. According to George limited/exemplary use of
force meant “the use of just enough force (…) to establish the credibility of one’s
determination to use more force if necessary.”50

47

See Jakobsen, “Pushing the Limits of Military Coercion Theory,” International Studies
Perspective 12, no.2 (2011), 162.
48

See Alexander L. George, Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative
to War (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991).
49

The limited/exemplary use of force is permitted.

50

See George, Forceful Persuasion, 5. Jakobsen, referencing George’s definition of
limited force, wrote “The problem is that it is next to impossible to operationalize ‘just
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Although George’s definition of coercive diplomacy is widely accepted among
scholars, there is disagreement how to define “limited” or “exemplary” use of force.
Some scholars, such as Robert Art, accepted the term and the use of limited force as a
part of coercive diplomacy.51 However, Art is not clear what “limited” or
“demonstrative” use of force exactly means when applied in practice.52 Art acknowledges
that defining where exactly the boundary is between limited and full-scale use of force is
crucial for coding a case as a success or failure of coercive diplomacy; however, Art
concludes that, after all, categorizing cases “becomes an exercise in qualitative
judgment.”53 Art, for example, codes NATO air strikes against Serbia/FR Yugoslavia in
1999 as a full-fladged war and the Kosovo Crisis as an example of unsuccessful coercive
diplomacy.54 On the other hand, Bayman and Waxman define the NATO air strikes as
limited use of force and the Kosovo Crisis as an example of successful coercive
diplomacy.55

enough [force]’… It can only be known after the fact.” See Jakobsen, “Pushing the
Limits of Military Coercion,” 162.
51

See Art, “Introduction,” in The United States and Coercive Diplomacy, 7.
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Ibid., 9.
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Ibid., 10.
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Ibid., 18.
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See Daniel Bayman and Matthew Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion: American
Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2002), 101.

24

In his attempt to operationalize the distinction between limited and full-scale
force, Jakobsen differentiates between the objective for which force is used and the
amount of force employed.56 Regarding the objective for which force is used, Jakobsen
argues that signaling what the coercer’s preferences are is considered a use of limited
force. The amount of force should not impose compliance but signal what a prescribed or
preferred behavior is, leaving a choice to the target to comply or not. Jakobsen’s
approach makes air and sea power part of a coercive strategy, since, according to
Jakobsen, it leaves the choice to the target to comply with the coercer’s demands.57 On
the other hand, the use of ground forces, as a part of the strategy, is only permitted if it
does not, for example, include taking control of the entire territory and, therefore,
eliminates the element of choice.58
Although Jakobsen’s distinction between limited and full-scale force is more
precise than any other attempt to define the distinction between the two (including
George’s “just enough force”), some scholars argue that it still does not precisely state
what the distinction is between the limited and full-scale force. For example, Art points
out that air power, due to technological advances, can also be used to escalate the conflict
to what some would define as a limited war.59
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See Jakobsen, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War, 16.
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Ibid., 17.
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War removes the choices, where coercion should retain and shape the choices. Haun
also argues although the threat of ground invasion is coercive, the commencement of a
ground offensive is more appropriate to be classified as a brute force strategy and not a
coercive strategy. See Haun, Coercion, Survival, and War, 18.
59

See Art, “Introduction,” 18.
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Todd Sechser, in his attempt to define what constitutes the limited use of force,
sets the threshold of 100 fatalities on the target side. He argues that “a militarized
compellent threat is defined as an explicit demand by one state (the coercer) to another
state (the target) to alter the status quo in some material way, backed by a threat of
military force if the target does not comply.”60 Sechser argues that outright physical
compulsion is sometimes necessary and he justifies use of limited force as a way to
communicate resolve. 61 However, a limit has to be set on how much force can be used
so the outcomes are not the result of the brute force as opposed to threat of force, that is,
for successful wars not to be classified as a successful use of threats. Therefore, Sechser
argues that the military action should not produce more than 100 fatalities on the target’s
side.
As Jakobsen points out “disagreement over how limited force should be defined
(…) translates into disagreement over how coercion outcomes should be evaluated.”62
Therefore, it is a contributing factor towards unsuccessful formulation of a systemic
general theory of coercive diplomacy success.
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See Todd S. Sechser, “Militarized Compellent Threats, 1918-2001.” Conflict
Management and Peace Science 28, no. 4 (2011), 380.
61

See Todd S. Sechser, “Reputations and Signaling in Coercive Bargaining.” Journal of
Conflict Resolution (June 2016): 327. Also see Fearon James D. Fearon, “Signaling
Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs,” Journal of Conflict
Resolution 41, no. 1, 68-90.
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See Jakobsen, “Pushing the Limits of Military Coercion Theory,” 159.
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2.3 Success Versus Failure
Relying on a cost-benefit model and the assumption of unitary actor rationality, Thomas
Schelling logically deduced five necessary conditions for successful compellence: (1) The
threat conveyed by the coercer must be potent enough to persuade the adversary that noncompliance is too costly; (2) the target must perceive the threat (conveyed by the coercer)
as credible; (3) the target must be given a define time to comply with the demand; (4) the
coercer must assure the target that compliance will not lead to more demands; (5) the
coercer’s intentions must not be perceived as zero-sum game; that is, the coercer and the
target must be persuaded that it can gain more by bargaining than by using brute force.63
One of the main strengths of this framework is its parsimonious character, mainly due to
the small number of the necessary factors for success. However, the main drawbacks of
Schelling’s work on compellence, as Schelling himself concedes, are that his framework
is purely at the theorizing stage, where historical examples were used “as illustration, not
evidence,” and the parsimony and abstractness of this model make it very challenging to
operationalize the variables necessary for success.64
In contrast, Alexander George motivated by the unsuccessful U.S. campaigns to
coerce North Vietnam in the 1960s, opted for an inductive approach.65 George and
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Schelling as cited by Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy after
the Cold War: A Challenge for Theory and Practice (London: MacMillan Press Ltd,
1998), 156.
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See Schelling, Arms and Influence, vii.
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See Alexander L. George, Alexander L., David K. Hall, and William R. Simons, The
Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971); George,
Alexander L. Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War
(Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991); Alexander L. George,
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Simons expanded Schelling’s abstract framework by identifying five contextual factors
and nine conditions necessary for success.66 It is significant that they also included
“carrots” or incentives (not mentioned in Shelling’s model), which should enhance the
probability of coercive diplomacy success.67 The five contextual factors identified by
George and Simons are: (1) Global strategic environment; (2) type of provocation; (3)
image of war; (4) unilateral or coalitional coercive diplomacy; (5) isolation of the
adversary.68 The nine conditions relevant to any situation in which coercive diplomacy
might be contemplated: (1) Clarity of the objective; (2) strong motivation; (3) asymmetry
of motivation; (4) sense of urgency; (5) strong leadership; (6) unacceptability of
threatened escalation; (7) clarity/the precise terms of the settlement of the crisis; (8)
adequate domestic support; (9) and international support.69
Although George and Simons provide much better operationalization of the
necessary conditions for success (compared to Schelling’s model), the drawbacks of their

“Theory and Practice,” in The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 2nd ed., edited by
Alexander L. George and William E. Simons (Boulder: Westview, 1994).
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See Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, “Findings and Conclusions,” in The
Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 2nd ed., edited by Alexander L. George and William E.
Simons (Boulder: Westview, 1994), 271-291.
67

George points out that “carrots” or positive inducements can include variety of things
that are important to the target. For example, from face-saving concession to side
payments. See Alexander L. George, “Theory and Practice,’ in The Limits of Coercive
Diplomacy, 2nd ed., edited by Alexander L. George and William E. Simons (Boulder:
Westview, 1994), 17.
68

See George and Simons, “Findings and Conclusion,” 271-274.
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Ibid., 280-286.
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model are that asymmetry of motivation and urgency of compliance can be measured
only after the crises are over.70 In addition, the large number of variables (14 in total)
create additional problems when applying the proposed model. George and Simons argue
that, while success is more likely if all nine conditions for coercive diplomacy success are
present, not all of these nine conditions are equally important. The four conditions that
are particularly important for influencing the outcome of coercive diplomacy are: (1)
Asymmetry of motivation, where the target perceives that the balance favors the coercer;
(2) the target’s fear of escalation that would produce unacceptable cost; (3) sense of
urgency where the target feels that there is an urgent need to comply; and (4) clarity of
settlement, where the clarity of the coercer’s objectives and demands demonstrate the
coercer’s strength of will.71
George and Simons also put forward a broadly defined and not fully
operationalized argument that on the scale from low (not vital for the survival of the
state) to high (vital for the survival of the state), the higher the demand, the target will be
less willing to comply with this demand.72 Therefore, the nature of the demand will have
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Based on ex-post factors as oppose to ex-ante factors.
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See George and Simons, “Findings and Conclusion,” 287.
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Ibid., 281. Although George and Simons are more precise than Schelling what
constitute demands (that is, more precise than Schelling’s “general directions of
compliance”), they are not precise about what constitutes “vital interests.” Jakobsen
based on the realist assumption that the international system is characterized by
Hobbesian anarchy and the welfare and survival of the states are the highest interests,
develops a hierarchy of interests where interests are ranked according to the importance
interests have for the welfare and protection of the state. The four interests ranked from
high to low importance are: vital interests (the defense of the homeland); strategic
interests (the preservation of the existing balance of power in the international system);
stability interests (preservation of the balance of power in the regional system); and
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a key influence on the asymmetry of motivation; broadly defined, the higher the demand
the target will be more motivated to resist it. However, one has to point out that
Schelling’s model is even more imprecise when it comes to defining the demands,
providing a range of options where threats should communicate “only the general
direction of compliance;” therefore leaving space for further bargaining.73
George also suggests that his proposed model could be more actor-specific, since
the target can be influenced by cultural factors and misperceptions.74 George and Simons,
expanding on George’s proposition, argue that whether the proposed strategy of coercive
diplomacy will succeed relies on “perceptions held by the leaders of the state that is being
subjected to coercive diplomacy,” that is, it “rests heavily on the correctness of the policy
maker’s assessment of the opponent’s perceptions and strategic reasoning.”75 George and
Simons make another important argument that the coercer should combine demands with
incentives; that is, the incentives should be coordinated and clearly communicated

moral/ideological interests (protection of the principles of international law, human rights
and, more broadly, ideological values of the coercer). See Jakobsen, Western Use of
Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War. 36-38. On the other hand, Press presents a
hierarchy of three state interests ranked from high to low: Vital, important, and concerns.
Vital interests are related to state’s survival (especially preserving sovereignty);
important interests comprised of issue that are important but do not threaten the state’s
survival; and concerns are related to state’s values. See Daryl G. Press, “The Credibility
of Power.” International Security 29, no. 3 (Winter 2004-5), 26-27.
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See Schelling, Arms and Influence, 73.
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See Alexander L. George, “Coercive Diplomacy: Definition and Characteristics,” in
The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 2nd ed., edited by Alexander L. George and William
E. Simons (Boulder: Westview, 1994), 4.
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See George and Simons, “Findings and Conclusions,” 288.
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(through verbal and non-verbal means).76 Although this dissertation does not support the
counter argument that incentives should not be a part of coercive strategies, that is, the
strategies should be based on fear, this dissertation proposes that assurances should be
coordinated and clearly communicated with demands.77
In sum, George and Simons expand Schelling’s model, but, as they also note,
their research does not enable them “to state that these perceptual variables are strictly
necessary or sufficient conditions for the success of the coercive diplomacy.”78
Therefore, leaving space for further research.

2.4 Why Great Powers Fail to Coerce Weak States
Scholars, expanding on the work of Schelling and George, have offered different
explanations why the strategy of coercive diplomacy, although desirable by great powers,
seems to be more difficult for states that have the most powerful military capabilities.79
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Ibid. Instead using a strategy based on coercion and accommodation, a coercer should
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threats.
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Incentives, though aimed at changing the target’s behavior, are not an example of
coercion, but, arguably, a bribe.
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Ibid., 292.
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The explanations discussed in this section are in the realm of rational explanations of
coercion failures and success. The literature also offers reasons in the realm of the
nonrational behavior including, for example, misperceptions, group bias, and emotions.
See, for example, Robert Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky,
“Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decisions under Risk,” Econometrics 47, no. 2 (March
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(New York: Free Press, 1994); Gary Schaub, “Deterrence, Compellence, and Prospect
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Daniel Byman and Mathew Waxman argue that coercive threats are most likely to
succeed when the coercer achieves escalation dominance, defined as the coercer’s ability
to increase the threatened costs to a target while denying the target the opportunity to
neutralize those costs or to counterescalate.80 The difficulties, and eventually the failure
of coercive diplomacy, arise from the coercer’s domestic politics (where democracies,
most notably the United States, are averse to civilian casualties) and from using forces in
alliances that hinder the coercer’s ability to escalate the crisis and achieve escalation
dominance.81 On the other hand, Peter Viggor Jakobsen proposes that for successful use
of coercion in alliances, leadership is one of the requirements, that is, “the presence of

Choice: How the Logic of Affect Shapes Coercive Diplomacy (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2018).
80

Byman and Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion, 30.
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Ibid., 19. Also, Kenneth Schultz, in his attempt to answer how the institutions and
practices of democracy influence the use of threats to wage war, argues that the coercer’s
domestic institutions are a source of threat credibility, where democracies, as opposed to
nondemocracies, are better able to credibly signal their intentions. The public nature of
democratic politics and the support of the opposition parties conveys information to the
target if the threats are carried out. See Kenneth A. Schultz, Democracy and Coercive
Diplomacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 1, 9, 57-59. Further to that,
Dan Reither and Alan Stam argue that democracies, as opposed to nondemocracies, are
more likely to make military threats when they can carry them out successfully, making
democratic threats more credible. See Dan Reither and Alan C. Stam III, “Democracy,
War Initiation, and Victory,” American Political Science Review 92, no. 2 (June 1998),
377-389. However, Scott Bennet and Allan Stam, underscoring the coercer’s
commitment problem and the target’s willingness to exploit the coercer’s breaking point,
argue that demands from democracies are more likely to be rejected in protracted
conflicts. See Scott D. Bennett and Alan C. Stam III, “The Declining Advantages of
Democracy: A Combined Model of War Outcomes and Duration,” Journal of Conflict
Resolution 42 (June 1998), 344-366.
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one or more states willing and capable to take the lead and accept most of the cost.”82
Moreover, Jakobsen, focusing on the Western use of coercive diplomacy in asymmetric
crises, argues that the coercer should offer positive incentives (“carrots”) for
compliance.83 Robert Pape uses the cost-benefits calculus on the part of the target and
argues that “economic inducements,” whether “employed simultaneously or promised to
sweeten deals,” are not likely to influence the target’s decision to acquiesce to the
demands. According to Pape, positive incentives are “poor compliments to military
coercion over significant interest.”84 Pape also argues that military coercion succeeds
when used to aim at the target’s military vulnerabilities, making it too costly for the target
not to acquiesce to the demands and to escalate military coercion to full-scale war.85
In more recent literature, Todd Sechser focuses on the coercer’s demands and the
target’s reputation, where Phil Haun focuses on the coercer’s demands and asymmetry of
power (favoring a coercer).86 On the other hand, Diane Chamberlain focuses on the

82

Jakobsen, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War, 138. The argument
is that “coalitional consensus concerning threats and use of force requires” leadership by
one or more states. Ibid.
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coercer’s resolve (that is, the willingness of the coercer to accept costs to achieve its
objectives/demands,) and its influence on the credibility of threats and the success and
failure of coercive diplomacy.87 Each scholar identifies different contextual factors that
have a negative influence on the outcome of coercive exchanges between the coercer (a
great power/strong state) and the target (a small power/weak state).88
Sechser explains the effectiveness of coercion from the perspective of a target
state. He argues that the targets, despite the military disadvantage, fight to defend their
reputations; the target hopes that by not acquiescing to the coercer’s demands, the target
will deter future challenges from powerful states.89 Sechser’s model identifies the target’s
need to preserve its reputation as a key drawback to a successful asymmetric military
coercion. He further argues that the coercer could benefit by taking into consideration the
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reputation costs that the target includes in the calculation of costs and benefits when
deciding to acquiesce to the coercer’s demands. He proposes that the coercer should offer
side payments and lower its demands to offset the cost to the target’s reputation.90
Sechser also points out that the coercer’s incentives to discount its demands to offset the
reputation cost of its target will be additionally influenced by the target’s perceptions of
the likelihood of further crisis as well as the ability of coercers to commit to restrain its
demands in the future.91 Sechser’s observation that the target’s perceptions of the worst
(that is, fear of future demands) and the coercer’s inability to estimate the target’s
anxieties and “insufficiently discount its demands” is significant but left underresearched.92
Haun argues that in asymmetric interstate conflict, the coercer has a significant
military superiority over the target and the coercer’s vital interests are not threatened.93
This imbalance in military power (favoring the coercer) will cause the coercer to make
high demands, which are too costly for the target; that is the cost of acquiescing to
demands is higher than the benefits of acquiescing to demands. 94 Therefore, high
demands, which Haun defines as regime change and surrender of territory, are the main
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expectations of cost in a way that erodes the target’s motivation to continue what the
target is doing. See Alexander L. George, Forceful Persuasion, 11.
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explanation why asymmetric coercion fails.95 Applying Haun’s hypotheses to the U.S.
coercion attempts, Haun argues that the United States makes demands that threaten the
survival of the target and by exceeding the cost acceptable to the target makes it more
profitable for the target not to acquiesce to its demands.
Although one can agree with Haun that coercers should be wise when defining
their objectives and demands (especially concerning the target’s vital interests), one can
also argue that there are many examples of leaders abdicating when facing coercive
demands against vital interest (such as a demand for regime change), which according to
Haun’s hypotheses should end by the target refusing to acquiesce.96 Moreover, one can
argue that the Kosovo Crisis of 1998-99 (the dispute with Serbia over Kosovo) does not
support Haun’s hypothesis that coercive demands concerning territory are destined to fail.
Kosovo, in the end, became of “marginal concern to Serbians.”97 Therefore, Haun’s
hypothesis that asymmetry of power (favoring the coercer) leads to unrealistic demands
that eventually lead to asymmetry of motivation favoring the target (and finally failed
coercive diplomacy) leaves space for further research. It is especially puzzling under
what conditions demands concerning territory and/or regime change are perceived by the
target as a threat to survival of the state.
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Focusing on the credibility of threats, Chamberlain argues that after the end of the
Cold War, the cost (financial and human) of using military force for the United States
became noticeably low (mainly due to use of advanced technology and relying more on
military contractors and an all-volunteer army).98 The downside to the shrinking costs of
war is that “cheap threats” undermined the ultimate credibility of American threats;
whereas “costly threats” are actually more credible and useful in coercive bargaining.99
Chamberlain argues that the “cheap threat” to use force is not a signal of high motivation
to target states. Although Chamberlain makes an important distinction between
immediate credibility (a threat taken in specific action) and ultimate credibility (a threat
that the coercer is committed to fighting a long war), one of the counter arguments is: If
the cost to use force is low, then the United States should be more willing to use it, and it
should make it more believable that if the United States threatens use of force, since it is
cheap to use the military, the United States will fulfill its threat. 100 In sum, the argument
that the asymmetry of power (favoring the coercer) leads to the asymmetry of motivation
(favoring the target), which eventually leads to the failure of coercive diplomacy, lacks
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On the contrary, Jakobsen argues, “A cheap threat is more credible than a costly one,
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empirical ground as well as logical reasoning leaving significant space for further
research.
Although Sechser, Haun, and Chamberlain point at the negative correlation
between the coercer’s physical capability and compellence success (“more power, less
success”), they propose different explanations for why the target decides not to acquiesce
to the demands. Sechser, evaluating under what conditions the target would decide to
fight in an asymmetric crisis, points to the target’s expectations (“anxiety”) of future
demands.101 Haun points at the coercer’s present demands being too costly for the target,
and Chamberlain points at the coercer’s threats not being adequately credible to back its
demands. Although these scholars provide a good analysis of asymmetric strategic
coercion in general and coercive diplomacy in particular, there is little consensus on why
great powers fail to coerce weak states.

2.5 The Coercive Diplomacy (CD) Triangle
Why do militarily weaker states resist coercive threats from a militarily superior state and
under what conditions do weaker states concede? This section addresses these questions
by proposing a model of coercive diplomacy in asymmetric military crises. At the core of
this model are three conditions considered as sufficient and necessary for the success of
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Sechser points out “from target’s perspective, two factors influence the likelihood that
it will face future threats: the challenger’s capabilities and its intentions.” Where the
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coercive diplomacy in asymmetric international crises: (1) Credible threats, (2) credible
assurances, and (3) the international environment favoring the coercer. This model
expects coercive diplomacy to succeed (that is, the target to acquiesce to the coercer’s
demands) when all three conditions are present. Before discussing the three minimally
sufficient and necessary conditions for success, the main terms are defined, as applied in
this dissertation.

2.5.1 The CD Triangle: Coercive Diplomacy Versus Military Coercion
Taking into consideration that the purpose of coercive diplomacy should be to persuade a
target to comply with the coercer’s demands and proposing that distinguishing between
the use of threats (only) as opposed to the use of limited force can have significant
implications for the theory as well as the strategy of coercion (for example, when and
why the coercer escalates from using threats only to using limited force) this dissertation
employs the term coercive diplomacy when military threats (only) are used to coerce the
target (see Figure 2).102 The threat of force can only involve a verbal warning,
swaggering, or mobilization, but not the actual use of force.103 In addition, this
dissertation employs the term military coercion when limited force is employed by the
coercer to persuade the target to change its behavior (see Figure 2). To define limited
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As Schelling argues, “the power to hurt (…) is the threat of damage, or of more
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Power.” International Security 4, no. 4 (Spring 1980), 10.
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force, this dissertation employs Jakobsen’s approach, which makes air and sea power part
of a coercive strategy; however, the coercer has to leave the choice to the target to
comply with the coercer’s demands.104 On the other hand, the use of ground forces, as a
part of the strategy is permitted only if it does not eliminate the element of choice.105

Figure 2. Spectrum of Coercion106

Coercive diplomacy and military coercion share the following four characteristics: (1)
Coercion is a state action; (2) a coercer has a clear target; (3) demands are clearly
defined; and (4) demands and military threats are communicated.107
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In sum, coercive diplomacy fails if, after the coercer communicates threats and
demands, the target: (1) Refuses to acquiesce to the demands; (2) the coercer escalates
the crisis and uses limited or brute force; or (3) the coercer accommodates the target and
abandoned the coercive strategy. Furthermore, coercive diplomacy succeeds when the
target acquiesces to the coercer’s demands without use of force. On the other hand,
military coercion succeeds when the target acquiesces to the coercer’s demands after the
coercer uses limited force to coerce the target. Military coercion fails if the target: (1)
Does not acquiesce to the coercer’s demands after the coercer used limited force; (2) the
coercer escalates the crisis and uses brute force; or (3) the coercer accommodates the
target and abandoned the coercive strategy.

2.5.2 The CD Triangle: The Three Conditions for Success
Drawing on the compellence model put forward by Schelling, the coercive diplomacy
model put forward by George, and insights from the literature on coercion, credibility,
and reputation, this dissertation proposes the Coercive Diplomacy (CD) Triangle, a
model of coercive diplomacy in asymmetric military crises (see Figure 3). As stated
before, at the center of this model are three conditions considered as sufficient and
necessary for the success of coercive diplomacy in asymmetric international crises: (1)
Credible threats, (2) credible assurances, and (3) the international strategic environment
favoring the coercer.

Sanctions, and Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000);
Kelly Greenhill and Peter Krause eds., Coercion: The Power to Hurt in International
Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018).
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Figure 3. The Coercive Diplomacy (CD) Triangle: A model of coercive diplomacy in
asymmetric military crises108

The logic behind focusing on the selected conditions is that the coercer and the
target are rational actors that behave according to defined preferences, that is, they assess
the benefits and the costs of engaging in military coercion (the coercer) and the benefits
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Figure 3. The Coercive Diplomacy (CD) Triangle: A model of coercive diplomacy in
asymmetric military crises, created by Danijela Felendes.
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and costs of acquiescing or not acquiescing to the demands (the target).109 Therefore, the
leaders/decisionmakers will try to maximize utility while minimizing cost when deciding
among the identified choices. In the coercer’s case, it means choosing among the strategy
of coercion (that is coercive diplomacy or military coercion), inaction, or the strategy of
brute force (that is war); in the target’s case, it means choosing between acquiescing to
the demands or resisting. Where credible threats are crucial to convince the target that
the coercer has the capability and will to inflict pain, credible assurances are necessary if
the coercer wants to convince the target that the demands and objectives are limited and
true to those stated by the coercer. Furthermore, a key component of credible assurances
is trust, where the asymmetry of power (favoring the coercer) and the asymmetry of
demands (favoring the target) can be balanced by presence of trust.110 This dissertation
argues that the target’s trust that the coercer will not expand its demands shapes the
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target’s behavior in a predictable way, that is, it will influence the target’s cost-benefit
equation in a predictable way: The target will acquiesce to the coercer’s demands if the
target trusts that the coercer will not change the cost-benefit equation, where expanded
demands mean increased cost for the target.111
If the target does not trust the coercer’s assurances, the target will resist to
acquiescing to the coercer’s demands and the target will look for the regional or global
spoiler/s to balance the coercer’s threat. The spoilers are those states that may perceive
the failure of coercion (that is, escalation of crisis to war) as beneficial to their regional or
international standing.112
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Realist Theory of International Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).
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2.6 Independent and Dependent Variables
Independent and dependent variables are defined in the following sections.

2.6.1 Independent Variables
Based on the logic of the CD Triangle, the three independent variables (IVs) used in this
dissertation are as follows: Credible threats, credible assurances, and the international
strategic environment favoring the coercer.

2.6.1.2 Credible Threats
One can argue that coercion is an exercise in risk manipulation. The essence of risk
manipulation is to create in the minds of the target state’s leaders/policymakers the
possibility that the situation might escalate to war.113 Therefore, for the coercer’s threats
to be credible, they must be perceived as credible by the target. One way to measure if
the threats were perceived as credible by the target is to inquire if the target acquiesced to
the demands or resisted (ex-post). Another way to measure if threats are credible or not,
is by measuring if the coercer has the power and will to proceed with punishment (exante).114 Schelling argues that coercion needs to exploit the target’s fears and wants;
therefore, to be credible, the coercer has to demonstrate the ability and willingness to
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hurt. This indicates two important factors that influence a target’s cost-benefit equation:
(1) Coercer’s will to pay the escalating cost if the threats would fail to make the target
acquiesce to demand/s (that is, if the threats do not produce desired results); and (2)
coercer’s military capability to execute its threats. Since the focus of this dissertation is
asymmetric coercion, when the coercer has the significant military advantage over the
target, the military capability of the coercer is not in question.115 Therefore, the main
focus in determining the credibility of the coercer’s threats (ex-ante) is on assessing the
coercer’s will to pay the cost of escalation (to “pay” for the potential failure of military
coercion and escalation to war). The two factors that can influence the target’s perception
of the coercer’s will to go through with its threats are: coercer’s present objectives and
coercer’s behavior in the past crisis situations (resolute as oppose to irresolute).116
Regarding the coercer’s behavior in past crisis situations, the past actions theory
can assist in the task to probe into the past actions of the coercer in crisis situations. This
theory postulates that a state’s credibility depends on its history of fulfilling or breaking
its commitments.117 The leaders/decision-makers would look to a coercer’s past actions
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pattern of behavior; broken commitments will be considered irresolute, and, if the state
consistently kept its promise and carried out its threats, the state will be considered
resolute and its commitments will carry weight. Press argues, “the core of the theory is
that the past behavior of an enemy can shed light on useful information about its
character, capabilities, or interest.”118
However, there are different versions of this theory.119 Noticeably, Harvey and
Mitton who link resolve reputation and past actions to credibility, distinguish between
two types of reputation: general and specific. General reputations rarely change and are
typically based on widely accepted impressions of the opportunities and priorities.120
With regard to specific reputation, Harvey and Mitton point out that it typically emerges
as a “direct consequence of specific interactions and exchanges during different stages of
a protracted military crisis or enduring rivalry.”121 One of the important characteristics of
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threat taken in the specific action) and ultimate credibility (a threat that the coercer is
committed to fight a long war). See Chamberlain, Cheap Threats.
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civilian casualties.
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specific reputation is that this reputation, as opposed to general reputation, can change
relatively quickly.
Applying this argument to coercive diplomacy: If the coercer, in previous
episodes of coercion, failed to respond to the challenges made by past targets (or the
present target in protracted crisis), the present target is likely to interpret this as coercer’s
lack of willingness to use military capabilities to enforce the threat in similar/present
situations. Therefore, the past actions theory postulates that the credibility of threats is a
product of past actions in similar situations.122
Regarding the objectives that influence and/or determine will, they can be
measured through assessments of coercer’s interests being ranked from high to low
importance with vital interests being the most important, and moral/ideological interests
being the least important (as opposed to being vital to the target’s survival). As
mentioned before, the four interests ranked from high to low importance are: Vital
interests (the defense of the homeland, territory, change of government); strategic
interests (preservation of the existing balance of power in the international system);
stability interests (preservation of the balance of power in the regional system); and
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Press tests these two competing theories, the past actions theory and the current
calculus theory, on a series of crises (Munich 1938-1939; Berlin 1958-1961; and Cuba
1962). Press points out that states do not use an adversary’s past behavior to calculate
credibility of threats, but they assess the credibility of threats by rationally calculating
whether the coercer has the sufficient power (capability) to follow through on a threat,
and whether the coercer is willing to do so (interest). See Daryl G. Press, Calculating
Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats (New York: Cornell University Press,
2005). On the other hand, the critics of Press concluded just the opposite, that reputations
do matter. See, for example, Alex Weisiger and Karen Yarhi-Milo, “Revisiting
Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics,” International
Organization 69 (Spring 2015), 473-495; Harvey and Mitton, Fighting for Credibility.
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moral/ideological interests (protection of the principles of international law, human rights
and, more broadly, ideological values of the coercer).123 In contrast to the past actions
theory, the current calculus theory posits that when assessing the credibility of coercer’s
threats the decision-makers assess if the coercer has the will (that is “sufficient”
interests), in addition to the capability, to pay the cost if the threats would fail to produce
desired results.124 The key factor is that the coercer must convince the target that the
threats will be executed if the target does not comply with the demands. Therefore, the
credibility of the threat depends on the relative balance of power between a coercer and a
target (capability) and the coercer’s interests (that is, will). Press goes further by arguing,
“if the threatened action would achieve something of value and entail low costs, the treat
will be credible.” However, “if the threatened action would likely result in failure or be
very costly, and if the potential gains would in all probability be small, the threat will be
dismissed.”125
One of the drawbacks of the past actions theory is that it does not specify whether
the decision-makers weight an adversary’s power or interests more heavily; that is, lowcost threats and small interests, as opposed to large interests and costly actions. More
generally, the theory holds that for a given level of interests, fluctuation in power will

123
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Ibid., 141. It is important to note that Chamberlain and Press disagree if “cheap
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Press); that is, the target’s perception on the credibility of threats. See Chamberlain,
Cheap Threats; Press, Calculating Credibility.
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have a predictable effect on credibility. On the other hand, for a given balance of power,
threats to defend vital interests will be more credible than threats to defend strategic,
stability, or moral/ideological interests. This goes along with George’s argument that “if
the coercing power pursues ambitious objectives that go beyond its own vital and
important interest, and if its demands infringe on vital or important interests of the
adversary, then the asymmetry of interests and balance of motivation will favor the
adversary.”126 The current calculus theory suggests that for a country to enhance its
credibility, it has to build sufficient capabilities to defend its interests as cheaply as
possible.
One can argue that the past actions and current calculus theories appear to
overlap when decision makers study an adversary’s previous behavior to assess its power
and interests. For example, previous behavior may also be used to learn what the
adversary’s values are. However, Press points out that a clear line can be drawn between
the two theories: If the decision-makers use the adversary’s past coercing attempts to
assess the adversary’s power or interests, they are reasoning the way the past actions
theory predicts.127 On the other hand, the use of an adversary’s military effectiveness to
assess the adversary’s power, and its credibility, supports the current calculus theory. The
logic of the current calculus theory is that if a state fights, it should fight to win that
particular battle. The logic of the past actions theory is that if the state fights, it should
fight not only to win that particular battle, but also to look powerful in the future.
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In sum, to determine the presence or absence of credible threats the dissertation
focuses on the following indicators: (1) Did the coercer fail to respond to the challenges
made by the past targets in similar situations? (2) Did the coercer explicitly communicate
its interest/s in a particular episode of coercion? (3) Did the coercer demonstrate its
readiness to employ military force (by, for example, mobilizing troops, conducting
military exercises)?

2.6.1.3 Credible Assurances
Assurances refer to the coercer’s promise not to expand its demands and not to change its
objectives once the target complies with the initial coercer’s demands. Translating it to a
cost-benefit equation, the target must believe that acquiescing to demands today will not
lead to more demands tomorrow, making the cost of acquiescing to that particular
demand higher than not to acquiesce to that particular demand. It is about utility, about
reason, not emotions, to persuade the target (not just to frighten the target) that the target
will be better off if the target acquiesce to coercer’s demands.128 However, as Schelling
argues, “The assurances that accompany a compellent action - move back a mile and I
won’t shoot (otherwise I shall) and I won’t then try again for a second mile - are harder to
demonstrate in advance, unless it be through a long past record of abiding by one’s own
verbal assurances.”129 Therefore, a threat should be combined with credible assurances
that the target will not be harmed if the target complies with the demands. Jakobsen
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agrees that communicating credible assurances is essential for the success of coercive
diplomacy, however, Jakobsen points out that it has not been studied systematically by
coercion theorists.130 This dissertation, therefore, introduces the role of trust and its
impact on the credibility of assurances.

2.6.1.3.1 The Role of Trust
This dissertation analyzes the role of trust, not as its own variable, but rather how it
affects the credibility of assurances. Trust can be understood and defined in many
different ways.131 Andrew Kydd argues that to be trustworthy is to return cooperation
rather than exploit it. On the other hand, to be untrustworthy is to exploit cooperation.132
Applying this argument to the international system, hegemony (the presence of a very
powerful state) can promote cooperation, but only if a hegemon is relatively trustworthy;
an untrustworthy hegemon will make cooperation less likely.133
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For example, Hardin presents a good critique of different conceptions of trust;
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Massachusetts, 1990); Aron M. Hoffman, “A concept of Trust in International
Relations,” European Journal of International Relations, 8 (2002), 375-401.
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Michel argues that the emotional element in acts of trust should not be ignored in
international relations; the emotional element should bring richness to our understanding
of international relations and foreign policy making.134 Hoffman agrees that trust could
be an attitude which was born of emotion rather than rational calculation. However,
Hofmann adds that there is “no reason to suppose that emotional responses violate an
actor’s self-interest.” 135 In addition, Hoffman puts forward Hardin’s rationalist argument
that trust can be understood in terms of self-interest and that “trust is never
unconditional;” it always applies that ‘A trusts B to do x’.136 Applying this to
international relations, and taking into consideration the anarchical features of the
international system, it is difficult to imagine a relationship in which one actor trusts
another unconditionally. Therefore, trust is important when the actors are not sure of the
fate of their interest, which introduces calculations of risk as well as estimates of the
probability that their trust will be honored into the decision making.137
This dissertation, as stated before, takes the rationalist approach where the target
is a rational actor applying a decision-making cost-benefit analysis with the goal of
maximizing utility and minimizing cost. Therefore, if the target perceives the coercer as
trustworthy, it translates to a cost-benefit calculation in which the target is better off
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trusting that the coercer will fulfill its assurances (that is, the coercer will not change its
demands and its objectives once the target acquiesces) and the fulfillment of the coercer’s
commitments will make the target better off (than not acquiescing).138 Therefore, this
dissertation hypothesizes that presence of trust shapes the target’s behavior in such a way
that target perceives the assurances as credible which contributes to the success of
coercive diplomacy.
To assess the presence of credible assurances this dissertation focuses on the
following indicators: (1) Did the target explicitly manifest its distrust of the coercer? (2)
Did the target perceive the coercer as trustworthy? (3) Did the coercer clearly
communicate its assurances?

2.6.1.4 International Strategic Environment
Taking into consideration that the international system is characterized by sovereign
states and Hobbesian anarchy, neorealists such as Kenneth Waltz argue that distribution
of power is crucial to the system stability.139 Furthermore, even though the case of
coercion involves two major parties (that is, a coercer and a target), super powers and
great powers and their support (or lack of support) can have a significant influence on the
target’s perception of the necessity of acquiesing to the demands put forward by the
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The danger of being betrayed can be lowered (but not eliminated) by improving the
amount and quality of information actors have about one another. See Hoffman, “A
Concept of Trust in International Relations,” 379.
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See Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House,
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crucial to the international system’s stability, where the bipolar system is the most stable.
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coercer.140 The assumption is that a bipolar international system (characterized by two
superpowers) restrains the use of compellent threats because the superpower (a bipole)
must take into consideration reaction of the other superpower in the system.141 The
assumption is also that a multipolar system, which is characterized by three or more great
powers, makes it even harder for the coercer to issue compellent threats since the coercer
should take into consideration the interests of the other great powers in the system and
the possibility of hostile great power intervention. On the other hand, in the unipolar
system a hegemon (or a unipol) is less restrained when issuing compellent threats.142
However, there are two important factors that can influence even the hegemon: The
presence of a rising global power and/or the presence of reemerging global power/s,
which is/are ready to take the role of spoiler and potentially (strategically) benefit from
the failure of coercive diplomacy and escalation of crisis (that is, the target not
acquiescing to coercer’s demands).143 The assumption is that escalation of a crisis and the
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coercer’s military failure may influence the regional or global balance of power and give
significant boost to a spoiler in the international arena.
As described by Stephen Walt, states have a tendency to balance against threats
instead of joining or bandwagoning with the stronger power (in this case the coercing
state).144 If coercion is applied, not just the target state, but also other states (such as
regional or global powers) might side with the target state against the coercer, especially
great powers with whom the target state has a military alliance or has close military and
economic relations. This could lead to the failure of coercion, where the lower cost of not
acquiescing could encourage the target not to acquiesce to the demands. The failure of
coercion means either escalation into military confrontation or loss of credibility in case
if the coercer decides to appease the target.
To assess the presence of a spoiler, this dissertation focuses on the great powers
in the international system and their stand on the demands put forward by the coercer and
their interactions with the coercer and the target. More precisely this dissertation assesses
documentary evidence in which leaders/decision-makers proclaim their stand on the
demands put forward by the coercer and their interaction with the coercer and the target.
This dissertation investigates if the target approached any of the great powers in the
international system in its attempt to balance the coercer’s threats, or if any of the great
powers approached the target offering logistical and/or any other type of assistance and
encouraging the target not to acquiesce to the demands.
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To determine/assess if the international strategic environment favors the coercer
this dissertation focuses on the following indicators: (1) Did any of the great powers
extend public and/or military support to the target? (2) Was the target a member of a
military alliance or did the target sign a military treaty with any of the great powers? (3)
Did the coercer engage diplomatically with the potential spoiler?

2.6.2 Dependent Variables
The dependent variables (DVs) of this dissertation are defined as a success/failure of
coercive diplomacy and success/failure of military coercion. Coercive diplomacy fails if,
after the coercer communicated threats and demands, the target: (1) Resisted acquiescing
to the demands; (2) the coercer escalated the crisis and used limited or brute force; or (3)
the coercer accommodated the target and abandoned the coercive strategy. Coercive
diplomacy succeeds when the target acquiesces to the coercer’s demands without use of
force. 145 On the other hand, military coercion succeeds when the target acquiesces to
coercer’s demands after the coercer used limited force to coerce the target. Military
coercion fails if the target (1) does not acquiesce to the coercer’s demands after the
coercer used limited force; (2) the coercer escalates the crisis and uses brute force; or (3)
the coercer accommodates the target and abandons the coercive strategy.
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In this dissertation, the success of coercive diplomacy/coercion is based on
effectiveness as opposed to efficiency. As Haun points out “effectiveness measures
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2.6.3 The CD Triangle: Predictions
The CD Triangle predicts if the following conditions are present the target will acquiesce
to a demand:
•

First, the target perceives threats as credible; that is, the coercer succeeds in
communicating that the coercer has the will to pay the cost if the threats fail.

•

Second, the target perceives assurances as credible; that is, the target trusts the
coercer that the coercer will not change its demand after the target acquiesces to
the coercer’s demands and there will be no more demands tomorrow.

•

Third, the international environment favors the coercer; that is, there are no
global/regional spoilers willing to balance the coercer’s threats.

2.7 Conclusion
Although scholars provide a good analysis of asymmetric strategic coercion in general
and coercive diplomacy in particular, there is little consensus on why great powers fail to
coerce weak states. This dissertation addresses the questions by proposing the CD
Triangle, a model of coercive diplomacy in asymmetric military crisis. At the core of this
model are three conditions considered as minimally sufficient and necessary for the
success of coercive diplomacy in asymmetric international crises: (1) Credible threats,
(2) credible assurances, and (3) the international strategic environment favoring the
coercer. This model predicts that the target will acquiesce to the coercer’s demands when
all three conditions are present. In the next two empirical chapters this model is applied to
U.S. coercive strategies during the Bosnian War (1992-95) and during the Kosovo Crisis
(1998-99).
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CHAPTER III: THE BOSNIAN WAR AND U.S. COERCIVE STRATEGIES (19921995)

After a brief overview of the events that preceded the Bosnian war and a brief overview
of the four phases of U.S. involvement in the Bosnian war, as related to the use of
coercive strategies, this chapter focuses on the fourth (last) phase of U.S. involvement in
the Bosnian war, when the United States decisively applied the strategy of coercive
diplomacy and military coercion to stop the war. The Coercive Diplomacy (CD) Triangle,
introduced in Chapter 2, is used to analyze success and failure of U.S. coercive
diplomacy and military coercion.
As discussed in Chapter 2, the CD Triangle predicts that, if the following
conditions are present, coercive diplomacy will succeed: First, the target perceives threats
as credible, that is, the coercer succeeds in communicating by using a threat of force
(coercive diplomacy) or by using limited force (military coercion); that the coercer has
the will to pay the cost if the threats fail. Second, the target perceives assurances as
credible, that is, the target trusts that the coercer will not change its objectives and will
not change its demands (there will be no “more demands tomorrow”) after the target
acquiesces to coercer’s demands. Third, the international environment favors the coercer,
that is, there are no global or regional spoilers willing to balance the coercer’s threats.
Similarly, failure of coercive diplomacy is expected if: The target does not perceive the
coercer’s threats as credible; and/or the target does not trust the coercer that its assurances
are credible, leading the target to look for regional or global spoilers to balance the
coercer’s threats without acquiescing to the coercer’s demands.
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3.1 Historical Overview of Yugoslavia and the Origin of Bosnian War
The first state of Yugoslavia (or the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, as it was
initially called) was founded on December 1, 1918, on the ruins of two empires: Ottoman
and Habsburg.146 Initially, Yugoslavia was a parliamentary monarchy, and Peter I, from
the Serbian dynasty Karadjordjevic, became the first king of this new state. In January
1929, King Alexander I abolished the parliament, suspended the constitution, and
declared absolute rule.147 The same year he officially renamed the country to the
Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The first Yugoslavia ceased to exist in 1941 when Nazi
Germany occupied the territory.148
The second Yugoslavia came into being in November 1945, when the Yugoslav
Communists, led by Josip Broz Tito, proclaimed the establishment of the Federal
People’s Republic of Yugoslavia.149 The Constitution of 1946 divided the territory into
the six republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Bosnia-
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Herzegovina) and the Constitution of 1974 identified two autonomous provinces within
Serbia: Vojvodina and Kosovo (see Figure 3.1 Map of Yugoslavia in the 20th Century,
1941 - 1989).

Figure 4. Map of Yugoslavia in the 20th Century, 1941-1989150

After World War Two, Tito emerged as widely accepted within Yugoslavia.151 However,
Tito’s attempt to maintain ‘political independence’ from the Soviet Union, became
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for example, James Gapinski, The Economic Structure and Failure of Yugoslavia
(London: Praeger, 1993), 4.
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increasingly challenged by the Soviet leadership and culminated in Yugoslavia’s removal
from the Cominform in 1948. Following this event, Tito restored trade relations with the
West; however, he stayed committed to socialist ideas.152 Tito’s death in 1980, after
being in power since the very inception of SFR Yugoslavia, left a political power
vacuum.153 In addition to domestic political changes, the increase in oil prices and the rise
of international interest rates in the 1970s made SFR Yugoslavia’s deficit in 1979 the
largest deficit SFR Yugoslavia ever had.154 In an attempt to curb the deficit, the federal
government introduced an “inflammatory macro-economic stabilization policy of radical
austerity, trade and price liberalization, and institutional reforms.”155
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The impact of the 1980s market-oriented reforms on SFR Yugoslavia’s
population was severe.156 In a background of almost a total loss of confidence in the
federal government and economic hardship, the Serbian League of Communists leader
Slobodan Milosevic established a degree of charismatic popularity in Serbia.157
Milosevic “started to build up tremendous support in Serbia through blunt exploitation of
Serbian sensitivities in relation to Kosovo, an autonomous province of the Serbian
republic,” historically perceived as a heartland of Serbia, but 85 percent Albanian in
158

population.

To republican leaders in Croatia and Slovenia, Milosevic looked like

out that in 1985, the Vrhovec Commission came into existence. This commission, named
after its chair Josip Vrhovec, Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs, had a goal of
exploring a possible path towards reforming the political system, which would eventually
speed up the economic reforms in Yugoslavia. See Steven L. Burg, “Elite Conflict in
Post-Tito Yugoslavia,” Soviet Studies, vol. 38, no. 2 (April 1986), 170-171.
156

Rationing was introduced for items such as petrol, sugar, flour, and coffee.
Investments in public infrastructure and social services were stopped; unemployment
accelerated, and, largely due to devaluation, the Yugoslav currency (dinar) fell by 90
percent. See Hudson, Breaking the South Slav Dream, 53.
157

In the 1987 NIN, the leading Serbian news outlet, public opinion survey, 79 percent of
respondents said that they believed that SFR Yugoslavia’s economic problems might
never be solved. See Dyker, Yugoslavia, 182. Woodward points that “Although the
Yugoslav federal government continued to function up to the second half of 1991, its
authority and especially its enforcement power had declined so much that (…) the
context of its dissolution could be said to resemble the conditions of anarchy in which a
security dilemma in international relations is said to occur.” See Susan Woodward,
Balkan Tragedy, 80.
158

See Dyker, Yugoslavia, 181; also, see Gapinski, The Economic Structure and Failure
of Yugoslavia, 5. The event that propelled Milosevic to political stardom was his speech
at Kosovo Polje, on April 25, 1987. Milosevic (as a protégé of Ivan Stambolic, a
President of Serbia) was sent to Kosovo Polje, a town located in central Kosovo, to ease
the tensions between the Serbs minority and the Albanian majority. Milosevic faced a
crowd of angry Serbs, who believed that the state failed to protect them and that Kosovo
police unjustifiably beats the Serbs. In his attempt to take the control of situation
Milosevic said, “No one should dare to beat you!” [“Niko ne sme da vas bije!] See, for

63

another Great-Serbian hegemonist, who had opened the door for the rise of ethnocentrism
in their own backyard. Economic hardship and nationalist sentiment were used by the
leadership of all republics to their advantage to win the voters in the first multi-party
elections in 1990.159
As the economic and political situation in Yugoslavia was worsening and without
any hope that agreement would be made between two opposing camps (Slovenia and
Croatia, on one side, arguing in favor of confederation, and Serbia, on the other side,
arguing in favor of federation), on June 25, 1991, Slovenia, followed by Croatia, declared
independence (or, as Slovenians argued, disassociation) from the federal state (SFR
Yugoslavia).
The war between Slovenia and the Yugoslav Federal Army (Jugoslavenska
Narodna Armija (JNA), hereafter referred to as JNA) started on 27th June 1991, when
JNA troops tried to retake a border post from the Slovenian National Guard.160 The war
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Yugoslavia (which since 1988 had eight members, one represented each republic and
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ended on 7th July 1991 when the European Community (EC) negotiated a peace
agreement in the Croatian town of Brioni.161 The war in Croatia started in August 1991,
when the JNA directly became involved in the conflict between Croatian police forces
and the force formed under the territory controlled by the ethnic Serbs supported by the
JNA.162 In December 1991, while fighting was intensifying in the Eastern part of Croatia,

autonomous provinces) was responsible for “command and control” of the JNA. See
“Constitution of SFR Yugoslavia of 1974, Articles 240, 262, 279, 313, and 328”, accessed
August 23, 2019, https://www.worldstatesmen.org/Yugoslavia-Constitution1974.pdf.
Christopher Hill describes the JNA as “a well-equipped army with a doctrine of citizensolider.” See Christopher Hill, Outpost: A Diplomat at Work (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2014), 137.
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This agreement is also known as the Brioni agreement. For elaboration see, for
example, Hudson, Breaking the South Slav Dream, 83; Carol Rogel, The Breakup of
Yugoslavia and its Aftermath, 57. Also, Borisav Jovic, Serbia’s representative to the
Presidency of the SFR Yugoslavia and its vice president and president from 1989 to
1991, stated that “[Slovenia] was a one-ethnic state, and it was easy to settle accounts
with them.” See Borisav Jovic, witness statement in “Milosevic” ICTY, November 20,
2003, [p.293666]
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Croatia had a significant ethnic Serbian population; according to 1991 census data 12
percent of the Croatian population in 1991 were ethnic Serbs. See “Intelligence Report:
Croatia’s Ethnic Serb-Controlled Areas: A Geographic Perspective,” CIA, May 1995,
https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/1995-05-01A.pdf. In summer of 1990 the
members of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) withdrew from the Assembly of the
newly independent Republic of Croatia. In their attempt to establish sovereignty and
autonomy for the Serbs in Croatia, and with the support of JNA, the Serbs started to
barricade the roads leading to the territory where Serbs were the majority or a significant
minority and eventually, on December 21, 1990, proclaimed the Serbian Autonomous
District (SAO) Krajina; the assembly of the SAO Krajina proclaimed the Republic of
Serbian Krajina (RSK). On February 1992, the SAO of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and
Western Srijem and the SAO of Western Slavonia joined the RSK (approximately 25
percent of Croatian territory bordering Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina). See, for
example, “Martic (Trial Judgment),” ICTY, June 12, 2007, [pp.49-53]
https://www.icty.org/case/martic/tjug/en/070612.pdf; see also “Intelligence Report:
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and four months before the war began in Bosnia, the debate over whether to recognize
Slovenia and Croatia as independent states divided the Western powers. On December
23, 1991, after the atrocities had been committed by the JNA and Serbian paramilitary
forces in the Croatian town of Vukovar, Germany unilaterally recognized Slovenian and
Croatian independence. The EC followed the lead of its member, Germany, and
recognized the independence of Croatia and Slovenia. The EC also indicated that it would
recognize the independence of any other ex-SFR Yugoslav republic that would meet
certain conditions, including democracy and respect for human rights.163
Fighting in Croatia lasted until 3rd January 1992, when the United Nationsnegotiated cease-fire agreement between Croatia and the leaders of JNA and Serbia came
into effect.164 What was significant for the upcoming war in Bosnia and Herzegovina
(hereafter referred to as Bosnia) was that the JNA, while leaving Croatia and Slovenia,
moved troops and ammunition from those two republics to Bosnia (mostly to the areas
populated by the Bosnian Serbs) and Serbia. In addition, “small arms, ammunition, and
weapons plants [were] clustered in Serbia, and the greatest variety of weapons [was]
produced in Bosnia” giving military advantage to these two republics (see Figure 5 &
Figure 6).
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Washington Post, January 16, 1992,
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See Chuck Sudetic, “Cease-fire Stills Gunfire in Croatia,” New York Times, January 4,
1992, https://www.nytimes.com/1992/01/04/world/cease-fire-stills-gunfire-incroatia.html.
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Figure 5. Military Regions & Corps Headquarters (SFR Yugoslavia)165

Figure 6. Major Weapons Production Facilities (SFR Yugoslavia)166

As Slovenia and Croatia became internationally recognized as independent states,
Macedonia, whose citizens during the referendum conducted in September of 1991
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overwhelmingly voted for independence, hoped to be recognized by the international
community too.167 On the other hand, the voters in Montenegro gave support to
Montenegro’s union with Serbia in a truncated Yugoslav state, and in late April 1992
Serbia and Montenegro proclaimed the (two-republic) Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(FRY) with de facto dominance of Serbia and its leader Slobodan Milosevic.168
In the multi-ethnic republic of Bosnia, the referendum conducted on March 2,
1992 was a victory for Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic and those who voted for an
independent Bosnia (mostly Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims, who together
accounted for 60 percent of four million Bosnian citizens).169 The Bosnian Serbs, who
accounted for 31 percent of the population and opposed independence, boycotted the
referendum and formed, so called, “Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina” (also known
as “Republika Srpska”). Radovan Karadzic, the president of the Serbian Democratic
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Yugoslavia,” New York Times, April 28, 1992,
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Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Srpska Demokratska Stranka (SDS)), declared himself
a president of an ‘independent’ Republika Srpsa.170
On May 12, 1992, the Bosnian Serb Assembly met in Banja Luka (de facto capital
of Republika Srpska) and adopted a document presented by Radovan Karadzic titled “Six
strategic objectives for the Serbian people in BiH [Bosnia].”171 This document defined
the borders of the Serb state within Bosnia and separation from the other two ethnic
communities in Bosnia, as well as division of the city of Sarajevo into Serbian and
Bosnian Muslim parts.172 During the same session of the Bosnian Serb assembly, the
decision was made for the formation of the Army of Republika Srpska (Vojska Republike
Srpske (VRS)). The VRS was formed by the combination of the JNA units, the Territorial
Defense (TO) forces, and local Serb volunteer units. The VRS assumed the
organizational structure, personnel, military equipment and weapons of the JNA.173
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Karadzic was elected President of the three-member Presidency of the self-proclaimed
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69

General Ratko Mladic, a career military office, and the commander of the 9th Corps of the
JNA, who participated in the fighting in Croatia, became a commander of the VSR.174
The JNA played the key role in arming and staffing the VRS. After the JNA had to
officially withdraw from independent republic Bosnia in May of 1992, the successor of
the JNA, the Yugoslav Army (VJ), continued to provide “the logistic, personnel and
material support” to the VRS.175 The support of the JNA and its successor the VJ (as well
as Serbia as a driving force in the two-republic Federal Yugoslavia) made the Bosnian
Serbs, among the three communities (Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats)
by far the best-armed force in Bosnia.176 After the proclamation of Republika Srpska, the
Bosnian Serb forces started to seize control of the territory they perceived to be

weaponry to Serb volunteer units in the area of the responsibility of the 2nd VO. (…)
17,298 pieces of weaponry were distributed through the SDS.” The SDS also received
weapons from JNA units that had to leave Slovenia and Croatia, for example, 20,000
pieces of weaponry from the military warehouse in Skradinik (Croatia) to the Bosnian
municipalities where ethnic Serbs had a majority. In addition to arms being supplied to
the Bosnian Serbs, the JNA played a major role in training Bosnian Serbs paramilitary.
See Kolaric, Dossier, 63-64.
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strategically important, according to Karadzic’s “six strategic objectives,” with the
ultimate goal of a union with Serbia.
In April of 1992 the Bosnian-Serb militia isolated major Bosnian cities (including
the capital city Sarajevo) and began ethnic cleansing. Alija Izetbegovic, a president of the
Republic of Bosnia, ordered the mobilization of the TO, that is, the national guard, and
police reserve units, calling on the Republic’s people to “defend themselves.”177
However, the militarily superior Bosnian Serb Army was on the offensive, and by the end
of summer of 1992 two-thirds of Bosnia was under the Bosnian Serb control. As Warren
Zimmerman, the last U.S. Ambassador to SFR Yugoslavia (1989-92), points outs, “There
was no debate in Washington who started the war; it was the Serbs. The issue was what
to do about it.”178

3.2 Phases of U.S. Involvement in the Bosnian War as Related to the Use of Coercive
Strategies (1992-1995)
The United States involvement in the Bosnian crisis and war can be divided into four
phases. Phase I: The politics of not using force (non-military coercion) and following the
EC/UN lead. Phase II: A rhetorical toughness, the politics of not using force, and
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Press Gorazde, Ignoring NATO Ultimatum,” New York Times, April 23, 1994,
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Payin (Washington, DC: RAND, 1996), 190.
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diplomatic support for the Vance-Owens peace plan. Phase III: The escalation of
diplomatic pressure and the Contact Group peace plan. Phase IV: The United States leads
and backs diplomacy with military force, resulting in Operation Deliberate Force, and the
Dayton peace agreement.

3.3 Phase I: The Politics of not Using Force and Following the EC/UN Lead (March
1992- January 1993)
The George H. W. Bush administration (1989-1993) viewed the crisis in SFR
Yugoslavia, and Bosnia, as a European problem and maintained a largely ‘hands-off’
policy in the region.179 When, in June 1991, Slovenia and Croatia both declared
independence, the U.S. policy towards these two republics was clear: They or any
country (including any of the six former Yugoslav republics) should not challenge the
existing (SFR Yugoslavia’s) borders. However, the Bush administration supported “any
new configuration that the Yugoslav republics negotiated” with an emphasis that it had to
be done peacefully through negotiations.180 Military intervention was not threatened, and
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See, for example, Thomas L. Friedman, “Conflict in Yugoslavia; War In Yugoslavia
Feared by Baker,” New York Times, July 4, 1991,
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it was not considered as one of the possible options. As Zimmermann, the last U.S.
Ambassador to SFR Yugoslavia, points out, “If those who wanted their republics to
secede from Yugoslavia feared no American use of force to stop them, those who wanted
to prevent secession felt a similar absence of threat.”181 However, as the war was
spreading from Slovenia to Croatia, the United States, in its attempt to defuse the
violence, suspended its financial assistance and aid to SFR Yugoslavia and supported UN
Security Council Resolution 713. This resolution, in September 1992, imposed an arms
embargo on SFR Yugoslavia.182
The crisis in Bosnia started to rapidly escalate after the first Bosnian multiparty
elections were held on November 19, 1992, dominated by the parties based on ethnic
lines. 183 The war became inevitable after the referendum on independence, conducted on
March 2, 1992, when Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croats voted for an independent
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Bosnia and the Bosnian Serbs proclaimed an ‘independent’ Republika Srpska. In an
attempt to constrain escalation, the United States, following the EC, on April 7, 1992,
recognized Bosnian independence.184 Motivated by significant military advantage and
supported by the JNA (de facto under the leadership of Serbian President Slobodan
Milosevic) the Bosnian Serbs started a military offensive in their attempt to take over the
territory as outlined in Karadzic’s plan.185
As the violence progressed and refugees flooded neighboring countries, the Bush
administration continued to take a secondary role by supporting the EC and UN in their
attempt to negotiate peace among the warring parties and by supporting UN economic
sanctions (that is, non-military coercion) aimed at FR Yugoslavia. More precisely, the
Bush administration perceived economic sanctions as a way to isolate Milosevic and
neutralize his support for the Bosnian Serbs and their military offensive. Despite the Bush
administration having discussed military support for humanitarian objectives and having
discussed the potential use of air power, that is, limited air strikes, to dislodge the Serbian
artillery around Sarajevo, the Bush administration did not, during its mandate, threaten
military force; it stayed committed to supporting the UN/EC diplomatic initiatives and
sanctions; the goal was to negotiate peace not to impose it. As Zimmerman notes “none
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of the major shapers of U.S. policy toward Bosnia leaned toward force;” most
significantly, President Bush, Secretary of State James Baker, Secretary of Defense Dick
Cheney, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell. All declared that U.S.
ground forces were not to be used in Bosnia.186
However, as the Bosnian Serb offensive intensified during the summer and fall of
1992, the Bush administration supported the UN initiative to deploy 7,700 UNPROFOR
troops (UN Protection Forces/non-U.S. peacekeepers); the goal was to secure the
Sarajevo airport and ensure delivery of humanitarian aid.187 The Bush administration also
supported the efforts by the UN and the EC in forming the International Conference on
Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), co-chaired by the UN representative (and former U.S.
Secretary of State), Cyrus Vance, and the EC envoy (and former British Foreign
Secretary), Lord David Owen, which by January 1993 proposed the Vance-Owen peace
plan.188 This plan proposed for Sarajevo to become a demilitarized zone, Bosnia to be
divided into ten provinces and governed by the decentralized government, and it also
called for the Bosnian Serbs to abandon the territory they had gained in the past year.

186

See Zimmerman, “Yugoslavia: 1989-1996,” 190. Zimmermann also argues that
aversion to use force had three sources: The “lessons” from Vietnam (“even a minimum
injection of American force could swell (…) into a major commitment and produce a
quagmire”); the need for clear objectives before possible U.S. intervention (that is, the
need for an “exit strategy” and “American casualties were sure to be minimal;” the
coming presidential elections of 1992 and [again] fear of American casualties. See Ibid.,
191.
187

See “UN Security Resolutions 764, 770, & 776,” UN, accessed April 24, 2019,
https://www.un.org/secuirtycouncil/content/resolutions-adopted-secuirty-council-1992.
188

See Phil Haun, Coercion, Survival, and War, (Stanford University Press: Stanford:
2015), 97.

75

However, the Bosnian Serbs, encouraged by their territorial gains, and without any
credible coercive threats, were not willing to accept the plan.189

3.4 Phase II: A Rhetorical Toughness, the Politics of not Using Force, and the
UN/EC Peace Plan (January 1993- February 1994)
When President Bill Clinton took office in January of 1993, the siege of Sarajevo was in
its second year, the Bosnian Serbs were holding onto their territorial gains (with their
eyes and heavy artillery aimed at the Bosnian Muslim enclaves), and a war (within a war)
had broken out between the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Muslims whose military was
the most disadvantaged by the UN imposed arms embargo in 1992.
As a presidential candidate, Bill Clinton was critical of U.S. Bosnia policy, calling
for “real leadership”190 and the use of military force to “open Serbian detention
camps”.191 However, the rhetorical toughness that marked his 1992 presidential race did
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not translate to a ‘tougher’ or more ‘decisive’ U.S. Bosnian policy during 1993. The new
Clinton administration faced the same dilemma that the Bush administration had: How to
end the war without committing U.S. ground forces. The Vance-Owen peace plan for
Bosnia (a collaboration of the UN and the EC) was the focus of the White House
Principals’ committee meeting on Bosnia, conducted on February 5, 1993. During the
meeting General Powell argued, referring to the Vance-Owen peace plan, that “The
nature of a Bosnia agreement will require ground forces. We can punish from the air but
cannot enforce from the air.”192
The Clinton administration, like the Bush administration before, concluded that
sending troops to fight in Bosnia to enforce the peace plan would not be supported either
by Congress or the American people, therefore, ruling out any military intervention (or
threat of military intervention) in the absence of a peace agreement.193 However, the
Clinton administration proposed several initiatives that did not directly include a U.S.
commitment to use military force. On February 22, 1993, the UN Security Council
passed Resolution 808 initiating the establishment of a war crimes tribunal to prosecute
war crimes in the Former Yugoslavia.194 To help enforce the Vance-Owen plan, the
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Clinton administration supported tougher economic sanctions against Serbia [that is, FR
Yugoslavia] and in April 1993, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 820 reflecting
this initiative.195 Milosevic, pressed by economic sanctions, began, at least publicly, to
urge the Bosnian Serbs to sign the Vance-Owen peace plan. However, the Bosnian Serbs
rejected the plan in a mid-May referendum.196
In an attempt to protect the Bosnian Muslim population in towns besieged by the
Bosnia Serbs, in May 1993, the United States, Britain, Spain, and Russia reached
agreement on a joint action program called for the establishment of “safe areas”. It set the
stage for the passing of U.N. Security Council Resolution 824 authorizing the
establishment of six UN-protected safe areas: Sarajevo, Tuzla, Bihac, Srebrenica,
Gorazde, and Zepa.197 The Clinton administration also cosponsored UN Security Council
Resolution 836, which extended the mandate of UN troops (UNPROFOR) to “deter
attack” on the safe areas.198 UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali insisted that, in
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order to be able to fulfill its mandate (to protect the safe areas) additional troops were
needed; proposing a “force of up to 70,000 troops, including tens of thousands of
American soldiers”.199 However, only a fraction of that total was provided, mostly
comprised of French troops, leaving the safe areas exposed to the Bosnian Serbs’ heavy
weaponry and attacks.
Although the Clinton administration ruled out committing ground forces, the
administration was considering the limited use of force, that is, to support strategic
NATO air strikes to enforce the “no-fly zone” over Bosnia as well as to coerce Bosnian
Serbs to place their heavy weapons under international monitoring.200 This consideration
evolved into a “lift and strike” policy; to lift the UN arms embargo on the Bosnian
Muslim government [to give the Muslim Government better chance to defend itself] and
to employ strategic NATO air strikes against the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS). The
ultimate goal was to stop the war and compel the Bosnian Serbs to accept the VanceOwen peace plan. However, the Clinton administration was not ready to “press” the “lift
and strike” policy “to the point of shattering relations with their European allies or the
Russians.”201 Russian President Boris Yeltsin was explicit in only in supporting the
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February 2, 2020, https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36614.
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tougher UN sanctions, and the European allies, led by France and Britain, rejected the
proposed policy, arguing that “lift and strike” would put the UN protection forces
(UNPROFOR) in great danger - the majority being from the European countries and
without any participation of U.S. troops.202 Despite that the Clinton administration
adopted “lift and strike” as its official stance, by the end of May 1993, the proposed
policy was abandoned.
Another significant attempt “to put military strength in the service of diplomacy”
came with NATO starting to enforce a UN imposed no-fly zone over Bosnia aiming to
prevent bombardment of civilian targets and to support UN troops if under attack. As a
part of this policy, in August 1993, NATO threatened air strikes against the Bosnian
Serbs if they did not ease the siege of Sarajevo.203 In response, the Bosnian Serbs
threatened that “the attack would trigger a huge battle and chaos.” 204 The confrontation
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Karadzic issued a threat: “If a single bomb strikes a Serbian position, there would be
no more talks. We would have an all-out war and catastrophe. (…) There would be
tremendous suffering on all three sides. I would (…) lose control of the central
command;” as cited in Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy after
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was eventually resolved peacefully.205 But due to the fear of possible Bosnian Serb
retaliation (such as taking the UNPROFOR troops as hostages) and NATO bombing
errors, the European allies, led by Britain and France, insisted on a “dual key”, requiring
approval from both the UN civilian leadership and NATO military leadership before
strikes could occur, limiting coercive effects.
By late 1993, all attempts by the UN and EU (previously EC) to negotiate peace
in Bosnia, including the Vance-Owen peace plan, had failed.

3.5 Phase III: The Contact Group Peace Plan and the Escalation of Diplomatic
Pressure (February 1994- April 1995)
The Bosnian Serb attack on Sarajevo’s crowded open-air marketplace, which, in
February 1994 killed at least 66 people and wounded over 200 people, brought a subtle
shift in U.S. policy in Bosnia.206 President Clinton was explicit that “more must be done
to stop the shelling of Sarajevo and the murder of innocents.” However, he also insisted
that the conflict should only be resolved by the warring parties and he ruled out any
unilateral use of American military power.207 The subtle shift meant that, militarily, the
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United States would now threaten NATO air strikes should the Bosnian Serbs not cease
shelling, should they not remove their heavy weapons from around Sarajevo, and should
they not respect the UN’s mandated no-fly ban. The goal was to use ‘decisive air strikes’
to coerce the Bosnian Serbs. However, the Clinton administration would, eventually,
settle for ‘limited air strikes’ with a ‘dual key’ limitation (the NATO air strike had to be
approved by the UN civilian leadership as well as by the NATO military leadership) and
without much coercing power.208
On the diplomatic front, the Clinton administration made two significant
achievements: First, the administration negotiated a cease-fire between the Bosnian
Muslims and Bosnian Croats, and the two groups, in March of 1994, agreed to form the
(Muslim-Croat) Bosnian Federation.209 The two groups would also, in the future peace
talks, negotiate as one delegation. Second, in April 1994, the United States, along Russia,
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Despite NATO threats and despite NATO taking down four Bosnian Serb planes in
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Watkins and Rosegrant note that after the agreement “Croatia revived a pipeline of
third-country arms shipments to Bosnia through Croatian territory, in violation of the UN
embargo. (…) Few heavy weapons got through, but the pipeline helped equalize the
military balance in the Balkans.” See Watkins and Rosegrant. Breakthrough International
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was a leading force in the creation of the Contact Group, comprised of the United States,
Russia, France, Germany, and Great Britain. The Contact Group’s goal was in the line
with the ICTY’s goal: To end the war in Bosnia. However, its approach was different; it
would employ bilateral negotiations, where the United States was responsible to bring the
Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims to the negotiating table and Russia was responsible
to bring the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiating table. In May 1994, the Contact Group
proposed a peace plan that partitioned the territory with 51 percent going to the Muslim
Croat Federation and 49 percent to the Bosnian Serbs, and the Contact Group plan, as
opposed to the Vance-Owens plan, allowed the Bosnian Serbs to retain their government
and to form independent diplomatic relations with Serbia. On the other hand, the Bosnian
Muslims would have to share their territory with the Croats, but the Contact Group plan
gave the Bosnian government an access to the sea.210
With the goal to compel the Bosnian Serbs to accept the Contact Group peace
plan, the Clinton administration again proposed a “lift and strike” policy, threatening to
lift the arms embargo on the Bosnian Federation Army and strike the VRS [the Bosnian
Serbs Army] with NATO air power.211 The Russians, as well as major NATO allies,
rejected the “lift and strike” policy, denying the proposed peace plan necessary coercive
leverage. The Bosnian Serbs rejected the Contact group peace plan. 212
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After this debacle, Milosevic, under economic and political pressure from Russia
as well as the West, increased public pressure on the Bosnian Serbs, especially on
Karadzic and Mladic, to accept the Contact Group peace plan.213 One can argue that
Milosevic was not sincere and played a “double-game,” a nationalist with the Bosnian
Serbs and an internationalist with the U.S. and Russia.214 However, one can also point out
that the balance of power favored the Bosnian Serbs (the militarily strongest party among
the three in Bosnia), and the economic pressure from Milosevic and Russia, without any
credible military threat, was not sufficient for the Bosnian Serbs to concede to a 51/49
partition since they, at the time, held 70 percent of Bosnia.
As the peace negotiations continued, the fighting in Bosnia continued. Under
increasing pressure to accept a peace agreement, most notably from Milosevic, and as
Bosnia’s harsh winter was approaching, Karadzic initiated a cease-fire proposal that was
mediated, on Karadzic’s insistence, by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter. Karadzic
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Milosevic’s support fluctuated publicly, depending on Serbia’s internal politics as well as
international political and economic pressures; for Milosevic, the goal was to stay in
power. Milosevic, who had control over the media in Serbia, initially was persistent in
blaming the international community for Serbia’s economic hardship (that is, Serbia
being “unfairly punished”). But Milosevic eventually changed the theme, accusing the
Bosnian Serbs being responsible for the economic hardship in Serbia because they were
not willing to accept the Contact Group peace plan. See “A Troubled Year of
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agreed to reopen the Sarajevo airport and to stop the harassment of UN personnel in
return for a four-month cease-fire and the recommencement of serious negotiations. 215
The cease-fire held until May 1995.

3.6 Phase IV: The U.S. Leads: Backing Diplomacy with Military Force (May 1995 November 1995)
In the spring of 1995, as the Bosnian Federation forces were growing stronger, the
Bosnian Serbs decided that going on the offensive would help them end the war on their
terms.216 On March 8, 1995, Karadzic, the President of Republika Srpska, issued

215
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Ivo Daalder argues that “The Bosnian Serb objective was clear: to conclude the war
before the onset of the winter.” However, based on the evidence, one can conclude that
the Bosnian Serbs went on the offensive before the military balance turned against them.
It is important to note that in addition to the Bosnian Federation military strength build
up, the military strength of Croatia grew significantly between 1994 and 1995. In 1994
Croatia spent an estimated $1 billion on arms; allowing Croatia to arm itself, despite the
UN arms embargo, was one of the important segments of the Clinton administration’s
Balkan policy during 1994 (one goal being to alter the balance of military power among
three parties in the Bosnia war). It is significant for the war in Bosnia that “Croatia
became the chief conductor for weapons to the Muslim-led Bosnian Army,” where
Croatia also profited from this by “taking 30 percent of all [military] shipments.” During
1994, the Croatian Army leadership, at the request by Croatian Minister of Defense,
Gojko Susak, also received significant military training from a company called Military
Professional Resources Inc., based in the United States. Ed Soyster, a retired U.S.
lieutenant general and one of the company’s vice presidents, argues that this “is the
greatest corporate assembly of military expertise in the world.” See Roger Cohen, “U.S.
Cooling Ties to Croatia After Winking at its Buildup,” New York Times, October 28,
1995, https://www.nytimes.com/1995/10/28/world/us-cooling-ties-to-croatia-afterwinking-at-its-buildup.html. Peter Galbraith, Former Ambassador to Croatia, stated that
“even if we had told them [the Croatian Officials] that they should respect the arms
embargo they would (…) had no intention of respecting it. (…) The irony is that the
country that was most adamant in insisting that the arms embargo stay was Russia (…)

85

“Directive 7,” which “ordered complete the physical separation of Srebrenica and Zepa
[UN protected] enclaves as soon as possible, preventing even communication between
individuals between the two enclaves.” Karadzic also ordered “[b]y planned and wellthought-out combat operation, create an unbearable situation (…) with no hope of further
survival of life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica or Zepa.”217 The goal was to finish ethnic
cleansing in eastern Bosnia by taking over the Bosnian Muslim populated eastern
enclaves.
At the beginning of May 1995, Sarajevo, despite being one of the UN protected
areas, came under intensified attacks by the Bosnian Serbs. When on May 11, 1995
Bosnian Serbs shelled the center of Sarajevo killing eight civilians and wounding 40, the
Bosnian Serbs seemed to cross the line of what could be called “acceptable behavior.”218
Lieutenant General Rupert Smith of Britain, the UNPROFOR commander in Sarajevo,
warned that fighting had to stop. However, fighting as well as harassment of
UNPROFOR troops continued. When on May 24 the Bosnian Serbs forces stole heavy
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weapons from two UNPROFOR-guarded depots, Lieutenant General Smith issued an
ultimatum demanding the Bosnian Serbs to return stolen weapons or face the air strikes.
As prescribed by the dual-key air strike authorization protocol, the air strike had to be
approved by the UN civilian authority and the NATO military leadership. When the noon
deadline passed, Yasushi Akashi, the senior UN official supervising operations in Bosnia,
reluctantly approved pinprick strikes, and NATO bombed the weapon depots near the
Bosnian Serbs’ capital Pale. 219 The Bosnian Serbs responded by shelling the UN
protected areas and taking nearly 400 UN hostages, who were chained to potential NATO
targets and televised around the world.220
After two days of selective bombing, fearing the potential spread of war and being
aware that the UN troops would be forced to cross so-called ‘Mogadishu line’ or become
an easy target for the Bosnian Serbs troops, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali
refused to approve the third day of selective air strikes. After weeks of negotiations all
UN hostages were released, but the Bosnian Serbs became more confident in the
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Raids,” AP News, May 26, 1995,
https://apnews.com/article/e6f1e380aa74c92d71bfd1837ec9e3a0. Richard Holbrooke
writes, “ (…) handcuffed (…) to trees and telephone poles. The world’s press was invited
to film these men standing miserably in the broiling sun. (…) The television pictures
were appalling. That the world’s greatest powers would be brought to their knees by such
thugs seemed to me inconceivable.” Holbrooke, To End A War, 64.
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limitations of NATO power and the vulnerability of UN troops.221 The UN was
humiliated and the NATO members, especially those which contributed troops to the UN
mission in Bosnia, were angered.222 It was confirmed again that the UN troops in Bosnia
were a soft target for the Bosnian Serb forces. In their attempt to protect their own troops
participating in the UN peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, Britain and France initiated the
creation of a Rapid Reaction Force, which would be “equipped with artillery and armor
for a real military action.”223 However, a disadvantage was that it would take weeks
before these troops could be operationalized.
In late May, as the events were unfolding, President Clinton started pressing his
National Security Council for a new policy in the Balkans.224 Although this was not the
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Lieutenant General Sir Michael Rose, commander of the UNPROFOR forces in
Bosnia, who was replaced in January 1995 by Lieutenant General Rupert Smith, coined
the phrase “Mogadishu line” which described the need to maintain “neutrality in the face
of all provocation for fear of becoming an unwilling participant in a civil war.” In other
words, not to cross the Mogadishu line, “the same one which the U.S. troops had crossed
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Evolution,” Washington Post, September 11, 1995,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/09/11/clintons-policyevolution/008683c3-44ea-4857-ad47-cdd1787370b2/.

88

first time that President Clinton asked the National Security Council to review the policy,
this time the President instructed his team to provide strategies for more activist U.S.
policy that would, once for all, end the war and force the warring sides to the bargaining
table; the “endgame” strategy.”225
Publicly, President Clinton defended the NATO air strikes and warned that
“taking hostages, as well as the killing of civilians (…) is totally wrong and inappropriate
and it should stop.” He expressed his support for further NATO airstrikes by positioning
an “aircraft carrier and three other warships in the Adriatic [sea] within 50 to 100 miles of
the Bosnian cost.” However, the dual key, which was still necessary for the activation of
air strikes, as well as President Clinton’s reluctance to commit U.S. troops discredited the
threats. When asked by the press if he knew about President Boris Yeltsin’s reaction to
the NATO air strikes, he responded that he did not and mentioned that “I would ask him
[President Yeltsin] to call Serbs and tell them to quit it and tell them to behave
themselves.”226 However, the Bosnian Serbs did not take President Clinton’s warning as
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credible. On July 6, 1995, the Bosnian Serbs launched an attack on Srebrenica, one of the
three UN-protected enclaves in eastern Bosnia, surrounded by Bosnian Serb forces since
the beginning of the Bosnian war.227 The outnumbered and lightly armed UNPROFOR
troops asked for NATO air strikes, but eventually withdrew from Srebrenica or were
taken as hostages by the Bosnia Serbs.228 By July 16, 1995, Srebrenica was in Bosnian
Serb hands, the UNPROFOR troops were humiliated and defeated; and the death toll of
Bosnian Muslims (civilians and prisoners of war) executed by the Bosnian Serb forces
was 7,079.229 The fall of Zepa on July 20, 1995 stunned the Clinton administration and its
NATO allies.230
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Holbrooke, To End A War, 70. Also, on July 25, 1995 Mladic and Karadzic were
indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia on charges of:
Genocide; crimes against humanity (“by prosecuting Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat
civilians on national, political and religious grounds”); and being “criminally responsible
for the unlawful confinement, murder, rape, sexual assaults, torture, beating, robbery and
inhumane treatment of civilians.” It was amended in November 1995 to include charges
of genocide and crimes against humanity in relation to Srebrenica. See “Milan Martic,
Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic Indicted Along with 21 Other Accused,” ICTY, July
25, 1995, https://www.icty.org/en/press/milan-martic-radovan-karadzic-and-ratkomladic-indicted-along-21-other-accused.
230

See Chris Hedges, “Conflict in the Balkans: In Bosnia; Second ‘Safe Area’ in Eastern
Bosnia Overrun by Serbs,” New York Times, July 20, 1995.

90

On July 21, 1995, an emergency conference in London was attended by the
NATO leaders, the UN envoy, and a Russian representative. After the conference,
Secretary of State Warren Christopher said, “The Bosnian Serb leaders are now on notice
that an attack against Gorazde will be met by substantial and decisive air power. (…)
There will be no more pinprick strikes.” This was a clear military threat; retaliation if the
Bosnia Serbs try to take over Gorazde This threat was extended on August 1, 1995, on
other UN protected areas, including Sarajevo.231, the last UN-protected enclave in eastern
Bosnia. A pivotal change, contributing to the credibility of military threats, was that UN
Secretary General Boutros-Ghali agreed to delegate UN strike authority (that is, his veto
and approval power) to the overall military commander for UNPROFOR, French
Lieutenant General, Bernard Javier. This made the NATO-UN coordination of air strike
approval and execution significantly better and faster. President Clinton gave his support
by stating, “That was the right decision for him [UN General Secretary] to take, and it
shows that he [General Secretary], too, is concerned that the United Nations cannot
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express a commitment to protect the security of people and then walk away from it.”232
Deterrence succeeded, since Bosnian Serbs did not take over Gorazde; however, when on
August 28, 1995, a mortar bomb hit a marketplace in Sarajevo, killing thirty-seven
civilians, it was clear that coercive diplomacy had failed. The Bosnian Serbs denied
responsibility for the marketplace attack; however, the UN spokesperson in a public
statement acknowledged that that the shelling was done from a southern position, that is
one held by the Bosnian Serbs. 233
Moreover, in western Bosnia, the Bosnian Serbs’ forces were on offense. The
(Croatian) Krajina Serbs joined this offensive on July 19, 1995, when they attacked
Bihac, the Muslim enclave in the northwest Bosnia.234 On August 4, 1995 Croatia’s flash
offensive Operation Storm put an end to the Krajina, Serb-ruled separatist territory of
Croatia. At this point, the balance of power started to visibly change.235 The fall of the
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The humanitarian toll of the Croatian military offensive was high. As a consequence
of the Croatian military action, thousands of Croatian Serbs, despite Croatian government
assurances that Serbs could stay without fearing for their lives, fled to the parts of Bosnia
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Krajina strategically weakened and demoralized Bosnian Serbs. As the events were
unfolding, and fights intensified, the status-quo became untenable; the Clinton
administration, concerned with its reputation and the reputation of the United States
decided to take the lead.236
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3.6.1 The “Endgame” Strategy
In late May President Clinton requested that the National Security Council
review the Bosnia policy.237 After the fall of Srebrenica, the Bosnia “endgame” strategy
schematic was forwarded at the request of Sandy Berger, Deputy National Security
Advisor, to the members of the National Security Council for a discussion. The goal of
the “endgame” strategy was a diplomatic settlement of the Bosnian War. The conditions
for success were listed as “Bosnian Serbs decide to negotiate rather than continue
military campaign.” The ways to achieve this goal was for NATO to demonstrate will
and capability to use sufficient military power to affect the balance of power between the
Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Federation. And the West to induce Milosevic, through
sanctions, carrots and sticks, to recognize Bosnia (as one state) and support peace
process.238
Based on the input he received from the NSC principals, Anthony Lake, National
Security Advisor, suggested to President Clinton that a political settlement in Bosnia
should “adhere to central principle of the Contact Group plan” (the “51-49” principle,
where 51 percent of the territory goes to the Croat-Muslim Federation and 49 percent to
the Bosnian Serbs), but “with a more realistic map.” The map had to include more
flexibility from all three sides. Lake stressed that it would require the United States to
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take a leadership role in the negotiations.239 Furthermore, two additional factors were
identified: First, the pivotal role of military pressure to compel the Bosnian Serbs to
negotiate a suitable peace settlement. Second, Russia as the prime diplomatic obstacle,
where the U.S. goal should be to minimize Russian support for Serbs and avoid Russia’s
veto in the Security Council.240 After the final deliberation on August 8, 1995, by
President Clinton and the National Security Council, the “endgame” strategy was
finalized: Diplomatic initiative backed by NATO’s air strikes, this time headed by the
United States.241
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According to Holbrooke, the final plan had seven points: (1) a comprehensive peace
settlement: (2) three-way recognition among Bosnia, Croatia, and FR Yugoslavia; (3) the
full lifting of all economic sanctions against Yugoslavia if a settlement was reached, and
a program to equip and train the Croat-Muslim Federation forces if there was a
settlement; (4) the peaceful return to Croatia of eastern Slavonia; (5) an all-out effort to
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Regarding the diplomatic initiative, it had two stages: First, presidential
emissaries (Anthony Lake, National Security Advisor, and Peter Tarnoff, Under
Secretary of State) went to Russia and six European countries and presented a framework
for peace. One of the requirements of the CD Triangle, the model proposed in this
dissertation, is to have an international environment that favors the coercer, that is, the
coercer should identify and engage the potential regional or global competitor (potential
“spoilers”), giving the target no option to balance the coercer’s threats by external
forces.242 Therefore, by identifying and engaging Russia, the Clinton administration
fulfilled one of the three factors identified in CD Triangle.
In the second stage Richard Holbrooke, U.S. Undersecretary of State, had the task
of persuading the three warring parties, most notably Serbian President Slobodan
Milosevic, to accept the peace plan for Bosnia.243
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3.6.2 The U.S. Leads: Holbrook, Milosevic, and the “Endgame” Strategy
As the peacekeeping drama was unfolding in May of 1995, a month-long attempt by
Robert Frasure, a U.S. Envoy to Bosnia and former Contact Group negotiator, to
negotiate with Milosevic ended unsuccessfully.244 Under the framework proposed by
Frasure, Milosevic was asked to recognize the Bosnian Federation, take steps to assure
that the Bosnian Serbs did not smuggle supplies from FR Yugoslavia, and commit
himself to securing Bosnian Serbs’ approval of an international peace plan. In exchange,
economic sanction imposed on FR Yugoslavia by the UN would be suspended. The
disagreement came over how sanctions would be reimposed in the event Milosevic did
not comply. Milosevic insisted that he should be guaranteed a full year without sanctions.
Also, in case of possible non-compliance, Milosevic insisted that UN General-Secretary,
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, should make recommendation to the Security Council on whether
they should be reposed, not the UN Security Council members.245 After Frasure’s
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unsuccessful attempt to persuade Milosevic to recognize the republic of Bosnia, Carl
Bildt, the EU negotiator, continued to negotiate with Milosevic through July 1995.
However, the negotiations did not produce any concrete results.246
Milosevic, despite the economic hardship and occasional dissent among hard core
nationalist or democratic forces within Serbia, still had control over Serbia and FR
Yugoslavia. Most notable he controlled the security service, senior offices in the VJ
(Yugoslav Army), and most of the media.247 Although recognized by the West as one of
the main actors and instigators of the wars on the territory of former Yugoslavia,
Milosevic, with more or less success, had played an international and domestic game of
“not me, but them.” The economic hardship in Serbia he blamed on the West. As the
events were unfolding, he gradually shifted blame to the Bosnian Serbs and their
unwillingness to accept a peace plan. However, as time passed, the costly war in Bosnia
as well as economic sanctions placed on FR Yugoslavia by the UN were putting
significant pressure on all strata of Serbian society and on Milosevic’s capability to
sustain his position. When in September 1994 Holbrook became the Assistant Secretary
of State for Europe, he argued that U.S. policy of isolating Milosevic was not working,
and he proposed that U.S. should make an attempt to engage with Milosevic in a “more
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positive” way. Milosevic’s ultimate objective was to stay in power, and the Clinton
administration wanted to end the war in Bosnia.248 To Holbrooke, Milosevic was “the key
to everything.”249

3.6.3 Holbrooke-Milosevic Meeting, August 17-18
Holbrooke met Milosevic, for the first time, on August 17 in Belgrade. This
meeting, which was called by Holbrooke, lasted almost six hours. After initial attempts
by Milosevic to “charm” Holbrooke and attempts by Holbrooke to “charm” Milosevic,
the meeting ended without any concrete results.250 The next morning, Holbrooke decided
to meet Milosevic again. This time Holbrook believed that to move the negotiations
forward the sticks and carrots were not the right tools, but a “hammer” or a
“sledgehammer.”251 The meeting lasted two hours, and Holbrooke was clear: Milosevic
had to produce results or face the consequences.252 The first step was to have Milosevic
commit himself to represent the Bosnian Serbs and eventually accept the peace plan.

248
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After these two initial meetings with Milosevic, Holbrooke was convinced that
diplomacy alone, without the decisive support of air power, would not achieve more than
what had been done in the previous attempts to persuade the Bosnia Serbs to accept the
peace plan.253 On August 27, Holbrooke, although not knowing that NATO would be
engaging any time soon, declared to the press, “If this peace initiative does not get
moving, dramatically moving in the next week or two, the consequences will be very
adverse to the Serbian goals. (…) [O]ne way or another, NATO will be heavily involved,
and the Serbs do not want that.”254
On August 28, 1995, a mortar bomb hit a marketplace in Sarajevo, killing thirtyseven civilians. When UNPROFOR troops confirmed that the Bosnian Serb forces were
behind this attack, the Clinton administration called for the UN to approve NATO air
operations.255 Having in mind the remaining UNPROFOR troops in Gorazde, Operation
Deliberate Force started on August 30, giving the UNPROFOR troops sufficient time to
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withdraw before the NATO air campaign. The operation lasted two weeks, involving
3400 sorties.256 The demands were clear: the Bosnian Serbs had to move heavy weapons
away from Sarajevo and they had to stop threatening other UN “safe areas.”257

3.6.4 Holbrooke-Milosevic Meeting, August 30
The day Operation Deliberate Force started, Holbrooke and his team arrived in
Belgrade.258 Holbrook believed that the bombing campaign was essential in moving the
stalled negotiations with Milosevic, and Operation Deliberate Force worked in
Holbrooke’s favor. Holbrooke expected a cold welcome from Milosevic, but the
reception was warm. Milosevic expressed sympathy over the death of Robert Frasure and
the other two American diplomats who died in a car crash on their way from Belgrade to
Sarajevo. Then Milosevic turned to Holbrooke and presented a two-page document, the
Patriarch Paper, which officially authorized Milosevic to negotiate on behalf of the
Bosnian Serbs, and was witnessed by Patriarch Pavle, the leader of the Serbian Orthodox
Church. This was a significant step forward in getting not just the Bosnian Serbs to
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participate in negotiations but also Milosevic, who in the past would argue that he did not
have control over the Bosnian Serbs.259
Milosevic, in his attempt to show his willingness to cooperate, went a step
forward and suggested for Holbrooke to convene an international peace conference where
Milosevic could meet “Izetbegovic [the president of Bosnian Federation] and Tudjman
[the president of Croatia] and ‘settle everything.’”260 Holbrooke, reminded Milosevic that
Sarajevo was still under the siege and NATO planes would remain in the air over Bosnia
until the siege of Sarajevo is ended.261 At this point, Milosevic called his aid, Goran
Milinovic, and instructed him to immediately contact Mladic, the Bosnian Serb military
commander. During the dinner, Milinovic returned with Mladic’s answer that the
Bosnian Serbs would stop the siege if there were given assurances that NATO and Bosnia
Federal forces would stop their attacks.262 Holbrooke perceived this a common tactic by
Mladic and Karadzic to condition their compliance with the demands. At this point
Holbrooke was clear, he would not negotiate with the indicted war criminals; the NATO
bombing would stop only if Milosevic could guarantee “an end to the siege of Sarajevo.”
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Holbrooke looked at Milosevic and said, “Karadzic and Mladic are your problem.” 263
Milosevic was reluctant to take the full responsibly for Karadzic and Mladic’s move on
the ground, but he was willing to cooperate. He insisted that the Patriarch Paper be made
public. He was ready to take his new role, a peacemaker, publicly for domestic and
international purpose. It is significant that Holbrooke ended this meeting with Milosevic
by saying, “We’ll be back Mr. President, but remember NATO planes are in the air over
Bosnia as we speak.” Milosevic replied, “Yes, Mr. Holbrooke, [a]nd you have the power
to stop them.”264
On August 31, one day after Holbrooke’s meeting with Milosevic, UNPROFOR
commander Lieutenant General Bernard Janvier requested from NATO a twenty-fourhour bombing pause to review the Bosnian Serb forces conditional acceptance to
withdraw heavy weapons from Sarajevo under the guarantee that the Bosnian Federal
Army would not take over the abandoned territory. The conditional acceptance was
refused.265 The same day Holbrooke and his team met in Belgrade with the British,
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264

As cited by Holbrooke, To End A War, 108. Hill notes in his account of the meeting
that Milosevic’s “English was pretty good” and Milosevic did not have a translator
during the meeting. Hill also noted that during the meeting, Holbrooke occasionally took
the phone call, which he would describe to Milosevic as “coming from the White House.”
As Hill notes “most of us [from the Holbrooke’s team”] suspected they are from his wife,
Kati, in New York.” See Hill, Outpost, 90.
265

See Daniel Williams, “NATO Continues Extensive Bombing Across Bosnia,”
Washington Post, August 31, 1995, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/inatl/longterm/balkans/stories/nato.htm.

103

French, German, and Russian representatives to inform them about the meeting
conducted with Milosevic.
On September 1, NATO suspended its air campaign in Bosnia giving
UNPROFOR commander General Janvier additional time to negotiate with Bosnian Serb
commander Mladic to lift the siege of Sarajevo.266 On the diplomatic front, the Clinton
administration announced that the meeting of the Balkan Foreign Ministers, the first since
September 1993, was scheduled for September 8 in Geneva. Although publicly cautious
about the prospects for the permanent settlement of the Bosnia war, Holbrooke’s team
started to work on the outlines of an interim agreement.267 As a part of Holbrooke’s
strategy, Milosevic, in the weeks following their meeting, was undergoing transformation
in the U.S. press. Milosevic metamorphosed from war criminal into a peacemaker. The
Clinton administration reinforced this perspective. Nicholas Burns, a State Department
spokesperson told reporters, “President Milosevic is a respected leader among the Serbs
and for him to come out and dedicate his government to the peace process is a positive
sign.”268 Holbrooke’s strategy helped cast Milosevic in a new light: A charming rogue
rather than a “butcher” of Yugoslavia and a mastermind of the Balkan war. Holbrooke
admitted that there was a Milosevic-centered strategy, “[b]ut not to make him a good
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guy.”269 It was Holbrooke’s attempt to build the trust between him and Milosevic,
Milosevic, according to Holbrooke, being the key to ending the war in Bosnia.
On September 8, the Clinton administration, led by Holbrooke and his team, made
one more significant step towards ending the war; the Bosnian Federation, Croatian and
FR Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) delegations met in Geneva and agreed to basic
principles for a Bosnia settlement. Accordingly, Bosnia will “continue its legal existence
with its present borders and continuing international recognition;” it will consist of two
political entities: the Serbian Republika Srpska (with 49 percent of the territory) and the
Croat-Muslim Federation of Bosnia (51 percent of the territory).270
On September 9, taking advantage of the NATO airstrikes the Croat and Federal
forces launched an offensive in northwest Bosnia. The next day NATO expanded its air
strikes against Serb radar and missile sites. As the bombing was entering its second week,
NATO, committed not to strike so-called level three targets (which could harm civilians),
was running out of military targets (ammunition depots and command-control centers).
Although one of the goals of NATO air operation was to alter the military balance
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between the Federation and the Bosnian Serbs, on the other hand the goal was also not to
threaten fragile alliance with Russia by looking pro-Federation. Taking into consideration
these two factors, there were indications that NATO bombing would soon halt.
Holbrooke did not want the bombing to end without the Bosnian Serbs’ full compliance,
but he had reasonable doubts that the British and French would support an expansion of
NATO targets. 271 On September 11, during the NSC Principals’ meeting in the White
House, President Clinton, who was under the pressure from the NATO allies to end the
NATO air campaign, asked the NSC if the bombing was hurting the peace process.
Holbrooke insisted that the NATO air campaign should continue. He argued that it was
hurting the Bosnian Serbs, but it was getting the Bosnian Serbs close to the negotiating
table. Holbrooke insisted that Bosnian Serbs should be aware that leaving the negotiating
table would be less profitable than staying at the table and try to compromise to end the
war in Bosnia.272 President Clinton concluded that the air campaign should be better
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coordinated with the diplomatic efforts. As NATO was running out of “Option Two”
targets in Bosnia, Holbrooke was running out of time to settle the war in Bosnia.273

3.6.5 Holbrooke-Milosevic Meeting, September 13
Holbrooke and his team met with Milosevic in Belgrade on September 13. Milosevic
complained that NATO “planes are giving close air support to the Muslims and Croats,”
clearly taking sides, and the bombing should stop. Holbrooke insisted that the Bosnian
Serbs had to end the siege of Sarajevo. At this point, Holbrooke although a great
supporter of further bombing, expected NATO to halt bombing in a day or two.
Therefore, he had a strong incentive to support the initiative expressed by Milosevic to
negotiate a settlement that evening. As Milosevic said, “the situation on the ground
needed calming.”274 The meeting lasted eleven hours, and it ended by Mladic, Karadizic
and Milosevic signing the paper agreeing to end the siege of Sarajevo and to remove the
heavy weapons. The assurances were made that the Russian UNPROFOR troops would
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take over the positions vacated by the Bosnian Serbs. NATO suspended air strikes on
September 14, initially for seventy-two hours and then permanently.275
Despite NATO having suspended air strikes, the Croat-Bosnian Federation
ground offensive continued taking over the large portions of western Bosnia. Holbrooke,
whose goal was to enter formal peace negotiations with the Contact Group’s “51/49”
partitioning of the territory, encouraged the Croat-Bosnian Federation forces to continue
seizing territory but was clear that Banja Luka, the Bosnian Serbs largest city and de
facto capital, should not be taken.276 By end of September 1995, the Croat-Bosnian
Federation offensive, without the NATO air support, had stalled.
With the Federation and Bosnian Serbs each controlling half of Bosnia, which
was Holbrooke’s goal, on October 5 Holbrooke secured a cease fire agreement between
the Bosnian Federation and the Bosnian Serbs. This time it was signed by Milosevic,
Izetbegovic, and Tudjman. President Clinton announced that the ceasefire would
officially start at one minute after midnight on October 10, with peace talks to take place
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at the end of October in the United Sates, following by the full-scale peace conference in
Paris.277

3.6.6 The “Endgame” End: Dayton Accords
The peace negotiations, which commenced at Wright-Patterson Air Force base in Dayton,
Ohio, on November 1, 1995, concluded with a formal signing of the Dayton Accords in
Paris on December 15.278 The focus in Dayton was on the Bosnian constitution and a
final map, including unified Sarajevo.279 An early agreement between Milosevic and
Tudjman resolved the pending issues of the Croatian war, that is, the return of eastern
Slavonia to Croatia. Milosevic agreed to turn over eastern Slavonia to Croatia, and
Tudjman, in return, supported the Bosnian peace negotiations.280 The challenging aspect
of the negotiations was the internal border between the Federation and the Republika
Srpska. Milosevic conceded on two key territorial issues. First, he agreed to give the
Bosnia Serb-controlled parts of Sarajevo to the Croat-Muslim Federation as well as the
territory in eastern Bosnia to provide the Croat-Muslim Federation with an access route
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to Gorazde. Second, he agreed that a decision over the Brcko corridor should be delayed
for a year and eventually submitted to international arbitration. 281 In return, the
Republica Srpska kept hold of 49 percent of Bosnian territory, received recognition as a
separate political entity within Bosnia, retained its military (excluding heavy weapons)
and had the right to directly interact with Serbia. Milosevic emerged from Dayton with
two achievements, he gained a reputation as a peacemaker and he finally succeeded in
having UN sanctions against FR Yugoslavia terminated.282 As he guaranteed to
Holbrooke, Milosevic secured the signature and cooperation of both Karadzic and Mladic
when he traveled to Bosnia following conclusion of the Dayton Accord.283 President
Yeltsin gave public support for the peace agreement, pledging Russia’s participation in
post-war rebuilding of Bosnia.284

3.7 The CD Triangle and the U.S. Coercive Strategies in Phase IV
As discussed in Chapter 2, the CD Triangle predicts that if in asymmetric military
coercion the following factors are present, coercive diplomacy will succeed: First, the
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target perceives the threats as credible, that is, the coercer succeeds in communicating the
will to use force. Second, the target perceives assurances as credible, that is, the target
trusts that the coercer will not change its objectives and will not change its demands.
Third, the international environment favors the coercer, that is, there are no global or
regional spoilers willing to balance the coercer’s threats.
In phase IV, as opposed to phases I, II, and III, the United States took the lead in
bringing the war in Bosnia to an end and attempted different coercive strategies to coerce
the Bosnia Serbs and Slobodan Milosevic to the negotiating table (see Table 3.1). From
the available evidence one can conclude that in phase IV the international environment
favored the coercer, where key potential spoiler Russia was willing to let the United
States take the lead in Bosnia, without any attempt to balance U.S. threats against the
Bosnian Serbs or Milosevic. However, the perceptions by the target regarding the
credibility of threats and assurances differed. In May 1995, Robert Frasure, U.S. Envoy
to Bosnia, was unsuccessful in using non-military coercion (lifting/extending economic
sanctions) to persuade Milosevic to recognize the Bosnian republic and stop support for
the Bosnian Serbs. Milosevic insisted on assurance that the United States was not willing
to make, and negotiations failed.
In July 1995, Warren Christopher, Secretary of State, used military threats
(decisive NATO air strikes) to successfully deter the Bosnian Serbs taking over Gorazde.
However, he failed to compel the Bosnian Serbs to end the siege of Sarajevo. As
predicted by the CD Triangle, credible threats and the international environment favoring
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the coercer without credible assurances were not sufficient for successful coercive
diplomacy.285
In August 1995 Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and
U.S. negotiator in Bosnia, by using military threats and assurances, succeeded in coercing
Serbian President Milosevic to officially represent the Bosnia Serbs at the negotiating
table. Operation Deliberate Force, that is the use of decisive NATO air strikes (limited
military force), was used by Holbrooke to successfully signal the United States would use
military force and to signal commitment to end the siege of Sarajevo and to end the war
in Bosnia.
Furthermore, the international environment favored the coercer; Russia accepted
the United States leading role in the negotiating process, and the assurances were
perceived as credible by the Bosnian Serbs that the Russian UNPROFOR troops would
take over the positions vacated by them. These three factors made military coercion
successful and brought an end to the war in Bosnia. However, it is important to note that
the evidence shows the Bosnian Serb leaders were willing to acquiesce to the demands
(to stop the siege of Sarajevo and windrow the heavy weapons) even before the limited
force was used, but only if they were given assurances that the territory, after their
withdrawal, would not be taken by the Bosnia Federal forces. One important factor that
was missing from the strategy used by Holbrooke on August 30, was his unwillingness to
provide the assurances to the Bosnian Serbs; however, the assurances were extended on
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September 14. The Bosnian Serbs and Milosevic agreed to stop the siege of Sarajevo
after all three conditions, as postulated by CD Triangle, were present.
It is significant that coercer’s past actions (in phase I, II or III) did not influence
target’s perceptions of coercer’s threats in phase IV. However, the target’s past action
and reputation did influence the coercer’s decision to continue to use limited force in
phase IV despite the target’s willingness to acquiesce to the demands if given the
assurances, that is, Holbrooke insisted on the “51-49” principle on the ground.

Table 1. Summary of U.S. Coercive Strategies in Bosnia, Phase IV (May 1995-Noveber
1995)
Row
No.

1

Episode
of Coercion

BosniaPhase IV:
U.S./
NATOBosnian
Serbs,
July 21/
August 1,
1995

CT

CA

ISE

Outcome
CD

Outcome
MC

Outcome
D

1

0

1

0
(NA)

0
(NA)

1

1

0

1

0

0
(NA)

NA
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Comments
Threat of
NATO air
strikes, if
Gorazde
would have
been
attacked;
successful
deterrence.
On August 1,
the coercive
threats were
extended on
other three
UN protected
areas,
including
Sarajevo;
unsuccessful
coercive
diplomacy.

2

3

BosniaPhase IV:
U.S.
(Holbrooke)
-Bosnian
Serbs/Milos
evic,
August 3031, 1999
(The
“Endgame”
Strategy)

BosniaPhase IV:
U.S.
(Holbrooke)
-Milosevic,
September
14-17, 1999
(The
“Endgame”
Strategy)

1
(LF)

1
(LF)

0

1

1

1

0
(NA)

0

0

1

0

0

HolbrookeBosnian
Serbs/
Milosevic:
To end the
siege of
Sarajevo and
remove the
heavy
weapons. The
U.S. initiated
Operation
Deliberate
Force.
Mladic
insisted on
conditional
termination;
the
assurances
were not
sufficient.
Mladic,
Karadzic,
Milosevic
agreed to end
the siege of
Sarajevo and
to remove the
heavy
weapons.
Assurances
that the
territory
would not be
taken by the
Federal
forces;
successful
military
coercion.

*CT: Credible Threats; CA: Credible Assurances; ISE: International Strategic
Environment Favoring Coercer; CD: Coercive Diplomacy; MC: Military Coercion; D:
Deterrence. ** 1=Success without the use of limited force; 1(LF)= Success with the
limited use of force; 0=Failure; NA=Not attempted.
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3.8 Conclusion
This chapter examined U.S. coercive strategies in Bosnian crisis and war. The U.S.
participation is divided into four phases. In phase I the Bush administration supported the
UN/EC diplomatic initiative and the use of economic sanctions as a way to isolate
Milosevic and neutralize his support for the Bosnian Serbs. This strategy was
unsuccessful as the crisis escalated to war.
Despite President Clinton’s rhetorical toughness during his presidential campaign,
in phase II the Clinton administration continued the politics of not using force and
diplomatic support for the Vance-Owens peace plan. This strategy was unsuccessful in
ending the war in Bosnia. In phase III, the Clinton administration initiated the formation
of the Contact Group, extended diplomatic pressure on the Bosnian Serbs and Milosevic
to accept the Contact Group plan, and implicitly supported the Croatian and Bosnian
Federation’s attempts to change the balance of power favoring the Bosnian Serbs. This
strategy was unsuccessful in ending the war and bringing the Bosnian Serbs to the
negotiating table. In phase IV, after the war in Bosnia escalated to the point that U.S.
credibility as a global superpower and, at the time a unipol, was put in question, the
United States took the lead, employed the “endgame” strategy and succeeded in
persuading the Bosnian Serbs and Milosevic to end the war in Bosnia and negotiate
peace. The “endgame” strategy comprised all three components that are postulated as
necessary by CD Triangle.
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CHAPTER IV: THE KOSOVO CRISIS AND U.S. COERCIVE STRATEGIES (19981999)

After a brief overview of the events that preceded the Kosovo crisis and a brief overview
of the four phases of the U.S. involvement in the Kosovo crisis, this chapter focuses on
the second, third, and fourth phase. In these three phases the United States applied the
strategy of coercive diplomacy and military coercion to persuade the Serbian regime, led
by Slobodan Milosevic, to stop state-violence against the Kosovo Albanians. The
Coercive Diplomacy (CD) Triangle, introduced in Chapter 2, is used to analyze success
and failure of U.S. coercive diplomacy and military coercion.
As discussed in Chapter 2, the CD Triangle predicts that if the following factors
are present coercive diplomacy will succeed: First, the target perceives threats as
credible, that is, the coercer succeeds in communicating by using a threat of force
(coercive diplomacy) or by using limited force (military coercion), that the coercer has
the will to pay the cost if the threats fail. Second, the target perceives assurances as
credible, that is, the target trusts that the coercer will not change its objectives and will
not change its demands (there will be no “more demands tomorrow”) after the target
acquiesces to the coercer’s demands. Third, the international environment favors the
coercer, that is, there are no global or regional spoilers willing to balance the coercer’s
threats. Similarly, failure of coercive diplomacy is expected if: The target does not
perceive the coercer’s threats as credible; and/or the target does not trust the coercer that
its assurances are credible, leading the target to look for regional or global spoilers to
balance the coercer’s threats without acquiescing to the coercer’s demands.
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4.1 Origins of the Kosovo Crisis
Kosovo, primarily settled by an ethnic Albanian population, for Serbs has been
considered a historical birthplace of their nation, the “Serbian Jerusalem,” a Holy Land, a
heartland of medieval Serbia and the site of some of the sacred Serbian monasteries and
churches.286 While Serbs are convinced that they are the region’s indigenous people,
Albanians argue that they descended from the ancient Illyrians, who, according to
Albanian claim, inhabited the region centuries before the arrival of the Slavic Serbs in the
seventh century.287
The Battle of Kosovo, which dates back to June 1389 and which Serbs lost to the
superior Ottoman Empire force, has been often described as the cradle of Serbian
nationhood.288 Although Serbs often explain this battle, fought at Kosovo Polje in
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present-day Kosovo, as the one where Albanians (including Kosovars, who are ethnic
Albanians) fought on the side of the Ottomans against the Serbs, Albanians almost
certainly fought alongside the Serbs, resisting the Ottoman attempt to conquer the
Balkans.289 Under the Ottomans, the majority of Albanians, who initially practiced
Christianity, converted, for different reasons, to Islam, either because they were forced to,
or to avoid taxes or to qualify for jobs in Ottoman ruled society. The Ottoman rule in the
Balkans started to decline in the nineteenth century. After World War I, and the
formation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1918, the Serbs dominated Kosovo. This
would change during World War II, when Kosovo became a part of Greater Albania, a
puppet state under the sponsorship of Nazi Germany and Italy.290 After World War II,
and the creation of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Kosovo became a
province of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, one of six Yugoslavia’s republics, and the
Serbs again dominated Kosovo.
The tensions between two ethnic groups, Serbs and Albanians, have been present
since the very creation of SFR Yugoslavia.291 The SFRY Constitution of 1974 had given
Kosovo the autonomous status within Serbia, that is, it gave this province, along with
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Vojvodina (which has a substantial Hungarian population and is historically linked to
Hungary), the same rights as any of the six republics in SFR Yugoslavia had, but without
officially becoming a republic.292 In 1989, as SFR Yugoslavia was dissolving, Serbia,
under the leadership of Slobodan Milosevic, revoked Kosovo’s far-reaching autonomy
and its status as a federal entity of Yugoslavia with rights similar to those of the six
republics.293 Under the constitutional changes Serbia gained full control of police, courts
and civil defense in Kosovo.294 By May 1991 Kosovo Albanian language media were
closed and about 150,000 Kosovo Albanian workers, including all Kosovo Albanians
police officers and all Kosovo Albanian professors, were expelled from their jobs.295
When in August 1991, the Conference on Yugoslavia, established by the European
Community (EC), negotiated the relations between six federal republics of SFR
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Yugoslavia (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and
Macedonia), Kosovo, as a province of Serbia, was left out (see Figure 7). However, the
state violence against the Albanian population in Kosovo continued as well as attempts
by the Kosovo Albanians and their leader Ibrahim Rugova to regain autonomy for
Kosovo.296 As Warren Zimmerman, the last U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia, points out,
both parties have claims over the same territory for different reasons; “[t]he Serbian
claim to hegemony is based (…) on the historical/cultural principles-the Jerusalem
argument. The Albanian claim to independence is based largely on the demographic
principle-the majority argument.”297
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Figure 7. Map of Serbia and Montenegro (FR Yugoslavia)298

On December 25, 1992, during his final days in office, President George H. W.
Bush issued the “Christmas Warning” to Milosevic, at the time President of Serbia and de
facto leader of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).299 President Bush declared
that Milosevic should not abuse the human rights of the Albanians of Kosovo, and the
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United States would act against Serbia if violence broke out in Kosovo and could be
attributed to Serbia. However, Bush was explicit that Kosovo was part of Serbia, and the
territorial integrity of Serbia/FR Yugoslavia would be respected.300 The Clinton
administration would not “activate” the Christmas warning until the late 1998, following
the escalation of violence in Kosovo.
During the 1995 Dayton peace negotiations, in their attempt to stop the war in
Bosnia and to gain Milosevic’s assistance in controlling the Bosnian Serbs, the U.S.
negotiators, led by Richard Holbrooke, excluded the demands from the Kosovo
Albanians to renegotiate the status of Kosovo.301 Milosevic was adamant that Kosovo
was an internal problem, a Serbian problem, not even a FR Yugoslav problem.302
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Serbian authority with the ultimate goal of Kosovo’s independence from Serbia.305 As the
KLA was gaining more support among the Kosovo Albanians and as the small weapons
started to flow from neighboring Albania to Kosovo, a mostly peaceful political
resistance to Serbian repressive rule was transformed into an armed insurgency.306 The
Serbian response to the rise of the KLA was increased pressure and violence against the
civilian population, which provoked more Kosovo Albanians to join the KLA.307 As the
tensions were escalating, in September 1997 Rugova, who was searching for a peaceful
solution to the Kosovo crisis, and Milosevic, who was trying to show the West that he
was willing to negotiate with the Kosovo Albanians, negotiated and signed a so-called
“school pact,” or education agreement.308 This agreement “called for the normalization of
the educational system of Kosovo” providing, on paper, that the Kosovo Albanian
students would have an opportunity to start a new school year in schools and universities,
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instead of basements and garages, and giving the opportunity to Albanian professors to
return to Albanian language schools and universities. 309
Despite the signed agreement and a personal promise by Milosevic that it would
be fulfilled, by late October 1997 there was no progress on implementation of the
education agreement. Therefore, the Kosovo Albanians, like many international observers
including the United States, perceived this agreement as another empty promise given by
Milosevic.310 The Kosovo Albanian students responded by organizing peaceful protests.
In February 1998, Robert Gelbard, the U.S. Special envoy to the Balkans, urged
Milosevic to begin implementing the school agreement, as a first step towards a peaceful
resolution to the Kosovo conflict.311 However, the implementation of the agreement did
not move forward.
As the KLA gained more support among the Kosovo Albanian population and as
the insurgency intensified, the repression by Serbian forces intensified too. In March
1998, Serbian forces and paramilitary attacked the Kosovo Albanian villages in the
Drenica Valley (central Kosovo) on the premise that the Drenica Valley was a center of
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the KLA. As a result, hundreds fled their homes, and, according to estimates, between
fifty to sixty people were killed, among them women and children.312 Rugova issued a
statement calling this “ethnic cleansing.” The Serbian interior minister justified the
killing by stating that the Serbian paramilitary units and the police destroyed a “terrorist
base.”313 As the situation in Kosovo was deteriorating, and the escalation of the crisis
intensified with a perceived potential to escalate into a regional war, the Clinton
administration intensified its search for the viable strategy to bring the crisis in Kosovo to
an end.314
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4.2 Phases of U.S. Involvement in the Kosovo Crisis as Related to the Use of
Coercive Strategies (1998-1999)
The United States involvement in Kosovo crisis can be divided into four phases. Phase I:
The United States supports non-military coercion and the Contact Group lead, resulting
in escalation of the crisis. Phase II: A temporary success of U.S. coercive strategy and
signing of the October Agreement. Phase III: Use of coercive diplomacy to coerce
Serbia/FR Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Albanians to sign the Rambouillet peace
agreement resulting in unsuccessful Rambouillet and Paris peace negotiations. Phase IV:
Three-phased military coercion, Russia’s diplomatic initiative, and Milosevic accedes to
the G8 peace agreement.

4.3 Phase I: The United State Supports Non-Military Coercion and the Contact
Group Leads
Following the events in the Drenica Valley, in March 1998, Robert Gelbard, the U.S.
Special envoy to the Balkans, met with Milosevic and warned him that the international
community would not stand idly by while his forces were committing atrocities against
the Kosovo Albanian civilian population. The Clinton administration’s first “instrument,”
in its attempt to coerce Milosevic, was economic sanctions. 315 As thousands of Kosovo
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Albanian demonstrators took to the streets in Pristina, Kosovo’s regional capital, to
protest the brutality of the Serbian regime, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright called
for the Contact Group (comprised of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy,
Russia, and the United States) to impose sanctions.316 The Contact Group responded by
demanding an end to violence against civilians, the withdrawal of special units from
Kosovo, and condemned terrorism. The Contact Group demands were strengthened by an
arms embargo against FR Yugoslavia, visa restrictions, and the suspension of financial
assistance, as well as the freezing of FR Yugoslavia funds held abroad. 317 The UN
Security Council Resolution 1160, adopted on March 31, 1998, incorporated the Contact
Group actions as well as condemned the use of force by all actors. 318
Milosevic responded by organizing a state referendum on foreign mediation to
assist in solving the Kosovo crisis, in which a majority of Serbs voted against the
mediation. However, the Serbian government also sent a letter to Rugova proposing
direct “talks about talks.” This proposal for direct “talks about talks” was refused by
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Rugova, who insisted on third-party participation.319 The Clinton administration, in
addition to being committed to the implementations of sanctions, decided to give
diplomacy another chance. Christopher Hill, who was at the time U.S. Ambassador to
North Macedonia, was appointed a U.S. envoy to Kosovo. He was joined by Richard
Holbrooke, a former U.S. envoy to Bosnia and, at the time a private consultant to the
Clinton administration, to assist Hill to convince Milosevic to start negotiations with
Rugova.320
Hill and Holbrooke met with Milosevic in Belgrade, in early May 1998.
Milosevic denied any existence of the crisis in Kosovo. Milosevic insisted, “There is no
crisis. There are just a few Albanian separatists that the American media is fond of
talking to, and our security services are dealing with.”321 However, Milosevic was
willing, upon Hill and Holbrook’s insistence, to meet with Rugova. The following day,
Rugova accepted, on Hill and Holbrook’s insistence, to meet with Milosevic. Under the
sponsorship of the United States, on May 15, 1998, Milosevic and Rugova met in
Belgrade. This meeting, however, ended without any significant progress or agreement.
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Following the meeting in Belgrade, on May 29, 1998, Rugova met with President
Clinton in the White House.322 President Clinton and Rugova agreed that both sides
supported a negotiated political solution to the Kosovo conflict, but Rugova also
expressed his disillusion with Milosevic’s promises to commit himself to a negotiated
political solution to the Kosovo crisis. Rugova, furthermore, asked President Clinton to
increase pressure on Milosevic to stop violence against the Kosovo Albanians. While
President Clinton and Rugova were meeting, the Serbian forces attacked a Kosovo
Albanian town, claiming that it was a KLA stronghold.323 What followed was a violent
crackdown on the KLA by FRY/Serbian military, paramilitary, and police units that
produced 500,000 homeless. 324
As the violence was escalating in Kosovo, on June 11, 1998, NATO defense
ministers agreed that NATO should conduct air exercises in the region to send Milosevic
a signal that NATO was concerned about the escalation of violence in the region and
committed to act if necessary. Following the meeting, on June 15, NATO conducted
Operation Determined Falcon (ODF).325 This military exercise over Albania and
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Macedonia included a variety of aircrafts provided by NATO members and it was
designed, in the words of U.S. defense secretary William Cohen, to “demonstrate (…)
that NATO is united in its commitment to seek a cease-fire and a cessation to hostilities
[in Kosovo] and demonstrate its capacity to rapidly mobilize some very significant lethal
capability.”326 As much as it was a clear evidence of NATO’s capability to launch air
strikes against FRY/Serbia, disagreement within the Contact Group over air strikes,
especially from Russia (a traditional ally of Serbia), diminished the coherence of Western
resolve, and, therefore, the effectiveness of the potential threat of force.327
On June 16, 1998, President of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, in coordination with and
approval by the Contact Group, met with Milosevic in Moscow.328 During this meeting
President Yeltsin presented a set of the Contact Group’s demands to Milosevic. The
demands included to end “all actions by Serbian security forces against civilians, access
for international monitors and humanitarian organizations, the rights of refugees to return
to their homes,” and return to dialog with the Kosovo Albania leadership.329
Milosevic committed himself to restart the negotiations with Rugova, or, as
Milosevic pointed out, with the moderate fraction of Kosovo Albanians. However,
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Milosevic refused to negotiate with the KLA, or a military fraction. Milosevic also
agreed to allow foreign observers to visit Kosovo, also known as the Kosovo Diplomatic
Observers Mission (KDOM). Milosevic, however, did not agree to any official
monitoring activities or international mediation, and he refused to pull Yugoslav army
(VJ) and Serbian special forces from Kosovo. The meeting was a partial success, where
Milosevic was eager to state that “all actions of Serbian police were only against terrorist
groups, not against civilians” and he also claimed that NATO’s show of air power, that is
Operation Determined Falcon, conducted on June 1, “had no effect on his talks with
[President] Yeltsin.”330 In her statement, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright welcomed
the progress, but she also pointed that it was insufficient if “the killing of civilians and
depopulation of villages continues.”331

4.3.1 The U.S. Peace Strategy and the KLA Factor
By June 1998, the Clinton administration was convinced that the KLA had become an
important part of both the Kosovo crisis and its solution. During the NSC Principals
meeting on June 19, 1998, it was agreed that the United States, as a part of its peace
strategy, should continue to work with the Contact Group and allies to achieve a political
resolution to the Kosovo crisis. However, it was also agreed that while increasing
pressure on Milosevic through international sanctions, the United States should also
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broaden and strengthen the Kosovo team by bringing the KLA into the political process.
Therefore, the KLA would be offered the place at the negotiating table as a part of the
Kosovo team, but, at the same time, that the KLA would face “sticks” if it did not agree
to participate in the political negotiations and proceeded with violent provocations.332
On June 22, 1998, the NSC principals agreed on Richard Holbrooke’s mission,
whose goals included “stressing to Milosevic that he must satisfy all Contact Group
demands, not only those accepted in Moscow” and it should be made clear to the KLA, or
in Albanian language the UCJ, that the United States would not accept “violent pursuit of
independence.”333 Holbrooke noted, “Whether they [the KLA] espoused a violent
solution or not, you could not ignore them [the KLA], because they were imposing their
presence on relationship. But Rugova, the acknowledged leader of the Albanians (…)
was the person we [the United States] dealt with publicly.”334
On June 23, 1998, Holbrooke, in the capacity of U.S. envoy to the Balkans, met
with Rugova in Skopje, a capital of North Macedonia, and with Milosevic in Belgrade, to
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share his concerns regarding the escalation of violence in Kosovo.335 Holbrooke also took
a brief tour of western Kosovo. When the photo of Holbrooke sitting alongside of one of
the KLA members appeared in the world news, Holbrooke downplayed this meeting by
stating that it was an incident, where men in “camouflage uniforms” joined his meeting
with the village elders.336 However, it was perceived by many observers as a sign that the
KLA, with its fast-growing membership and support among the Kosovo Albanians, was
taken as a serious player in any peace settlement. It also angered Milosevic, who was
adamant not to negotiate with the KLA and who considered the KLA a terrorist group.
Holbrooke, anticipating that the photo of him and the KLA member would have a
potential negative influence on Milosevic’s willingness to cooperate, sent Ambassador
Christopher Hill to meet with Milosevic. Hill convinced Milosevic that the “mediators
should talk to all sides,” but Hill also stressed that the photo and the meeting with the
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KLA members were not intentional, but incidental.337 As the FRY/Serbian forces were
attempting to gain control over the territory lost to the KLA and intensified and
broadened their offensive, the number of internally displaced Kosovo Albanians
increased drastically, as well as the number of refugees who flooded neighboring
countries.338 During the joint news conference Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, despite
their differences regarding the potential NATO intervention in Kosovo, agreed that
humanitarian catastrophe had to be prevented.339

4.4 Phase II: Coercive Diplomacy and the October Agreement
On September 23, the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 1199, which
called for all parties in Kosovo conflict to cease hostilities, maintain a ceasefire, and start
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a dialog without any preconditions.340 Despite the fact that UNSC Resolution 1199 did
not authorize the use of force, it was backed by the Activation Warning (ACTWARN),
for both a phased air campaign and a limited air option in Kosovo, issued by NATO
Secretary General Javier Solana.341 Secretary Solana pointed out that the ACTWARN is
an “important signal of NATO’s readiness to use force if it becomes necessary to do so.”
He also reiterated that Milosevic must stop his repressive actions against the population;
must seek a political solution to the Kosovo crisis based on negotiations; and must take
immediate steps to alleviate the humanitarian situation.342
It is significant that on September 30, 1998, the NSC principals proposed the
following strategy: To pressure NATO to authorize, by October 2, the issuing of an
Activation Request (ACTREQ) for the limited air operation and phased air campaign,
that would be followed by a public statement by the NATO Secretary General explaining
the decision was made as a result of Belgrade’s non-compliance with UNSC Resolution
1199.343 A meeting of the Contact Group on October 3 to discuss the elements of political
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settlement, to be followed up with a demarche in Belgrade by the United States, Russia
and EU Presidency ambassadors. The UN Secretary-General should issue his report on
compliance with UNSC Resolution 1199 no later than October 5. The goal was also to
keep Russia “on board,” by continuing diplomatic engagement, while making clear to
Milosevic that the Alliance was prepared to act. On October 7, NATO should authorize
the issuing an Activation Order (ACTORD) covering both the limited air option and the
phased air campaign. Following the issuance of the ACTORD and prior to execution of
air strikes, Ambassador Holbrooke would be dispatched to Belgrade to confront
Milosevic with a clear set of demands aimed at attaining full compliance with UNSC
Resolution 1199.344

4.4.1 Coercive Diplomacy Implementation
As was proposed during the NSC principals meeting, the NATO issued an Activation
Request (ACTREQ) for the limited air option and phased air campaign on October 1,
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1998. UN Secretary General Koffi Annan issued a critical UN Security Council report on
FRY/Serbia not complying with UNSC Resolution 1199. The Contact Group issued a
statement demanding Milosevic to comply with UNSC Resolution 1199. This threat was
backed by NATO’s “promise” to use force against FRY/Serbia in the event of
noncompliance. On October 12, NATO adopted an Activation Order (ACTORD)
authorizing the NATO force to carry out the attack but delayed its implementation for
ninety-six hours in order to allow Milosevic to demonstrate compliance. NATO Secretary
General Solana, in his attempt to convince Milosevic that this time the threats would be
executed if Serbia did not comply with the demands, stated, “The Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia has still not complied fully with UNSC Resolution 1199 and time is running
out. (…) the use of military force can be avoided. The responsibility is on President
Milosevic’s shoulders.”345 The Clinton administration dispatched Ambassador Richard
Holbrooke to Belgrade to persuade Milosevic to comply with UNSC Resolution 1199; at
the same time, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott was dispatched to Moscow to
“keep the Russians on board.”346
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4.4.2 The October Agreement
Richard Holbrooke’s team included Christopher Hill and Jim O’Brien from the State
Department. U.S. General Mike Short, the NATO commander in charge of NATO
military intervention in FRY/Serbia was called, by Holbrooke, to join the meeting with
Milosevic. Holbrooke’s goal was for General Short to make it clear to Milosevic that
NATO military threats were real by giving Milosevic a clear choice between complying
with UNSC Resolution 1199, which would be monitored by NATO (that is monitored by
“U2s” and other aircrafts for intelligence gathering and reconnaissance), or being bombed
by NATO (that is, by “B52s” and other strategic bombers).347 According to Holbrooke,
General Short’s answer to Milosevic’s question “(…) you are the man who’s gonna bomb
us?” was “Mr. President, I have B52s in one hand, and I have U2s in the other. It’s up to
you which one I am going to have to use.”348 However, General Short also pointed that he
told Milosevic “Well, I hope that won’t be the case. I have a plan to propose to your

“Russia Vows to Block the U.N. from Backing Attack on Serbs,” New York Times,
October 7, 1998, https://www.nytimes.com/1998/10/07/world/russia-vows-to-block-theun-from-backing-attack-on-serbs.html; also, for example, Declassified Documents
Concerning Russian President, “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation: Telephone
Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin, August 14, 1999 [pp.384-389; 393-396],”
Clinton Digital Library, https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/57569.
347

Holbrooke told Milosevic, “Mr. President, as General Short said, he has a plan for
doing reconnaissance in Kosovo. It will allow the international community to confirm
that you are doing as you say you are doing-that you are not conducting ethnic cleansing
(…).” See, Frontline, “Interview: General Michael C. Short,” PBS, assessed July 23,
2019, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/short.html.
348

See Frontline, “Interview: Richard Holbrooke,” PBS, accessed July 16, 2020,
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/holbrooke.html.
Also, see Frontline, “Interview: General Michael C. Short,” Frontline PBS, assessed July
23, 2019, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/short.html

139

generals that will prevent your country from being bombed, but in essence, you’re
right.”349 Holbrooke and Milosevic talked for additional 15 minutes and Holbrooke
closed the conversation by saying, “Mr. President, as General Short said, he has a plan
for doing reconnaissance in Kosovo. It will allow the international community to confirm
that you are doing as you say you are doing—that you are not conducting ethnic
cleansing (…).”350
The negotiations between Holbrooke and Milosevic produced the October
agreement. Milosevic agreed to have an international presence in Kosovo, that is, the
agreement established an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
verification mission on the ground in Kosovo (OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission or
KVM). Milosevic also agreed to the withdrawal of the FRY/Serbian troops, keeping only
the pre-March 1998 level of the troops in Kosovo. The main goal of the agreement was to
stop violence in Kosovo and enable the refugees to return to their homes.351 However, the
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agreement was short lived. When Milosevic addressed the nation, he stated that the
agreement with Holbrooke “removed the threat of military intervention,” and his office
issued a statement that the agreement with Holbrooke “guarantees Kosovo’s autonomy
within Serbia.” However, Holbrooke stated that he hoped the “deal would lead the way
to autonomy and self-determination” for the people of Kosovo,” and he also stressed that
he never mentioned that he, and the United States, guaranteed territorial integrity of FY
Yugoslavia.352 Therefore, the assurances that Milosevic assumed were given to him by
Holbrooke, and the United States, came into question. Furthermore, a representative of
the KLA, in a public statement, replied, “anything short of full Kosovo independence was
unacceptable.”353
As the FRY/Serbian military forces were pulling out from Kosovo, keeping only
the pre-March 1998 force, and refugees were returning to the villages, the KLA was
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coming back too. 354 The KLA was not consulted on the agreement, was not satisfied with
the agreement, and did not respect the ceasefire. The sporadic provocations by the KLA
provoked a severe military offensive by the Serbian/VJ forces.355
As the security situation in Kosovo was deteriorating, James Padrew, a U.S.
special representative for Kosovo, met with Milosevic on December 22, 1998. Padrew
reminded Milosevic of his commitments to stop the violence against civilians and
cooperate with the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (OCEKVM). Milosevic, as he did
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during the previous meetings, denied any charges of excessive use of force against
civilians in Kosovo and denied any failure to cooperate with the OSCEKVM and
international community.356
The implementation of U.S. strategy, initially, included all three requirements of
the CD Triangle, the model proposed in this dissertation: Credible threats, that is, NATO
demonstrated a will to carry out the threats; credible assurance, which were according to
Milosevic given by U.S. envoy Holbrooke during their meeting; and the international
environment that favored the coercer, that is, the Clinton administration engaged with
Russia, a potential “spoiler,” diplomatically and economically, giving Serbia/FRY no
option to balance the coercer’s threats by external force. However, the October agreement
fell apart when Holbrooke publicly denied giving the assurance to Milosevic that the
demands would not be expanded in the future (Kosovo’s autonomy as mentioned in the
agreement versus Kosovo’s independence) and that territorial integrity of Serbia/FR
Yugoslavia was guaranteed by the United Sates. As the KLA was retaking the territory,
the Serb/VJ forces retaliated in a disproportionally violent manner.

4.4.3 The Racak Massacre
As the violence continued, on January 17, 1999 forty-five Kosovo Albanian civilians
were brutally murdered by Serb forces near the village of Racak, central Kosovo.357
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Despite the Serbian claim that the victims were the KLM fighters, they included elderly
men, women, and a child.358 After the massacre, William Walker, the chief of the OSCE
Kosovo Verification Mission (OSCEKVM) and U.S. diplomat, visited the scene and
called the massacre an “unspeakable atrocity” and “a crime very much against
humanity.” Walker made it clear that Serbia was responsible for the committed crimes.359
Milosevic responded by denouncing Walker’s report about the Racak massacre and
expelling Walker from FY Yugoslavia.360
After Walker’s report about the Racak massacre was published, Milosevic refused
to take Holbrooke’s call on the premise that Holbrooke was supporting the KLA and
Holbrooke would not be trusted.361 However, Milosevic agreed to meet with General

358

See, for example, Jeffrey Smith, Attempt to Cover up Racak Massacre Revealed,”
Irish Times, January 29, 1999, https://www.irishtimes.com/news/attempt-to-cover-upracak-massacre-revealed-1.1258467.
359

See Frontline, “Interview: Ambassador William Walker,” PBS, access July 16, 2020,
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/walker.html. In the
same interview Walker also noted that “The bodies were so torn up by shots, by bullets
(…). It was absolutely horrible. All you could think is how could one human being do
this to another human being.” See also Hill, Outpost, 147.
360

See, for example, “Expelled Head of Peace Mission is a Veteran U.S. Diplomat,” Irish
Times, January 20, 1999, https://www.irishtimes.com/news/expelled-head-of-peacemission-is-a-veteran-us-diplomat-1.125686.
361

See Frontline, “Interview: Ambassador William Walker,” PBS, access July 16, 2020,
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/walker.html. Also,
commander of the Yugoslav Third Army General Pavkovic, responsible for the overall
prosecution of the war in Kosovo and known Milosevic loyalist, stated that “we actually
came to know that he [Holbrooke] was actually supporting the terrorists; [he] was there to
help them.” See Frontline, “Interview: Commander [of the Yugoslav 3rd Army, General]
Nebojsa Pavkovic,” PBS, accessed July 20, 2020,
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/pavkovic.html.

144

Wesley Clark, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, who was sent to Belgrade to
persuade Milosevic to end the violence. More precisely, General Clark presented
Milosevic with three demands: To allow Hague Tribunal Chief Prosecutor Louise Arbour
into Kosovo to investigate the Racak massacre; to allow William Walker, who was
ordered to leave Serbia after he called the Racak massacre “a crime against humanity,” to
stay in Kosovo; and to insist that Milosevic deliver on his October promise to reduce
Serb forces in Kosovo. According to General Clark, Milosevic was “belligerent” and
extremely “stubborn” and vehemently shouted, “These people [the KLA] are terrorists.”
When, after six hours of negotiations, General Clark said he would have to inform NATO
that Milosevic rejected all of his demands, Milosevic yelled, “Serbia is democracy-You
are threatening -You are a war criminal.” 362 General Clark pointed out that “after the
outburst” he spent additional two hours persuading Milosevic to accept the three
demands, but without any success.363 It is significant that Milosevic met with
Christopher Hill, a U.S. special envoy to Kosovo, in late November 1998. After reading
the draft presented by Hill, which “banned the Yugoslav military stepping foot in
Kosovo,” Milosevic stated, “You might as well ask for my head.”364 Milosevic was
convinced that pulling the Yugoslav army out from Kosovo meant that the KLA would

362

General Clark told Milosevic, “Please understand, Mr. President, that if we carry back
your answer to NATO, they are going to tell us to start moving aircrafts. They are going
to ask, who is this man who is destroying his own country, who had crashed democracy
(…), forced university professors to sign the loyalty oaths. (…) Please do not leave it this
way.” See Clark, Waging Modern War, 161.
363

Ibid. Also see Sell, Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia, 294.

364

Hill, Outpost, 144.

145

take over the territory, as the KLA did after the October agreement was negotiated
between Holbrooke and Milosevic, and after Milosevic argued that Holbrooke guaranteed
the territorial integrity of Serbia, which was, ex post, denied by Holbrooke. Milosevic did
not trust Holbrooke that the United States supported the autonomy of Kosovo. On the
contrary, Milosevic was convinced that the United States was supporting an independent
Kosovo. For Milosevic, losing Kosovo meant losing the support from an ultraright
segment of the Serbian population, which was an important part of his hold on power.365
It meant losing his “head.”

4.5 Phase III: Coercive Diplomacy and Rambouillet/Paris Peace Negotiations
In the aftermath of the Racak massacre, it was obvious that the October agreement
collapsed without providing a solution to permanently quell the violence. Given the
international attention that the Racak massacre received, as well as Milosevic’s decision
to reverse the initial compliance with the three proposed demands, President Clinton
decided to change the approach to the Kosovo crisis. Secretary of State Madeline
Albright proposed a strategy where both sides, Kosovo Albanians and Serbs, would be
given an ultimatum to accept the political agreement with a specific deadline for
compliance, backed by the threat of NATO airstrikes if the parties did not comply with
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the demands. The strategy was to focus on military threats to coerce Milosevic to comply
with the previously signed October agreement. On January 21, 1999, the U.S. NSC
deputies agreed that an ultimatum should be issued “as soon as possible,” it should be
backed by the threat of NATO air strikes, and it should, in its core, consist of “a demand
that Belgrade fully comply with its commitments under the October agreement,”
including “stricter restrictions on Serb security forces.”366 James O’Brian, Albright’s
senior advisor, and Jonathan Levitsky, from the State Department’s Office of Policy
Planning, crafted a detailed political agreement that would be presented to the Contact
Group Ministerial Meeting scheduled for January 29, 1999, and, if approved, it would be
presented to the two warring sides in Kosovo.367
At the Contact Group Ministerial meeting on January 29, 1999, the Contact Group
demanded that the Kosovo Albanians and Serbs “accept its framework agreement
[initially proposed by the United States] and summoned them to proximity talks in
Rambouillet.”368 Secretary of State Albright argued that Rambouillet was the last
diplomatic chance before going to war. However, she stressed that the goal was not a
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war. 369 Richard Holbrooke points out that the massacre in Racak, based on the October
agreement signed by Milosevic, would have justified an immediate NATO military
response, but the Clinton administration decided, rather than “bombing the Serbs
immediately,” to summon both sides, Kosovo Albanians and Serbs, to Rambouillet.370
Secretary Albright in a key public speech in early February 1999, argued that the United
States was committed to bring the Kosovo crisis to an end. She argued that the U.S.
interests were to strengthen democratic principles and practices in the region, to prevent a
massive refugee crisis and the spillover of the conflict, especially to Albania and
Macedonia, with the potential involvement of Greece and Turkey, both NATO allies.
After all, Secretary Albright stressed that it was in the U.S. interest to preserve NATO’s
credibility as the guarantor of peace and stability in Europe.371 On January 28, speaking
at NATO headquarters in Brussels, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, indirectly
endorsed the NATO threat to use force by saying that a “combination of force and
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diplomacy” is “the key to peace in the Balkans,” but pointed out the “need to use force,
when all means have failed.”372

4.5.1 The Rambouillet Conference
The international conference began at Rambouillet, a chalet about thirty miles outside
Paris, on February 6, 1999. The goal was to coerce two warring sides, the Serbs and
Kosovo Albanians, to accept the “Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in
Kosovo.”373 French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine and his British counterpart, Robin
Cook, had the facilitator’s role, with the direct involvement of the United States, Russian,
and EU diplomats, represented by U.S. Ambassador Christopher Hill, EU diplomat
Wolfgang Petritsch, and Russian Ambassador Boris Mayorsky. 374 However, even before
the conference began, it was clear that one of the main actors, Slobodan Milosevic, would
not be present. Milosevic, who was at the time the President of FR Yugoslavia, refused
to attend the conference. One excuse given by Milosevic was that Kosovo was a part of
Serbia and therefore negotiations should be with Serbian President Milan Milutinovic.375
However, Milosevic also feared that he was secretly indicted for war crimes and could be
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arrested during the conference.376 The Serbian delegation, therefore, was led by President
of Serbia Milan Milutinovic and it was comprised of about thirty persons, including a
representative from every minority in Serbia. The goal was to present Serbia as
harmonious multiethnic society.377 During the first day of the conference, it became clear
that Milutinovic, or any other member of the Serbian delegation, had no authority to
make any decisions.378
The Kosovo Albanian delegation was comprised of the members of the KLA, led
by Hashim Thaci, and the members of the LDK, led by Ibrahim Rugova.379 The Kosovo
Albanian delegation, was deeply divided, lacked the leadership and did not have one
goal, and these factors presented the major obstacles for the attempt by the U.S.
negotiators to make the Kosovo Albanian delegation accept the agreement.380 The KLA
envisioned Kosovo as an independent state, while the LDK was ready to accept
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autonomy, which could eventually lead to independence. At one point, the LDK members
told their KLA counterparts, who were not accepting the proposed agreement because it
included the autonomy of Kosovo (as opposed to independence), that they would stop the
talks indefinitely if the KLA could win the war on the battlefield. However, the KLA, as
well as the U.S. negotiators, knew that the KLA had ammunition sufficient only for a few
weeks of hard fighting.381 The Kosovo Albanian delegation, which towards the end of the
conference signaled that they were ready to sign the draft interim agreement, believed
that Milosevic would arrive in Rambouillet at the last minute to sign the agreement.
When he did not show up, one of the Kosovo Albanian delegation members said,
“Milosevic (…) decided to fight.”382
Nikola Sainovi, a senior member of the Serbian delegation, argued that at
Rambouillet the U.S. negotiators, especially Secretary Albright, who was present for the
last three days of the negotiations, had a deciding role. Sainovic, who was not pleased by
the shuttle diplomacy practiced during the negotiations, pointed that the Serbian
delegation was not given a chance to negotiate directly with the Kosovo Albanian
delegation. He also stressed that they were given an ultimatum either to sign the
agreement or they would be responsible for the war. As he said, Secretary Albright left
the agreement on the table, said “sign or you would be bombed,” and left the room.383
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Milan Milutinovic, the leader of the Serbian delegation, argued that there was a
possibility for two delegations (Serbs and Kosovo Albanians) to talk directly, but the lack
of protocol and disunity within the Contact Group, which, according to Milutinovic, gave
the U.S. negotiators advantages, produced the agreement that favored the Kosovo
Albanians.384 Milosevic, after all, stressed that the Rambouillet conference was never
about negotiations between the Kosovo Albanians and Serbs, since “the Albanian and
Serb delegations never held talks and that his emissaries only met Americans.”385
As the negotiations seemed to reach a dead end, Christopher Hill, the U.S. envoy
to Kosovo and the principal U.S. negotiator in Rambouillet, was sent to Belgrade to
convince Milosevic to sing the agreement. Milosevic refused to meet with Hill, hoping
for a higher-level U.S. delegation to be sent to Belgrade, including Secretary Albright,
and insisting on assurances that Kosovo would not become independent. The pressure
placed on Milosevic to accept the agreement resulted in what was seen as almost
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complete rejection of the agreement, where Milosevic insisted that he would never accept
a NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo.386
On the other hand, the Kosovo Albanian delegation, deeply divided over the
independence versus autonomy of Kosovo, was also under the pressure to sign the
proposed agreement. Secretary Albright was clear, “If the talks crater because the Serbs
do not say yes, we will have bombing. If the talks crater because the Albanians have not
said yes, we will not be able to support them (…).”387 After all, the Kosovo Albanian
delegation agreed to sign the agreement, but they wanted additional assurance that after
three years there would be a referendum on Kosovo independence.388
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February 21, 1999, as released by the Office of the Spokesman, Paris, France,” U.S.
Department of State-Archive, https://1997-2001.state.gov/statements/1999/990221a.html.
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Hashim Thaci insisted that the agreement include a clause calling for a referendum
after three years of Kosovo autonomy. Since Kosovo Albanians made up 90 percent of
the Kosovo population, the referendum guaranteed that Kosovo would become
independent. The agreement proposed by the United States, and approved by the Contact
group, guaranteed the autonomy, not independence, of Kosovo. See, for example, Jane
Perez, “Diplomats vs. Rebels,” New York Times, February 25, 1999,
https://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/25/world/diplomat-vs-rebels.html
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On February 23, 1999, after 12 days of mediation and after a 72-hour extension,
the Rambouillet negotiations were adjourned; the resumption of the talks was scheduled
to be in Paris two weeks later. The same day when the Rambouillet negotiations were
adjourned, the U.S. intelligence reported that 6,500 more Yugoslav Army (VJ) troops,
along with 250 tanks and 90 artillery pieces were ready to enter Kosovo, prepared for the
large-scale offensive.389
Despite the announcement made by the U.S. Defense Secretary, George
Robertson, that the United States was sending six B-52 bombers to the United Kingdom,
the U.S. negotiators were not unified in their decision to proceed with NATO military
action.390 U.S. General and NATO Supreme Commander Wesley Clark supported a swift
use of NATO force if Milosevic moved more troops into Kosovo.391 On the other hand,
Richard Holbrooke argued that there was “moral ambiguity” about the U.S. position to
fight the Serbs in Kosovo, especially to fight on behalf of the KLA, which was “thuggish
and scornful of humanitarian law.”392
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1999, https://www.theguardina.com/world/1999/feb/20/ianblack.
391

See Charles Trueheart and Dana Priest, “Peace Talks Adjourn in Disarray,”
Washington Post, February 24, 1999, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/inatl/longterm/balkans/stories/disarray022499.htm.
392

See Phillips, Liberating Kosovo, 105.

154

In fourteen days between the end of Rambouillet conference and the beginning of
the Paris conference there were several failed attempts by the European, OSCE, Russian,
and U.S. diplomats to convince Milosevic to sign the agreement. Most notably, Secretary
Albright had a phone conversation with Milosevic trying to persuade him to sign the
Rambouillet agreement.393 The Clinton administration also sent Richard Holbrooke to
Belgrade to meet with Milosevic. Milosevic’s main point for not accepting the agreement
was “the [proposed] presence of NATO troops [as Milosevic argued foreign troops] in
Kosovo to enforce the deal.” However, the Clinton Administration, after many attempts
to convince Milosevic to stop the violence in Kosovo, was not ready to compromise on
this provision.394 On Holbrooke’s departure, Milosevic issued another defiant statement
that the “attempts to condition a political agreement on our country’s acceptance of
foreign troops (…) are unacceptable.”395
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See Albright, Madam Secretary, 400.
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This refers to the existence of so-called Annex B. This would have provided NATO
personnel, vehicles, and aircrafts with unimpeded access to all FRY territory. According
to Sell, the annex was actually a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which the United
States and NATO forces generally preferred to have in areas where they operate, largely
from legal reasons, and, according to Sell and Holbrook was not a primary factor in
Milosevic’s rejection of Rambouillet. See Sell, Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction
of Yugoslavia, 298-9; Frontline, “Interview: Richard Holbrooke” PBS, accessed July 16,
2020,
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4.5.2 The Paris Conference
During the negotiations in Paris, which commenced on March 15, 1999, the Kosovo
Albanian delegation, after the pressure from the U.S. negotiators and the addendum of the
agreement that an international meeting would be organized to decide the future of
Kosovo, signed the agreement and the focus was shifted to the Serbian delegation.396 In
addition to requesting the changes to the proposed agreement that amounted to revising
an estimated 70 percent of the text, in the view of one European negotiator, it was
obvious that “Milosevic had (…) instructed Milutinovic not to conclude this or any other
deal.”397
On March 18, the process came to its inevitable end: The Kosovo Albanians
signed the agreement, the Serbs refused. The U.S. strategy that focused mainly on
military threats did not coerce Milosevic to accept the Rambouillet agreement.398 The
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The United States did not accept the KLA-led wing of Kosovo Albanian delegation’s
request for a referendum for Kosovo independence, which was opposed by the Serbs as
well as Russia. However, the United Sates included an addendum of the agreement,
where it was stated, “Three years after the entry into force of [the] Agreement, an
international meeting shall be convened to determine a mechanism for a final settlement
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following day President Clinton issued an open warning to Milosevic stating that
Milosevic would face military action.399

4.5.3 Holbrooke’s Last Meeting with Milosevic, March 1999
Richard Holbrooke and the group of Western diplomats returned to Belgrade for one last
meeting with Milosevic, presenting the ultimatum to Milosevic to sign the Rambouillet
agreement or to face NATO bombing. Wanting to make sure that Milosevic had no
misunderstanding about the scale of the threat he faced, if he did not go along with the
agreement, Holbrooke described the planned bombing as “swift, severe, and sustained.”
Milosevic responded by saying, “You are a great country, a powerful country. You can
do anything you want. We cannot stop you.” 400 EU diplomat Joschka Fischer recalled

stated, “We have never expected Russia to be supportive of the possibility of air strikes
and NATO Secretary General now has the authority to act based in an assessment on
what goes on here at Rambouilllet (…).” See, “James Rubin, Department of State
Spokesman: Press Briefing on the Kosovo Peace Talks, Rambouillet, France, February
21, 1999,” U.S. Department of State-Archive, https://19972001.state.gov/policy_remarks/1999/990221_rubin.html.
399

President Clinton said, “I think that the threshold has been crossed. I do not believe
that we ought to have to have thousands more people slaughtered and buried in open
soccer fields before we do something.” See “Crisis in the Balkans; Statements of United
States’ policy on Kosovo,” New York Times, April 18, 1999,
https://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/18/world/crisis-in-the-balkans-statements-of-unitedstates-policy-on-kosovo.html.
400

Holbrooke describes Secretary Albright and the president asking him to go back to
Belgrade and meet with Milosevic. Holbrooke met with Milosevic twice. During his first
meeting Holbrooke was accompanied with several members of US negotiating team, and
Milosevic’s answer to proposed agreement was: No. Second meeting was between
Holbrooke and Milosevic alone, and his answer was again no to the proposed agreement.
See Frontline, “Interview: Richard Holbrooke,” PBS, accessed July 20, 2020,
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/holbrooke.html.
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Milosevic saying, “I am ready to walk on corpses, and the West is not.”401 The next
morning, just before leaving for the airport, Holbrooke met with Milosevic alone, and he
asked Milosevic if he was aware what would happen next. Milosevic responded, “Yes.
You will bomb us.”402
Addressing journalists in Belgrade, before flying out, Holbrooke stated that two
days of talks did not bring any commitments from Milosevic regarding what the United
States considered crucial points. Holbrooke mentioned that, during the talks, he
emphasized two things: “[W]e sought evidence that there would be a ceasefire of the
military operation going on in Kosovo and secondly a readiness to enter and to prompt
actions that would lead rapidly to a NATO-led force in Kosovo in accordance with the
Rambouillet accords. (…) A force, I would stress that was neither pro- or [sic] anti- any
ethnic group but in favor of peace in the region.” Holbrooke, leaving the press conference
mentioned that “Communications are always open even in times of conflict. [Negotiator
and U.S.] Ambassador [Christopher] Hill will return to Skopje [Macedonia], and the rest
of us go to Brussels and Washington. Belgrade has his phone number.”403
As Holbrooke was leaving Belgrade, the Serbian parliament unanimously rejected
Western demands for the deployment of NATO military forces to Kosovo, and Milosevic
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replaced the supreme commander of the Yugoslav Army (VJ), General Aleksanar
Dimitrijevic, by General Geza Farkas. This was viewed by some as a signal that
Milosevic was in full command of the military. According to allied officials, there were
22,000 Yugoslav Army troops in Kosovo, 14,000 special policemen from the Interior
Ministry and 4,000 paramilitary troops, and between 6,000 and 10,000 the KLA
fighters.404 The NATO forces had 350 planes ready when the bombing began, roughly
one-third of the aircrafts NATO finally needed, and one-tenth of the aircrafts used in the
Gulf War.405
Addressing the nation on NATO airstrikes against FRY/Serbia, on March 24,
1999, President Clinton declared that it was about America’s values, but also America’s
economic interest to take a stand on Kosovo. He said, “If our country is going to be
prosperous and secure, we need a Europe that is safe, secure, free, united, a good partner
for trading (…). I want us to live in a world where ... we don't have to worry about seeing
scenes [on TV] every night for the next 40 years of ethnic cleansing in some part of the
world.” However, President Clinton also stated, “I do not intend to put our troops in
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Kosovo to fight a war.”406 It was a signal that President Clinton would not send ground
troops to Kosovo.
Two close political allies of Milosevic, Nikola Sainovic and Milan Milutionvic,
pointed out that they did not expect that the bombing would start. Sainovic said that [the
Serbian political leadership] did not expect that “[NATO] would go so far.” Milutinovic,
who met with Secretary Albright four times during the Rambouillet conference, argued
that Serbia tried to avoid war, and he suggested, in the last days prior to bombing, that
Albright come to Belgrade; however, she, according to Milutinovic, insisted on a neutral
place, and a meeting did not occur.407 On the contrary, Commander of Yugoslav 3rd Amy
General Pavkovic and Milosevic’s loyalists, expected that the intense bombing would last
for only three days, not for 78 days, and the ground invasion would follow. General
Pavkovic also stressed that they had 150,000 men, which were prepared to die for
Kosovo, and it would take NATO as much as twice that many to successfully invade
Kosovo.408 As Milosevic told Holbrooke during their last meeting in Belgrade, he knew
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that NATO bombing would follow; the NATO threats were credible. But what Milosevic
did not know is how long the NATO bombing would last.409
After all, the NATO bombing of selected targets in Serbia did start on March 24,
less than 30 hours after Holbrook’s departure. The start of the NATO bombing clearly
presented a failure of coercive diplomacy, a failure of the efforts to achieve Milosevic’s
compliance by threatening force without providing credible assurances.

4.6 Phase IV: Military Coercion, Russia’s Diplomatic Initiative, and Milosevic
Accedes to G8 Peace Proposal
The last, fourth, phase of U.S. involvement in the Kosovo crisis was marked by the threephased military coercion carried by NATO, also known as Operation Allied Force, and
the diplomatic initiative by Russia. The military pressure and diplomatic initiative ended
by Milosevic finally acceding to the G8 peace proposal.

4.6.1 Operation Allied Force
The U.S.-led NATO air campaign in Serbia, officially named Operation Allied Force
(OAF), lasted from March 24 until June 10, 1999. The political goal of this military
operation was to coerce Milosevic to accept the Rambouillet agreement using gradual
escalation of a bombing campaign. More precisely, the two main goals were for

409

See Frontline, “Interview: Richard Holbrooke,” PBS, accessed July 20, 2020,
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/holbrooke.html.
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Milosevic to withdraw all Serbian/VJ forces from Kosovo and to accept the key role of
NATO as a peacekeeping force.410
The first phase of OAF, from March 24 to March 27, 1999, took aim at fifty
NATO-approved targets, focusing on the integrated Serbian air defense system and
military facilities.411 This phase, which included only restricted air strikes and lasted four
days, did not coerce Milosevic to accept the Rambouillet agreement.412 The start of the
NATO air campaign, in turn, intensified the Serbian/VJ forces ethnic cleansing
operations against the Kosovo Albanians.413 The NATO bombing, therefore, initially
deepened the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo; within a week, the number of Kosovo
Albania refugees in neighboring North Macedonia, Albania, and Montenegro swelled to
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hundreds of thousands.414 The U.S.-led alliance responded to the escalation of violence in
Kosovo by expanding NATO’s target list, marking the beginning of phase II of OAF. The
targets in phase II included the police, military and security headquarters in Belgrade,
TV/radio stations and towers, oil refineries and dual-use factories.415 The targets also
included the headquarters of two political parties led by Milosevic and his wife Mira
Markovic.416 Milosevic’s official residence was also removed from the prohibited target
list and bombed on April 23.417 Despite the increased and expanded number of targets, by
April 24 the second phase of NATO bombing had not compelled Milosevic to sign the
agreement.418
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During the Washington/NATO 50th Anniversary Summit, from April 23 to April
25, 1999, President Clinton and his NATO allies concluded that the prolonged Kosovo
crisis jeopardized NATO credibility and reputation.419 Therefore, the United States and
its NATO allies became even more committed to “victory” in Kosovo. This would
include additional economic sanctions on FRY/Serbia, which consequently meant
additional economic pressure on the citizens, and a further expanded NATO target list,
including air strikes against railways, bridges, and Serbia’s electric grid.420 This marked

bombing of Serb TV stations, despite the criticism that the TV stations were civilian
targets. President Clinton said, “Serb television is an essential instrument of Mr.
Milosevic’s command and control. He uses it to spew hatred and to (…) spread
disinformation. He does not use it to show all the Kosovar villages he has burned, to
show the mass graves, to show the children that have been raped by the soldiers that he
sent there.” See, John F. Harris, “Clinton Urges Patience With NATO Bombing
Campaign,” Washington Post, April 25, 1999, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/inatl/longterm/balkans/stories/clinton25.htm.
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international community.” See, “Washington Summit [April 23, 1999],” NATO, last
updated November 6, 2008,
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The conflict in Kosovo became a reality for a majority of the residents of Serbia,
especially residents of three major Serbian cities (Belgrade, Nis, and Novi Sad) when
NATO bombers targeted (successfully) Serbia’s power grid and millions of civilians
across the Serbia were without electricity and water. With 80 percent of Serbia’s electric
power being interrupted, the Serbian population started to feel the pain of the violence
their government was conducting in Kosovo. NATO supreme commander, General
Wesley Clark, insisted that NATO’s top priority was to “chase out of Kosovo” the
Yugoslav Third Army. However, as was confirmed by NATO senior officials, the NATO
goal was also to damage the quality of everyday life and encourage public disaffection
with the government of Slobodan Milosevic. It is significant that at the beginning of the
NATO bombing campaign the majority of the population blamed the United States and
its allies for the hardship, but this would gradually change. The first sign of public

164

the third phase of OAF, which started on April 25 and lasted until June 10. In May,
NATO came closely to doubling the attacks on the targets in Serbia and increased by half
the number of missions flown.421As the number and intensity of air strikes escalated, the
possibility of potential hitting the wrong target increased too. When, on May 7, a U.S. B2 stealth fighter, bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, killing three Chinese
citizens, NATO’s official statement, as well as the statements made by President Clinton
and CIA Director George Tenet, was that it regretted this mistake.422 As a result, NATO
suspended all strikes around Belgrade for three days. However, the bombing of the
embassy produced controversial news and reports, one stating that NATO deliberately

dissatisfaction with the government of Milosevic came when several hundred army
reservists, scheduled to return to Kosovo, as well as the relatives of those who did not
return from Kosovo took to the streets in the Serbian town of Krusevac. Demonstrations,
although peaceful, were a sign that the public was slowly breaking away from support for
or indifference towards the government of Slobodan Milosevic. However, it was not
sufficient to bring any change towards Milosevic’s policy in Kosovo. See, for example,
Philip Bennett and Steve Coll, “NATO Warplanes Jolt Yugoslav Power Grid,”
Washington Post, May 25, 1999,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/inatl/longterm/Balkans/stories/belgrade052599.h
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High-Profile Maverick,” New York Times, April 29, 1999,
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Deliberately,” Guardian, October 16, 1999,
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bombed the embassy “after discovering it was being used to transmit Yugoslav army (VJ)
communications.”423 The bombing of the embassy also slowed down an attempt by the
American and Russian diplomats to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis in Kosovo.

4.6.2 Russia’s Diplomatic Initiative
Prior to OAF, the Clinton administration hoped that Russia would participate in the
Washington summit, as this summit was not just about the future of NATO and NATORussia relations, but also about the future of U.S.-Russia relations. Since Russia strongly
opposed OAF, no Russian representative was sent to participate in the summit.424
However, on April 25, during the last day of the summit, President Yeltsin called
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President Clinton and they agreed that the Kosovo crisis had to be brought to an end, and
Yeltsin assured Clinton that Russia would extend only humanitarian air to Serbia.425
Yeltsin, under pressure from the Russian nationalists and a rise of anti-NATO and antiAmerican sentiment in Russia, initially insisted that the NATO airstrikes in Kosovo
against the fellow Slavs had to stop immediately. After President Clinton reiterated that
Milosevic first had to agree to withdraw all Serbian/VJ forces from Kosovo and stop
atrocities, Yeltsin argued that more than just airstrikes had to be done to persuade
Milosevic to stop the violence in Kosovo. Yeltsin suggested that the Russian presidential
envoy to the Balkans Victor Chernomyrdin, also a former prime minister of Russia and
Yeltsin’s close political ally, work with his U.S. counterpart on a peaceful settlement of
the Kosovo conflict. Yeltsin also mentioned that Chernomyrdin met with Milosevic on
April 24, and Milosevic was ready to accept four out of five proposed points discussed
between Secretary Albright and Foreign Minister Ivanov. Milosevic, most notably,
insisted that the peacekeeping operations in Kosovo should be under UN auspices and
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June 6, 1999, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1999/06/06/the-kosovopeace-deal/8d8de6c4-561c-4bd9-af60-6937ec438028/.
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with Russian participation.426 During the phone conversation, Presidents Clinton and
Yeltsin agreed that a joint diplomatic initiative should be given a chance. However,
President Clinton was clear that the United States would not compromise on two issues:
The withdrawal of all Serbian/VJ troops (the stress was on ‘all’) and the key NATO role
in peacekeeping force in Kosovo.427
On May 4, Chernomyrdin, in capacity of Russian presidential envoy to the
Balkans, traveled to Washington to deliver a letter to President Clinton in which
President Yeltsin proposed a cease-fire in Kosovo and requested President Clinton to
name a U.S. envoy, preferably Vice President Al Gore, to help Russia’s diplomatic
effort.428 President Clinton chose Assistant Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, a leading
Soviet specialist and President Clinton’s close advisor, as a U.S. envoy.429 On
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Al Gore and Victor Chernomyrdin as a welcoming precondition for successful
collaboration in finding diplomatic solution to the Kosovo crisis. See, Frontline,
“Interview: Madeleine Albright,” PBS, accessed June 20, 2020,
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/albright.html.
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See Frontline, “Interview: Strobe Talbott,” PBS, access July 20, 2020,
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/talbott.html.
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Chernomyrdin’s insistence that an additional international diplomat, preferably from a
non-NATO country, should join the diplomatic effort of the United States and Russia,
Secretary Albright proposed that Martti Ahtisaari, President of Finland, join
Chernomyrdin and Talbott. Secretary Albright noted that Finland was a non-aligned
country, and, at the same time, a member of the European Union. Furthermore, President
Ahtisaari was a person with immense standing in international arena as well as a tough
negotiator. Chernomyrdin agreed to Ahtisaari joining this diplomatic initiative.430
As a result of collaboration between Talbott, Chernomyrdin, and Athisarri, on
May 6 a peace plan was released at a Group of Eight (G8) Foreign Ministers meeting
(comprising the United States, Canada, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, Germany, France,
and Russia). The peace plan, summarized in seven general points, “modified the
Rambouillet Accords to allow the UN Security Council determine the make-up of
peacekeeping” and to affirm “the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity” for
Serbia.431 The Foreign Ministers from the G8 nations unanimously agreed that there is a
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Ibid. See also Frontline, “Interview: Madeleine Albright,” PBS, accessed July 16,
2020, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/albright.html.
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See G7 Information Center, “G8 Foreign Ministers’ Meetings: Statement by the
Chairman on the Conclusion of the Meeting of the G8 Foreign Ministers on the
Petersburg, May 6, 1999,” University of Toronto-G7 Research Group, accessed March
21, 2021, http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/fm990506.htm The seven general principles
adopted by the G8 Ministers were: (1) Immediate and verifiable end of violence and
repression in Kosovo; (2) Withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police and paramilitary
forces; (3) Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presence,
endorsed and adopted by the United Nations, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of
the common objectives; (4) Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo to be
decided by the Security Council of the United Nations to ensure conditions for peaceful
and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo; (5) The safe and free return of all refugees
and displaced persons and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid
organizations; (6) A political process towards the establishment of an interim political
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need for an international military presence to keep peace in Kosovo and accepted the
seven-point peace plan.432 This was significant because it demonstrated that Russia
supported the effort led by the United Sates for the international military presence in
Kosovo, as opposed to Milosevic’s insistance that no international military force would
be allowed in Kosovo.433
Despite that the proposed peace plan was a step forward in the joint attempt to
bring the Kosovo crisis to an end, there were significant differences between the United
States and Russia in their approach to the Kosovo crisis and these differences had to be
bridged. The two main issues being: the composition of the international forces in
Kosovo (especially the role of NATO) and the fact that the seven-point agreement did not
“explicitly call for the complete withdrawal of Serbian/VJ forces from Kosovo,” as
favored by Russia, but opposed by the United States. The argument consistently
presented by the Clinton administration, including President Clinton and especially
Secretary Albright, was that if NATO did not have the key role in peacekeeping in

framework agreement providing for substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full
account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and
the demilitarization of Kosovo; (7) Comprehensive approach to the economic
development and stabilization of the crisis region.
432
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Kosovo the KLA would not, out of fear, disarm, and the Kosovo Albanian refugees
would be reluctant to return home, therefore, prolonging the refugee crisis in the
region.434
On May 20, 1999, Chernomyrdin personally presented the G8 peace plan to
Milosevic.435 The follow up meeting between Milosevic and Chernomyrdin was on May
28, 1999, when Chernomyrdin expressed his commitment to negotiations despite
Milosevic being indicted for war crimes and despite Milosevic refusing to accept
complete withdrawal of Serbian/VJ forces and the key role of NATO in peacekeeping
force to follow Serbian withdrawal. 436 Strobe Talbott, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State
and one of the three main negotiators in this diplomatic effort to bring the crisis to an end,
was not pleased by Chernomyrdin’s meeting with Milosevic. Talbott stressed that NATO
demanded a complete withdrawal of Serbian/VJ forces from Kosovo and Chernomyrdin
had to represent not only Russia, but also of the United States and NATO.437
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4.6.3 Milosevic Accepted the G8 Peace Proposal
As Chernomyrdin was preparing to make one more trip to Belgrade to meet with
Milosevic and to persuade him to accept the G8 proposed peace agreement, he wanted to
make sure that the United States, represented by Talbott, would negotiate the “all” word;
that is, the United Sates insisted that “all” Serbian/VJ forces would have to withdraw
from Kosovo. After a day of negotiations between Chernomyrdin and Talbott, Russia
accepted that the word “all” would have to stay in the agreement. Talbott was clear that
Milosevic’s refusal to accept the agreement, which included that “all” Serbian/VJ troops
would have to be pulled out from Kosovo, would result in NATO’s next step, moving
from “an air war to a ground war.”438
As Chernomyrdin, this time accompanied by Finish President Ahtisaari, was
flying to Belgrade, the government of Germany received a letter from the FRY
government. The letter stated that President Slobodan Milosevic would withdraw the
troops from Kosovo. However, President Milosevic would only accept the United

438

See Frontline, “Interview: Strobe Talbott,” PBS, access July 20, 2020,
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Nations presence in Kosovo.439 On June 3, 1999, Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari were in
Belgrade meeting with Milosevic. As Chernomyrdin pointed out, Milosevic considered
NATO an aggressor and Milosevic did not trust NATO to be an honest broker. According
to Chernomyrdin, Milosevic said, “I do not believe Western Alliance. (…) They will
occupy Kosovo (…).” Chernomyrdin assured Milosevic that Russia, by participating in
the peacekeeping troops, as agreed and compromised by the United Sates, was also a
guarantor that the agreement would be executed.440 Athissari read to Milosevic the
agreement, line by line, answering Milosevic’s questions and insisting that the agreement
was the best offer Milosevic would get.441 Milosevic finally acquiesced and signed the
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G8 peace proposal.442 However, President Clinton insisted that the NATO air campaign
(OAF) continue until “Serb forces begin a verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo.”443
The NATO air campaign in Serbia officially ended on June 10, 1999, when
NATO Secretary General Javier Solana confirmed that Milosevic complied with the
demands to withdraw the Serbian/VJ troops from Kosovo and requested the suspension
of NATO bombing. On the same day, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1244
permitting the deployment of the international military (KFOR) and civil forces in
Kosovo (UNMIK).444
In his address to the nation on June 10, 1999, Milosevic claimed that the country
was defended, and the territorial integrity could never be questioned again; it was
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guaranteed by the G8 nations and the UN.445 On June 12, 1999, NATO and Russian
ground forces entered Kosovo.446

4.7 The CD Triangle and U.S. Coercive Strategies in Phases II, III, and IV
As discussed in Chapter 2, the CD Triangle predicts that coercive diplomacy will succeed
if the following conditions are present: First, the target perceives the threats as credible,
that is, the coercer succeeds in communicating the will to use force. Second, the target
perceives assurances as credible, that is, the target trusts the coercer that the coercer will
not change its objectives and will not change its demands. Third, the international
environment favors the coercer, that is, there are no global or regional spoilers willing to
balance the coercer’s threats.
In phases II, III, and IV, the United Sates used military threats and limited force to
coerce Milosevic to end the crisis in Kosovo (see Table 4.1). In phase II, U.S. strategy to
coerce Milosevic to comply with UNSC Resolution 1199 included NATO issuing an
ACTREQ for a limited air option as well as a phased air campaign, followed by an
ACTOR authorizing the NATO forces to carry out the attacks in Serbia. The Contact
Group statement demanding that Milosevic comply with UNSC Resolution 1199
enhanced the credibility of the threats by showing a united front between the United
States and Russia, a potential spoiler/balancer of the coercive threats. The Clinton
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administration also dispatched Ambassador Richard Holbrooke to persuade Milosevic
that complying with the demands was less costly than to resist them.

Table 2. Summary of U.S. Coercive Strategies in Kosovo, Phases II, III, and IV
Row
No.

1

Episodes
of Coercion

Phase II:
The October
Agreement
(October
1998)

2

Phase III:
Ramboulliet
/ Paris
Negotiations
(February
1999)

3

Phase IV:
OAF-Phase
I
(March 2427, 1999)

4

Phase IV:
OAF-Phase
II
(March 28April 25,
1999)

CT

1

1

CA

1

0

ISE

Outcome
CD

1

1

1

1
(LF)

0

1

1
(LF)

0

1

0

0
(NA)

0
(NA)
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Outcome
MC

0
(NA)

0
(NA)

0

0

Comments
Holbrooke-Milosevic:
UNSCR 1199 backed by
NATO’s
ACTWARN/ACTEQ;
Holbrooke persuaded
Milosevic that the
military threats were
credible, and the
assurances were valid.
Serbian/VJ troops pulled
out from Kosovo to the
pre-March 1998 level.
U.S. negotiating team
(led by Secretary
Albright)-Serbian
Delegation/Milosevic:
Efforts at coercive
diplomacy by
threatening force.
Milosevic refused to
sign the Rambouillet
peace agreement.
U.S.-led NATO military
coercion; Milosevic
refused to sign the
Rambouillet peace
agreement.
U.S.-led NATO military
coercion; increased
military pressure;
Milosevic refused to
sign the Rambouillet
peace agreement.

5

Phase IV:
OAF-Phase
III/ Russia’s
Diplomatic
Initiative
(April 25June 10)

1
(LF)

1

1

0
(NA)

1

U.S.-led NATO military
coercion; Russia’s
diplomatic initiative and
the assurances extended
to Milosevic;
Chernomyrdin-Athisaari
meeting; Milosevic
signed the G8 peace
proposal.

*CT: Credible Threats; CA: Credible Assurances; ISE: International Strategic
Environment Favoring Coercer; CD: Coercive Diplomacy; MC: Military Coercion
** 1=Success without the use Limited Force; 1(LF)= Success with the use of Limited
Force; 0=Failure; NA=Not attempted.

Holbrooke, as stated by Milosevic, assured Milosevic that the territorial integrity
of Serbia would be preserved, that is the coercer assured the target that the demands
would not be changed. As predicted by the CD Triangle, Milosevic acquiesced to the
demands and signed the October agreement. However, the October agreement fell apart
when the KLA, taking advantages of the ceasefire, regained the territory, and
Ambassador Holbrooke publicly denounced giving any assurances to Milosevic.
In phase III, the U.S. negotiating team, led by Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright, used military threats to coerce Milosevic to sign the Rambouillet peace
agreement; most notably, to accept the NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo. Insisting
on a NATO air campaign in Kosovo with or without Russia’s approval enhanced the
credibility of military threats; however, it alienated Russia and signaled to the target
(Serbia) that Russia could be persuaded to balance against the coercer. Although
Milosevic perceived the military threats as credible, Milosevic did not trust the U.S.
negotiators; Milosevic perceived that the U.S. demanded a NATO presence in Kosovo as
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a step towards Kosovo’s independence. Milosevic insisted on assurances that Kosovo
would gain autonomy, but not independence; assurances the United States was not
willing to extend. The coercive strategy employed by the United Sates in phase III, as
predicted by the CD Triangle, failed to coerce Milosevic to sign the Rambouillet
agreement.
In phase IV, the U.S.-led NATO air campaign in Serbia, officially named
Operation Allied Force (OAF), had a primary goal of coercing Milosevic to sign the
Rambouillet agreement. From the available evidence one can conclude that the
international environment favored the coercer. Although Russia, a potential spoiler,
officially announced that it would veto a UN Security Council resolution to authorize the
use of force in Kosovo, President Yeltsin signaled that Russia would not interfere
militarily if NATO proceeded with limited air strikes without a UN mandate.
OAF had three phases: Efforts at military coercion in phase I of OAF (March 2427, 1999), focusing on the Serbian air defense system and military facilities, did not
coerce Milosevic to accept the Rambouillet agreement. It initiated Serbian/VJ offensive
in Kosovo and deepened the humanitarian crisis. In phase II of OAF (March 28-April
25), the target list was expanded to TV/radio stations and towers, oil refineries and dualuse factories. However, Milosevic refused to sign the Rambouillet agreement. In phase
III of OAF (April 26-June 10), the NATO target list was further expanded, including air
strikes against railways, bridges, and Serbia’s electric grid. In this phase, Russia’s
diplomatic initiative supported by the United Sates, produced the modified Rambouillet
peace agreement, known as the G8 peace proposal. Most notably, under the G8 peace
proposal, the peacekeeping operations in Kosovo had to be under UN auspices and with
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Russian participation. Russia’s negotiator Chernomyrdin assured Milosevic that Russia,
by participating in the peacekeeping troops, was also a guarantor of the agreement, most
notably by increasing the cost for the United Sates, the coercer, not to comply with its
promise. In phase III of OAF, the United Sates succeeded at coercing Milosevic to sign
the G8 agreement. Milosevic acquiesced only after all three conditions, predicted by the
CD triangle, were present. However, what made the third phase of OAF unique is that the
assurances were not given by the coercer, as predicted by the CD Triangle, but by the
third party.

4.8 Conclusion
This chapter examined U.S. coercive strategies during the Kosovo crisis. The United
States’ participation was divided into four phases. In phase I, the Clinton administration
supported the Contact Group efforts at non-military coercion. In phase II, the Clinton
administration used military threats and assurances to successfully coerce Milosevic to
sign the October agreement. In phase III, the Clinton administration’s coercive strategy,
focusing on military threats, did not succeed in coercing Milosevic to sign the
Rambouillet peace agreement. In phase IV, the Clinton administration used limited force
to coerce Milosevic to accept the G8 peace proposal. However, Milosevic acquiesced
only after Russia, a third party, provided credible assurances that Russia, by participating
in the peacekeeping troops, was also a guarantor of the agreement. The CD Triangle
correctly expected that Milosevic would acquiesce only after all three necessary
conditions (credible threats, credible assurances, and the international environment
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favoring coercer) are present. However, the CD Triangle incorrectly anticipated that the
assurances would be given by the coercer.
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CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION

This chapter summarizes the main features of a model for coercive diplomacy in
asymmetric military crises, recapitulates the central finding of the case studies, suggests
avenues for further research and implications for U.S. foreign policy.

5.1 Revisiting the Research Question and Hypotheses
In coercive diplomacy, a coercer employs the threat of force to get a target to change its
behavior. Therefore, coercive diplomacy, if applied in asymmetric interstate crises,
should be easy for great powers due to their military might. This dissertation began with
the perplexed observation that the great powers, including the United States, have a poor
record in coercing militarily weaker opponents, who often rejected coercive threats and
refused to comply with their demands. Current literature on coercion offers a significant
analysis of an asymmetric strategic coercion in general and coercive diplomacy in
particular; however, there is little consensus among scholars about why great powers fail
to coerce weak states.447 Therefore, the key goal of this dissertation is to answer the
following question: Why do weak states resist coercive threats from a militarily superior
state, and under what conditions do weaker states concede?
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Building upon existing research on coercion, credibility and reputation in
international relations, this dissertation proposed the Coercive Diplomacy (CD) Triangle,
a model for coercive diplomacy in the asymmetric military crises. The CD Triangle
predicts that if the following three conditions are present, the target/weak state will most
likely acquiesce to the demands of the coercer/great power: Credible threats, credible
assurances, and the international strategic environment favoring the coercer. Where
credible threats are crucial to convince the target that the coercer has the capability and
will to inflict pain, credible assurances are necessary to convince the target that the
demands and objectives are limited and true to those stated by the coercer. Moreover, an
important component of credible assurances is trust. This dissertation argues that the trust
felt by the target that the coercer will not expand its demands shapes the target’s behavior
in a predictable way. Trust will influence the target’s cost-benefit equation in a
predictable way. The target will acquiesce to coercer’s demands if the target trusts the
coercer that it will not change the cost-benefits equation, where expanded demands mean
increased cost for the target. If the target does not trust that the coercer’s assurances are
true, the target will resist to acquiescing to the coercer’s demands and the target will look
for the regional or global spoiler/s to balance the coercer’s threat. The spoilers are those
states that may perceive the failure of coercion (that is, escalation of crisis to war) as
beneficial to their regional or international standing.
To test the explanatory power of the CD Triangle, this dissertation analyzes U.S.
coercive strategies in two case studies: the Bosnian War (1993-1995) and the Kosovo
Crisis (1997-1998). These cases share an effort by the United States, a great power, to
employ coercive strategies after the Cold War against weaker states.
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5.2 Summary of the Findings
5.2.1 The Bosnian War
U.S. involvement in the Bosnian War was divided into four phases. In phases I and II, the
Bush administration and the successor Clinton administration supported the United
Nation/European Community diplomatic initiative and the use of economic sanctions to
isolate Serbia led by Slobodan Milosevic and neutralize his support for the Bosnian
Serbs. This strategy was unsuccessful in preventing and ending the war in Bosnia.
In phase III, the Clinton administration initiated the formation of the six-nation
Contact Group for the Balkans, extended diplomatic pressure on the Bosnian Serbs and
Milosevic to accept the Contact Group plan, and implicitly supported the Croatian and
Bosnian Federation’s attempts to change the balance of power favoring the Bosnian
Serbs. This strategy was unsuccessful in ending the war and bringing the Bosnian Serbs
to the negotiating table.
In phase IV, after war in Bosnia had escalated to the point that U.S. credibility
was put in question, the United States took the lead. In this phase, there were three
distinct episodes of coercion. First, in August 1995, the Clinton administration employed
coercive diplomacy to coerce the Bosnia Serbs to stop the siege of Sarajevo. This episode
of coercion started as a U.S.-led attempt to deter the Bosnia Serbs from attacking the UN
safe area Gorazde. After the fall of UN safe areas Srebrenica and Zepa, the NATO
leaders and the representatives of the UN and Russia met for an emergency conference.
After the conference, on July 21, 1995, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher
declared that any future attacks by the Bosnian Serbs on Gorazde would be met by
substantial and decisive NATO air strikes. The credibility of this military threat was
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enhanced by UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali’s agreement to delegate UN strike
authority (that is, his veto and approval power) to the overall military commander for
UNPROFOR. This, insisted on by the United States, made the NATO-UN coordination
of air strike approval and execution faster. The presence of Russia at the meeting was a
signal to the Bosnian Serbs and Milosevic that Russia supported the U.S. initiative and
diminished the role of Russia as a potential spoiler. On August 1, under pressure from the
United States, the NATO Council expanded this military threat to Sarajevo, where it was
demanded that the Bosnian Serbs stop attacks on Sarajevo and Bihac. However, the
fighting in western Bosnia continued as did the siege of Sarajevo. The siege of Sarajevo
culminated on August 28, 1995, when a mortar bomb hit a marketplace, killing thirtyseven civilians. The CD Triangle suggests that credible threats and the international
environment, without the coercer providing credible assurance, were not sufficient for the
success of coercive diplomacy.
The alternative explanations highlight that the fighting intensified, and coercive
diplomacy failed, because: First, the Bosnian Federation military offensive, as well as the
Croatian Army Operation Storm pushed Bosnian Serbs onto the offensive. Second, the
Bosnian Serbs, seeing that war in Bosnia would have to come to an end before the
coming winter, were trying to hold onto as much territory as possible before the peace
negotiations. However, based on the available evidence one can conclude that in August
1995 the Clinton administration was finalizing its new Endgame strategy, which relied on
the use of limited force, and the administration did not attempt to negotiate with the
Bosnian Serbs directly.
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Second, the shelling of Sarajevo on August 28, 1995, triggered the employment of
the Clinton administration’s Endgame strategy, that is, a strategy of military coercion, to
coerce the Bosnia Serbs to stop the siege of Sarajevo and proceed with political
negotiations. The strategy had two components: First, use of limited force; that is, the
NATO air campaign (also known as Operation Deliberate Force), which commenced on
August 30, 1995. Second, the diplomatic engagement with, most notably, Russia, Serbia,
and the Bosnian Serbs. The first episode of military coercion was on August 30, when
U.S. negotiator Richard Holbrooke met with President of Serbia Slobodan Milosevic,
representing the Bosnian Serbs. During this meeting, the Bosnian Serbs did not acquiesce
to the demand to end the siege of Sarajevo insisting on assurances that after withdrawal
the Bosnian Federal Army would not take over the vacant territory. Holbrooke refused to
provide assurances.
Third, the second episode of military coercion was on September 14, when U.S.
negotiator Richard Holbrooke met with the Bosnia Serbs and Slobodan Milosevic. This
time the Bosnian Serbs and Milosevic agreed to stop the siege of Sarajevo after the
United States and NATO made assurances that the Russian UNPROFOR troops would
take over the positions vacated by the Bosnian Serbs. As predicted by the CD Triangle,
the target acquiesced after all three postulated conditions were present. The alternative
explanations are: First, the Bosnian Federation ground offensive taking over large
portions of western Bosnia and resulting in significant territory losses on the side of
Bosnian Serbs led to the Bosnian Serbs acquiescing to the demands. Second, Milosevic
was eager to have the UN sanctions terminated against FR Yugoslavia/Serbia. However,
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the Clinton administration’s willingness to provide assurances to the Bosnian Serbs
finally made the Bosnia Serbs end the siege of Sarajevo.

5.2.2 The Kosovo Crisis
The U.S. involvement in the Kosovo crisis was divided into four phases. In phase I, the
Clinton administration supported the Contact Group efforts at non-military coercion. In
phase II, the Clinton administration used a strategy of coercive diplomacy and coerced
Milosevic to sign the October agreement. In phase III, the Clinton administration’s
coercive strategy, focusing on military threats, did not succeed in coercing Milosevic to
sign the Rambouillet peace agreement. In phase IV, the Clinton administration used a
strategy of military coercion to coerce Milosevic to accept the G8 peace proposal. During
the Kosovo crisis, there were five distinct episodes of coercion, with the United States as
a leading coercer.
First, in October 1998, U.S. strategy to coerce Milosevic to comply with UNSC
Resolution 1199 included three components: First, use of military threat (NATO issuing
an ACTREQ for a limited air option and a phased air campaign, followed by an ACTOR
authorizing the NATO forces to carry out the attacks in Serbia). Second, the Contact
Group statement demanding that Milosevic comply with UNSC Resolution 1199
enhanced the credibility of the threats by showing a united front between the United
States and Russia, a potential spoiler/balancer of the coercive threats. The Clinton
administration also dispatched Ambassador Richard Holbrooke to Belgrade to meet with
Milosevic. During the meeting, Holbrooke gave Milosevic the option to withdraw the
FRY/Serbian troops from Kosovo, to keep only the pre-March 1998 level of troops, and
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to have an international presence in Kosovo (OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission), or to
face NATO bombing.
However, Holbrooke also assured Milosevic that the territorial integrity of Serbia
would be preserved; that is, the coercer assured the target that the demands would not be
expanded in the future. As predicted by the CD Triangle, Milosevic acquiesced to the
demands and signed the October agreement. However, the October agreement fell apart
when the KLA, taking advantage of the ceasefire, retook the territory. Holbrooke publicly
denounced giving any assurances to Milosevic, and FRY/Serbian troops started an
offensive in Kosovo.
An alternative explanation is that Milosevic, when acquiescing to the demands,
miscalculated the presence of KLA and their commitment to an independent Kosovo.
However, one can argue that this alternative explanation helps to explain why coercive
diplomacy failed, but it does not give a useful insight into why coercive diplomacy
succeeded.
Second, in February 1999, the U.S. negotiating team, led by Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright, used military threats to coerce Milosevic to sign the Rambouillet
peace agreement; most notably, to accept, as a part of the peace agreement, the NATO
peacekeeping force in Kosovo. Insisting on a NATO air campaign in Kosovo with or
without Russia’s approval enhanced the credibility of military threats; however, it could
have alienated Russia, and it could have signaled to the target (Serbia) that Russia could
be persuaded to balance against the coercer. Although Milosevic, in his own words,
understood the threats to be credible, Milosevic did not trust the U.S. negotiators.
Milosevic perceived that the U.S. demanded a NATO presence in Kosovo as a step
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towards Kosovo’s independence. Milosevic insisted on assurances that Kosovo would
gain autonomy, but not independence; assurances the United States was unwilling to
extend. The coercive strategy employed by the United States, as predicted by the CD
Triangle, failed to coerce Milosevic to sign the Rambouillet agreement. An alternative
explanation is that the Clinton administration was not committed to the success of
coercive diplomacy, focusing on elevating coercive threat to use of limited force; that is,
focusing on the next stage of the coercion. However, one can also conclude from the
available evidence that the Clinton administration did not take into consideration
Milosevic’s “anxiety” about future demands and his distrust after the failed October
agreement.
Third, the U.S.-led NATO air campaign in Serbia, officially named Operation
Allied Force (OAF), had a primary goal of coercing Milosevic to sign the Rambouillet
agreement. Although Russia, a potential spoiler, officially announced that it would veto a
UN Security Council resolution to authorize the use of force in Kosovo, President Yeltsin
signaled that Russia would not interfere militarily if NATO proceeded with limited air
strikes without a UN mandate. Therefore, one can conclude that the international strategic
environment in this phase also favored the coercer. The U.S. attempt to coerce Milosevic
to sign the Rambouillet agreement has three distinct episodes of coercion.
In the first phase of OAF, that is, the first episode of military coercion (March 2427, 1999), the focus was on using limited force; that is, the NATO air campaign targeted
the Serbian air defense system and military facilities. The Clinton administration,
expecting that Milosevic would acquiesce after three days of the bombing, did not
attempt any direct talks with Milosevic.
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In the second phase of OAF, that is the second episode of military coercion
(March 28-April 25), NATO expanded the target list to TV/radio stations and towers, oil
refineries, and dual-use facilities. However, Milosevic did not acquiesce to the demands,
and the Clinton administration did not attempt any direct talks with Milosevic.
In the third phase of OAF, that is, the third episode of military coercion (April 26June 10), the NATO target list was further expanded, including air strikes against
railways, bridges, and Serbia’s electric grid. In this episode, Russia’s diplomatic
initiative, supported by the United States, produced the modified Rambouillet peace
agreement, known as the G8 peace proposal. Most notably, under the G8 peace proposal,
the peacekeeping operations in Kosovo had to be under UN auspices and with Russian
participation. Russia’s negotiator Chernomyrdin assured Milosevic that Russia, by
participating in the peacekeeping troops, was also a guarantor of the agreement; most
notably by increasing the cost for the United States, the coercer, not to comply with its
assurances. In this episode of coercion, the United States succeeded at coercing Milosevic
to sign the G8 agreement. Milosevic acquiesced after all three conditions, predicted by
the CD Triangle, were present. However, the CD Triangle did not predict that the
assurances would be given by the third party. The alternative explanations why Milosevic
acquiesced to the demands are: First, the threat of a NATO ground invasion, which
intensified in the third phase of OAF. However, based on the evidence, one has to point
out that a NATO ground invasion was evaluated by the Serbian/VJ top commanders and
Milosevic as an opportunity for the Vietnamization of Kosovo.
Second, the domestic pressure due to economic hardship caused by economic
sanctions and NATO bombing. More precisely, pressure from the elite and public on
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Milosevic to accept the peace agreement, even if this meant the presence of foreign
troops in Kosovo. However, for Milosevic remaining in power was directly linked with
his ability to keep Kosovo as an integral part of Serbia. Although the pressure on the
Serbian population was significant, there was no domestic group that could overthrow
Milosevic’s regime. Milosevic, despite the intense bombing and economic sanctions, had
control of the military and government.

5.2.3 Comparing the Case Studies and the Episodes of Coercion
A comparison of the two case studies and eight episodes of coercion reveals the
following:
First, as predicted by the CD Triangle, the three conditions (credible threats,
credible assurances, and the international environment favoring the coercer) were present
when coercive diplomacy and military coercion succeeded (see Table 3 and Table 4).
Second, coercive diplomacy was successful in one out of three episodes of
coercive diplomacy (see Table 3) with a success rate of 33 percent. Military coercion was
successful in two out of five episodes of military coercion (see Table 4) with a success
rate of 40 percent. These success rates affirm the findings that coercive diplomacy,
defined as the use of military threats only or the use of limited force, in general, has a low
success rate.448 However, the application of the model for coercive diplomacy in
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asymmetric military crisis (that is, the CD Triangle), shows that unsuccessful coercive
diplomacy in two out of three episodes led to escalation of coercion from use of military
threats to use of limited force despite the target “believing” that threats were credible and
despite the target expressing the “need” for assurance that the coercer would not expand
its demands. Furthermore, in all three unsuccessful cases of military coercion, the coercer
increased the application of military force, despite the target “believing” that threats were
credible and despite the target expressing the “need” for assurance that the coercer would
not expand its demands.
Third, the lack of trust was an important issue that influenced the weak state to
fear the great power’s intentions. That is, the target’s “anxiety” that acquiescing to the
demands would lead to more demands tomorrow manifested in the target’s insistence on
assurances. In in the fourth phase of U.S. involvement in the Bosnian War the Clinton
administration made a significant attempt to publicly elevate Milosevic from a war
criminal to a peacemaker as a part of the administration’s strategy to ease Milosevic’s
“anxiety” that U.S. intentions were to end the war in Bosnia, but not to change the regime
in Serbia. However, an unsuccessful attempt to coerce Milosevic to sign the Rambouillet
agreement points to the Clinton administration refusing to give assurances that the United
States was committed to the autonomy of Kosovo, as opposed to independence, as well as
what Milosevic saw as broken commitments when the KLA recaptured the vacant
territory.

War: Why Weak States Resist the United States, (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2015), 5-6.
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Table 3. Summary of U.S. Coercive Diplomacy in Bosnia and Kosovo
Row
No.
1

2

3

Episode of Coercive Diplomacy
Bosnia, Phase IV:
U.S./NATO-Bosnian Serbs,
July 21/August 1, 1995
Kosovo, Phase II:
U.S.(Holbrooke)/Serbia (Milosevic) The
October Agreement,
October 1998
Kosovo, Phase III:
Ramboulliet/Paris Negotiations
February 1999

CT

CA

ISE

Outcome
CD

1

0

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

0

Table 4. Summary of U.S. Military Coercion in Bosnia and Kosovo
Row
No.
1

2

3
4

5

Episode of Military Coercion
Bosnia, Phase IV:
U.S. (Holbrooke)-Bosnian Serbs/Milosevic,
August 30-31, 1999
(The “Endgame” Strategy)
Bosnia, Phase IV:
U.S. (Holbrooke)-Milosevic,
September 14-17, 1999
(The “Endgame” Strategy)
Kosovo, Phase IV:
OAF, Phase I,
March 24-27, 1999
Kosovo, Phase IV:
OAF, Phase II,
March 28-April 25, 1999
Kosovo, Phase IV:
OAF, Phase III/ Russia’s Diplomatic
Initiative,
April 25-June 10

CT

CA

ISE

Outcome
MC

1
(LF)

0

1

0

1
(LF)

1

1

1

1
(LF)

0

1

0

1
(LF)

0

1

0

1
(LF)

1

1

1

*CT: Credible Threats; CA: Credible Assurances; ISE: International Strategic
Environment Favoring Coercer; CD: Coercive Diplomacy; MC: Military Coercion; D:
Deterrence. ** 1=Success without the use of limited force; 1(LF)= Success with the
limited use of force; 0=Failure; NA=Not attempted.
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5.3 Contributions and Suggestions for Further Research
This dissertation contributes to the coercion literature in two respects. First, this
dissertation adds to the efforts to analyze the effectiveness of coercive diplomacy by
analyzing when and why weak states acquiesce, and when and why coercer states decide
to escalate coercion from using military threats to using limited force. Second, this
dissertation adds to the literature on reputation by showing that the coercer being
perceived as “trustworthy” is relevant for the target’s “need” for assurances.
Based on the findings, two broad avenues for further research are suggested: The
first relates to the relevance of reputation for determining the effectiveness of coercive
diplomacy. There has been a significant attempt to research the relevance of reputation
for resolve for determining the credibility of coercive threats, as related to the success of
coercive diplomacy.449 However, the empirical findings in this dissertation point at the
relevance of reputation for being “trustworthy” for determining the credibility of
assurances as related to the success of coercive diplomacy.450
The second relates to the theory of coercion and the concepts employed.
Distinguishing between the use of threats only and the use of limited force has
implications for how strategies of coercion are employed. Escalation from coercive
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diplomacy to military coercion usually is an attempt by the coercer to increase the
credibility of threats. However, more comprehensive study should be conducted to
determine whether the coercer misjudges or disregards the target’s “need” for assurances.

5.4 Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy
This dissertation analyzes two cases in which the United States employed coercive
diplomacy and military coercion in asymmetric interstate crises in the decade after the
Cold War. The United States eventually succeeded in ending the war in Bosnia and
ending the crisis in Kosovo, but not before the United States failed in employing coercive
diplomacy, putting its reputation as a global power in question. Based on the findings,
there are two important foreign policy implications that can be drawn from the model of
coercive diplomacy in asymmetric military crises.
First, the U.S. leaders and policymakers should not underestimate the weak
state’s concerns that acquiescing to demands will lead to more demands tomorrow.
Moreover, when coercion is applied in asymmetric interstate crises, the threats should be
combined with credible assurances that the survival of the target would not be put into
question if the target complies with the demands.
Second, the leaders and policymakers must understand that coercive diplomacy
and military coercion employ force to convince the target to comply with the demands
not to force the target to comply with the demands. Therefore, the military should not be
given the tasks that are diplomatic in nature.
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